



Australian Government



NATIONAL
ARCHIVES
OF AUSTRALIA

Your story, our history

These copies are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) you should familiarise yourself with any copyright obligations.

NAA: A1838, 175/11/20/15 PART 1

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 175/11/20/15 PART 1

Barcode: 424208

Number of pages: 236

Australian policy in relation to the Israeli attack on Egypt, United Kingdom-French intervention and related developments

SUBJECT: *Australian Policy in Relation to the Israeli
Attack on Egypt, U.K./French Intervention and Related
Developments*

SECRET.

RELATED PAPERS

FORMER PAPERS

LATER PAPERS *PART 2*

ARCHIVAL ACTION

RP

FILE No.	SUBJECT:
<i>175/11/20</i>	<i>TOP SECRET</i>
<i>175/11/20/1A</i>	<i>TOP SECRET - U.K./FRENCH INTERVENTION, MINISTERIAL MESSAGES</i>
<i>183/4/7/3/3</i>	<i>EGYPT - NATIONALISATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL</i>

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared
-----------	-------------	------	----------------------------	--------------	-----------	-------------	------	----------------------------	--------------	-----------	-------------	------	----------------------------	--------------

CLOSED

BASEMENT

WARNING
ARCHIVAL FILE
Return to Registrar

Archival Action

RP

CAUTION

This file contains Cabinet Documents

DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE
ARCHIVAL FILE
*PLEASE RETURN TO ARCHIVES
REPOSITORY AFTER USE.

TRIM NO. (Archives use only):

OLD88/... *46505* ...

CLOSED

File No. 175/11/20/15

KEY PAPERS ON FILE

(e.g. Cabinet papers, Policy matters, &c.)

FOLIO No.	SOURCE	DATE	DETAILS

175/11/20/15

PT. NO. /.....

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON 30th October 1956

THIS PART CLOSED ON 8th November 1956

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE PART 2

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

ABK:VA

O. 15056/7/8/9/60/1/2/
3/4/5/6/7/8/9/
70/1

Sent: 8th November, 1956
0040

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

Australia Legation,
ROME.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

Australian Legation,
SAIGON.

Australian Legation,
RIO DE JANEIRO.

Australian Embassy,
BONN.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.

Australian Embassy,
THE HAGUE.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. (For External)

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

U/N. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

You should not attend Soviet reception tomorrow.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(Cost £29.15.9)
8th November, 1956.

SECRET

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME
INF DL MT C&P E AF&ME

203

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SHA.

0.15051/2/3/4/5.

Dated: 8th November, 1956.
0045

TO:

Australian Mission to United
Nations,
NEW YORK....440Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....941

REPEATED TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....2633Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....180Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON....344CONFIDENTIAL. EMERGENCY.

New York pass to Washington and Ottawa.

Egypt-Israel.1. You should oppose the Afro-Asian resolution
(your 819) on the following grounds:-

- (a) it is substantially a repetition of the first Afro-Asian resolution; previously stated objections stand and there is no point in the Assembly repeating itself in a swiftly-moving crisis of great importance;
- (b) given the stated attitude of Israel, the resolution, by requiring the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces, will ensure the resumption of an Egyptian-Israel conflict; it ignores the offer the United Kingdom and France have made, which should be examined;
- (c) more than offer, the Anglo-French forces have ceased fire and the Israelis have ceased fire;
- (d) if the Assembly will prevail upon Egypt to do so, the way is clear for the Assembly to lay the foundations for a new regime of peace and stability;
- (e) taking first things first, the Assembly should concentrate upon the urgent establishment of the International Force and its movement into the area of hostilities. The stated objectives of the Force correspond to what the Afro-Asian resolution seeks to accomplish.

2. Accordingly, you should urge that the 7-Power resolution (your 822) should be given priority.

3. The 7-Power resolution leaves considerable

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.15051/2/3/4/5.

- 2 -

doubt as to the duration of the activities of the Force. On the other hand, the negotiation of an enduring Israel-Arab settlement will be long drawn out. Can we even assume that force will be long enough established to secure the Egyptian Israel border while efforts are made to get this settlement?

4. Without the exact text of paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report, we are not precisely aware of stated functions. In addition, we have the following relatively minor comments:-

- (a) the draft does not to our mind reflect sufficiently the urgency of constituting the Force and getting it into the area of hostilities. You might discuss with friendly delegations an amendment to operative paragraph 3 which would inject a note of urgency;
- (b) it seems peculiar that the Secretary-General should be the Chairman of a Committee of Governments which has political functions as well as the function to advise him. Should the Committee not elect its own Chairman?

5. We have been unable to ascertain United Kingdom or French views or intentions. We do not wish you to vote against the resolution. You should indicate some of our doubts about its effectiveness in facilitating an enduring settlement but vote for it unless the United Kingdom Delegation's instructions make it clear that the United Kingdom will find some important aspect of it to be embarrassing. In this case, you should abstain reiterating Australia's desire to see an effective United Nations force quickly in position as the first step towards a settlement.

Cost £107/18/4

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

201

SEC A/Ss UN@ CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT
G

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WGAL/RON

175/11/20

Memo No.

8th November, 1956

Djakarta
New York
Tel Aviv

575
1690
209

E G Y P T

.....

Enclosed herewith, for your information,
is copy of a Record of Conversation between the
Indonesian Ambassador and the Acting Minister for External
Affairs.

(W.G.A. LANDALE)
for the Secretary

200

CONFIDENTIAL

Submission No.

Copy No.

FOR CABINET

EGYPT-ISRAEL

STATE OF HOSTILITIES

As at Wednesday, 7th November, the following position had been reached:-

- (a) As a result of Israeli action, Egyptian forces had withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula, and Egyptian forces in the Gaza area had surrendered to the Israeli Army.
- (b) After local truce arrangements had proved abortive, British paratroops and seaborne British commando units had attacked Egyptian forces in Port Said. (The capture of Port Said as well as Port Fuad was announced by the United Kingdom-France on 7th November. It was also announced that British and French armoured units were moving on the south-bound road from Port Said to Ismailia.)
- (c) As a result of Anglo-French aerial activity, Egyptian Air Force had been largely destroyed or disabled, mostly while on the ground. The Egyptian naval forces had been sunk, captured or otherwise brought under control.
- (d) Egyptian airfields, including those in and around the Canal Zone, had been bombed by Anglo-French air forces and rendered unusable. Egyptian military installations had likewise been bombed.
- (e) Two-thirds of the Egyptian Army was estimated to remain intact, but these troops were reported to be now spread among Egyptian cities, towns and villages west of the Canal.

/ (f) Anglo

99

SECRET

- (f) Anglo-French losses had been negligible. Israeli losses are not known.

COMPASS OF ANGLO-FRENCH MILITARY ACTION

2. United Kingdom and French military action has been limited by their stated intention to avoid civilian targets, and by the broad nature of their operations which they say has been to safeguard the Suez Canal, and to separate Egyptian-Israeli forces operating on and around it. Anglo-French action was further limited by the United Kingdom statements made yesterday that there would be no further bombing of Egyptian targets except in direct support of military action.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION

3. The Israeli invasion, and the Anglo-French intervention, have been the subject of the following United Nations action, which
..... is dealt with more fully in Appendix "B".

(a) Security Council:

(i) United States Resolution: This was submitted on 30th October. The Security Council was asked to call upon Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice lines and all Members were called upon to refrain from giving aid to Israel. The resolution received seven votes and the United Kingdom and France vetoed it.

(ii) Soviet Resolution: This was submitted on 30th October. It asked the Security Council to call on Israel and Egypt to cease fire and withdraw behind their frontiers. The resolution received seven votes. The United Kingdom and France vetoed it.

/ (iii)

SECRET

198

SECRET

- 3 -

(iii) Yugoslav Resolution: This was submitted on 31st October. It proposed that the General Assembly should meet immediately in emergency session. It received seven votes and, being procedural, it was adopted.

(iv) Soviet Item: By majority vote on 5th November, the Security Council refused to admit for discussion a Soviet item proposing joint United States and Soviet military intervention in the present situation.

(b) General Assembly: Several resolutions have come before the General Assembly, sitting in emergency session, following the Security Council's decision to refer the subject to it.

(i) On 2nd November, after the Anglo-French intervention, but before they had undertaken military action, the General Assembly by majority vote adopted a United States resolution urging the parties to cease fire, to halt the movement of military forces, and to withdraw behind the Armistice lines.

(ii) Two further United States resolutions were submitted on 3rd November. These have not yet been debated and put to the vote. The first dealt with the broad problem of Arab-Israeli relations; the second with the Suez Canal problem.

(iii) The United States agreed that a Canadian resolution, brought forward on the same day, 3rd November, should have priority treatment. The Canadian resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit within forty-eight hours a plan for a United Nations force to secure and supervise the

197

SECRET

/ cessation

SECRET

cessation of hostilities. This resolution was adopted by majority vote.

(iv) Also on 3rd November, the Assembly adopted by majority vote a resolution proposed by nineteen Afro-Asian Members which reaffirmed the United States resolution of 2nd November and called for immediate compliance. The Secretary-General was asked to report on compliance within twelve hours.

(v) Following a report by Mr. Hammarskjöld, Canada, Colombia and Norway on 5th November submitted a resolution which was adopted by majority vote providing for the establishment of a United Nations Command to secure and observe the cessation of hostilities. (It is claimed that this force can be put into position within a few days, and nine countries including Canada, Colombia, Norway, India and Pakistan are ready to supply military units to it totalling 8,000 men.)

(vi) A second Afro-Asian resolution, which has not yet been presented, is being discussed behind the scenes. It condemns Israel and Anglo-French intervention, calls upon Israel to withdraw from Egypt and requires the United Kingdom and France to cease fire and to withdraw their forces from Egypt. (Dr. Walker has reported rumours that differences over the drafting of the resolution developed between the Arab-Asians and the Latin Americans - the latter being annoyed at Arab-Asian abstentions on the resolution condemning the Soviet Union over Hungary.)

/ UNITED NATIONS

SECRET

SECRET

UNITED NATIONS FORCE : BRITISH POSITION

4. The creation of a United Nations force springs from the Canadian resolution of 3rd November (para. 3(b)(iii) above). Four countries (Canada, Norway, Pakistan and Colombia) had yesterday committed themselves to a total of two brigades. Dr. Walker reported yesterday that Mr. Hammarskjöld had approached a number of Governments, including New Zealand, for forces. Walker himself received no approach. Mr. Pearson (Canada) is reported to be working actively with the United Kingdom on the one hand and Mr. Hammarskjöld on the other to further the organisation of the United Nations force. The assumption is being made at the United Nations that the United Nations force can move into the Canal within a few days, but this appears to take no account of problems or organisation.

5. The United Kingdom has throughout welcomed the idea of an international force being interposed between Israel and Egypt. Regarding the effect on its own military action, the United Kingdom has variously stated:

- (a) its acceptance of an international force was subject to limited Anglo-French detachments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, being stationed between Israeli and Egyptian troops until the United Nations force was constituted;
- (b) its military operations would cease as soon as the United Nations endorsed the plan for a United Nations force and Egypt and Israel accepted it;
- (c) if Israel and Egypt accept an unconditional cease fire and if the international force to be set up is competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the first United States resolution (cease fire between Egypt and Israel, withdrawal of forces behind the Armistice lines, re-opening of the Canal), the United Kingdom will stop further military operations.

SECRET

/ CEASE FIRE.

195

CEASE FIRE

6. The United Kingdom (and presumably France) yesterday advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations that:

"If the Secretary-General can confirm that the Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted an unconditional cease-fire and that the International Force to be set up will be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the operative paragraphs of the Resolution passed by the General Assembly on 2nd November, H.M.G. will agree to stop further military operations. They wish to point out, however, that the clearing of the obstructions in the Suez Canal and its approaches which is in no sense a military operation, is a matter of great urgency in the interests of world shipping and trade. The Franco-British force is equipped to tackle this task. H.M.G., therefore, propose that the technicians accompanying the Franco-British force shall begin this work at once.

"Pending the confirmation of the above, H.M.G. are ordering their forces to cease fire at midnight today G.M.T. (10 a.m. Australian time, 7th November) unless they are attacked."

7. Israel on November 6th notified the United Nations General Assembly that she agreed to a cease fire and that all Israeli fighting had ceased.

8. On 4th November Egypt announced acceptance of the cease fire called for in the United States resolution of 2nd November "on condition that it would not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continue their aggression." It remains to be determined whether the Egyptians will regard the presence of Anglo-French forces as justifying continuance of fire. Cairo Radio announced today,

194

although before the Anglo-French cease fire became operative, that Egypt would continue fighting "so long as there were aggressors on Egyptian soil" . The "Voice of Britain" at Nicosia stated at 10.15 a.m. (Australian time today) that the cease fire by Anglo-French forces had come into effect

9. The Egyptian position is therefore, not yet clearly established. News just received over the B.B.C. (7th November, 4 p.m.) states:

(a) The ceasefire in Egypt ordered by the British and French Governments became effective 6 hours ago, according to the Voice of Britain Radio in Cyprus. On the other hand, a spokesman of the Egyptian Government said about three hours ago that he was unaware of any ceasefire at Port Said. He said that his information was that fighting was still going on.

(b) Cairo Radio has announced that Egypt accepts the ceasefire on 5 conditions. These include the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt, as well as the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israel forces behind the Armistice line. Other Egyptian demands, according to Cairo Radio, are that there must be no outside help to the combatants, and that navigation through the Suez Canal should be resumed and safeguarded. Cairo Radio's announcement was made an hour before the allied order for the ceasefire took effect

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM EGYPT.

(a) United Kingdom Position

10. In his broadcast to the nation on 3rd November, Sir Anthony Eden said:

"Once British and French forces have occupied key positions along the Canal, H.M.G. will ensure that Israeli forces will withdraw from Egyptian territory. I believe this is their intention, but they will not do so unless we are there to keep the peace and give the necessary guarantees to prevent a repetition of these things."

SECRET

8.

(b) Israeli Position

11. The Israelis have made no statement that they will withdraw from Egyptian territory although after the first phase of their operation they expressed themselves ready, subject to conditions, to withdraw behind a line ten miles from the Canal. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt is required by the United Nations resolution above-mentioned - the implementation of which will be a duty of the United Nations Force.

WITHDRAWAL OF ANGLO-FRENCH FORCES FROM EGYPT

12. It is not clear whether, and if so, at what stage, Anglo-French forces propose to withdraw from Egypt, but the United Kingdom and French Governments have now told Mr. Hammarskjöld that the clearing of Canal obstructions, which was in no sense a military operation, was a matter of grave urgency and that, since the Anglo-French force is equipped to tackle this task, the United Kingdom proposed that their technicians who were accompanying the Anglo-French forces should set about this work at once. This statement, coupled with the British statements mentioned in paragraph 5 above are the only indications we have received regarding British intentions which, nevertheless, remain unclear.

BRITISH POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

13. The stated British objective is settlement of the Palestine and Suez Canal problems. It has as another, if unstated, objective, the containment of Nasser and his expansionist aims which jeopardise the stability of the Middle East. No indication has been forthcoming, however, as to how the United Kingdom proposes to follow up politically, the military action it has undertaken.

SOVIET INTERVENTION

14. The United Kingdom has replied to Russia's condemnation, /reported yesterday...

SECRET

192

SECRET

9.

reported yesterday, of the Anglo-French action. The Soviet statements were in strong terms and the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Lord Hume) has privately described the Russian attitude as perhaps ominous. Lord Hume has told our Acting High Commissioner in London that the United Kingdom Government's immediate fear in respect of Russia is their influence on Syria. He said that if Syria came in quickly with Russian support it would have the effect of widening the conflict; the aim of Britain up to the present had been to narrow it. A further message from the United Kingdom develops this theme.

15. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, in disclosing Bulganin's letters to Sir Anthony Eden and M. Mollet, emphasised that Russia only contemplated action "in conjunction with other nations". The Soviet letters to Sir Anthony Eden and M. Mollet are likely and presumably were designed to encourage Egypt to decline to cease fire, so that the fighting will continue, and to encourage also the passage by the General Assembly of a further resolution calling upon Anglo-French forces to withdraw from Egypt. In these circumstances the Soviet statement would open up new and serious possibilities.

OTHER REACTIONS

16. Notwithstanding Soviet action in Hungary, the attitude of other countries has, for the most part, been critical of the Anglo-French intervention. The popular reaction in some South-East Asian countries (Indonesia and India) has been particularly strong. Among the Arab States there has been little violent response from governments, but sabotage of oil installations has occurred in Syria and Lebanon. Syrian and Iraqi troop movements into Jordan have been reported. While public opinion in Pakistan has been angry, there have been second thoughts in official circles. Turkey, Iran and Iraq seem not entirely displeased with the turn of events.

/ Reactions in...

SECRET

Reactions in Commonwealth countries vary and are described in Appendices "A" and "C".

EGYPT-AUSTRALIA: RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

17. At 1.30 p.m. Cairo time on 6th November the Egyptian Foreign Ministry informed the Australian Minister that the Egyptian Government had broken off diplomatic relations with Australia as from that date. The Aide Memoire given to Mr. Cutler said that the position adopted by Australia in the General Assembly on 2nd November and in the Security Council on 6th November "on a question which touches on the highest honour, dignity and independence of Egypt" was the reason. Steps are being taken to appoint a protecting power and secure evacuation of the Legation staff immediately.

AUSTRALIANS IN EGYPT

18. Our reports, received during the past week, show that there were still some 30 Australian citizens in Egypt, who had stayed on despite the Legation's first advice to them, two months ago, and its second warning to them last month. Cutler describes these as the hard core. The Australian Legation has maintained contact with them and in one of its messages described them as being in good heart. The Australian Minister has been instructed to assist (before his own departure) as far as possible those wishing to depart from Egypt and inform them that the Power whom we designate Protecting Power will watch over their interests on behalf of the Australian Government.

DIVERSION OF QANTAS

19. Following the closing of the Cairo International Airport, Qantas flights to the United Kingdom have been diverted so that after leaving Karachi the planes go to the head of the Persian Gulf (Basra or Abadan) and thence over Iran, Turkey and Greece to Rome. We understand the B.O.A.C. has also made a substantially similar diversion.

/Following advice...

SECRET

20. Following advice from its Djakarta representatives of strikes in Indonesia, Qantas has instructed aircraft, until further notice, to proceed directly from Darwin to Singapore without putting down on Indonesian territory. It had earlier been reported that refuelling facilities were being denied British and French planes but this did not extend to Australian aircraft.

DOCUMENTS

21. A diary of events and copies of cablegrams are being circulated, together with the full text of United Nations resolutions.

(P.A. McBRIDE)
Acting Minister of External Affairs

CANBERRA . A.C.T.

7th November, 1956.

189

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

COMMONWEALTH REACTIONS TO ANGLO-FRENCH INTERVENTION

Canada

Despite their earlier irritation and anxiety, the Canadians are now trying to break down excessive criticism of the United Kingdom and France and to put their intervention into proper perspective. They have been responsible for introducing into the General Assembly, the suggestion of a United Nations Police Force, to which they are prepared to contribute 1,000 troops.

New Zealand

The New Zealand Cabinet is more positively on the side of the United Kingdom than public statements may suggest. Their immediate concern has been the position of the New Zealand cruiser "Royalist" serving with the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and which the United Kingdom asked to be made available for operations.

Their instinct is to stand behind the United Kingdom without reservation, but the possibility of being immediately involved through the "Royalist" has introduced a number of doubts and second thoughts and the possibility of being branded an aggressor; e.g. the effect on their relations with the United States through SEATO and ANZUS.

India

The Indian Government has described the Anglo-French action as a "flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter" and fears that it may have far reaching consequences in Asia and Africa. In their view the United Kingdom-French action cannot be justified and they have openly supported the Egyptian case.

182

/ Ceylon

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2

Ceylon

The Prime Minister has expressed regret at developments and urged the withdrawal of all forces from Ceylon. He has, however, since accepted the assurance that British bases in Ceylon would not be used in connection with hostilities in the Middle East. Publically, he has said that there is no justification either for the Israel invasion or the Anglo-French action.

Pakistan

The public position the Pakistan Government has taken is that it "strongly deprecates" the Anglo-French intervention. The Prime Minister personally appears not to be impressed by the arguments put forward by his Cabinet but he does fear pressure from his own party, and others, for Pakistan to secede from the Commonwealth and has spoken in terms of his Government being forced out of office and the isolationists taking over. Cawthorn's assessment is that the official Pakistani attitude will be influenced by the speed and efficiency of the United Kingdom-French military action.

A separate paper on the United Kingdom assessment is attached.

187

SECRET

UNITED NATIONS PROCEEDINGS

A. SECURITY COUNCIL

1. United States Resolution: This resolution, which was submitted on 30th October:-

- (a) called on Israel to withdraw behind Armistice lines; and
- (b) called on all Members to refrain from use of force in the area and to refrain from giving military, economic or financial assistance to Israel.

The resolution was vetoed by the United Kingdom and France. The vote was 7 (in favour), 2 (against) and 2 (abstentions). The Australian delegate was without instructions except that the Security Council should establish the facts before condemning Israel. Since defeat of the resolution was certain and abstention would indicate support for the United Kingdom but would not be a vote against the United States, Dr. Walker abstained.

2. Soviet Resolution: This resolution, which was submitted on 30th October:-

- (a) noted Israel's violation of the Armistice Agreement; and
- (b) called on Israel and Egypt to cease fire and to withdraw behind their frontiers.

The resolution was vetoed by the United Kingdom and France. The vote was 7 (in favour including Australia), 2 (against) and 2 (abstentions).

The Australian delegate was without instructions upon this resolution. He voted in favour because a call for a cease fire as between Israel and Egypt was consistent with Australia's previous policies, because the United Kingdom advised that they were voting against only out of solidarity with France, and because the United Kingdom and French vetoes meant that the Australian vote would have no practical effect. The United States had advised that they would vote for the resolution, but at the last moment, and without consultation, they abstained.

3. Yugoslav resolution: This was submitted on 31st October. It called on the General Assembly to meet immediately. This was adopted 7 (in favour) 2 (against) and 2 (abstentions including Australia in pursuance of instructions that he should avoid opposition to the United Kingdom and France but not identify Australia as a strong advocate of their action).

B. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

4. United States Resolution: This resolution, which was submitted on 1st November,

- (a) urged parties to cease fire and halt movement of military forces and arms into the area;
- (b) urged parties to the Armistice Agreements to withdraw behind the Armistice lines and to observe the Armistice Agreements;
- (c) recommended Members refrain from introducing military goods into the area and to refrain from acts which would delay or prevent implementation of this resolution;

(d) urged steps...

2.

- (d) urged steps to be taken to re-open the Canal; and
- (e) requested the Secretary-General to report on compliance.

This was adopted on 2nd November by a vote of 64 in favour five against (United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Israel) and 6 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa). Australia's vote was in support of the United Kingdom.

6. United States Resolutions: Two further resolutions were submitted by the United States on 3rd November.

- (i) The first covers the whole problem of Arab-Israel relations. It called for the establishment of a committee of five Members (unspecified) to:-

- (a) prepare recommendations after consultation with the parties regarding settlement of major problems between the Arab States and Israel;
- (b) transmit recommendations to the parties, the Security Council and the Assembly as appropriate, and to report to the Assembly.

- (ii) The second resolution concerns the Canal. This resolution:-

- (a) notes the Security Council's agreement on the six principles;

- (b) recognizes the need for a permanent solution;

- (c) establishes a committee of three members (unspecified) to assume responsibilities for:

- (i) taking measures to re-open the Canal immediately;

- (ii) preparation of a plan in consultation with Egypt, France and the United Kingdom for operation and maintenance of the Canal and freedom of passage in accordance with the 1888 Convention and the six principles;

- (iii) the adoption and putting into effect of such a plan.

- (d) instructs the Committee to report to the Assembly or the Security Council, as appropriate, in implementation of the above responsibilities, and to make recommendations to promote a just and permanent settlement of the Suez problem.

7. Canadian Resolution: The United States agreed that a subsequent Canadian resolution should have priority (hence, the two United States draft resolutions have yet to be disposed of.) The Canadian resolution:-

- (a) referred to the urgent need for "facilitating compliance with the resolution of 2nd November";
- (b) requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly within 48 hours "a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities".

8. The Canadian...

3.

8. The Canadian resolution was adopted by a vote of 57 in favour, 0 against, and 19 abstentions (including United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Portugal, Austria, Israel, Laos, Egypt and the Soviet group). Australia abstained because of the implied endorsement to the Resolution of 2nd November.
9. Afro-Asian Resolution: The Assembly also adopted a resolution proposed by 19 Arab-Asian members which:
- (a) re-affirmed the resolution of 2nd November and called for immediate compliance;
 - (b) authorized the Secretary-General to arrange immediately for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of forces into the area; and
 - (c) requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly within 12 hours on compliance.
10. The vote on this resolution was 59 - 5 (United Kingdom, France, Israel, Australia, New Zealand) - 12. Australia voted in support of the United Kingdom.
11. Canada, Columbia, Norway: On 5th November, following the submission of a report by the Secretary-General, Canada, Colombia, and Norway submitted a resolution providing:-
- (a) for the establishment of a United Nations Command for the emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the Assembly resolution of 2nd November (paras. 4 and 5 above);
 - (b) for the appointment of General Burns (Canadian Chief of Staff of U.N.T.S.O.) as Chief of Command on an emergency basis;
 - (c) authority to the Chief of Command to recruit officers for the force from amongst the Observer Corps of U.N.T.S.O. and directly from Member States other than permanent members of the Security Council.

12. The Assembly adopted this resolution by a vote of 50 in favour, 0 against and 19 abstentions (including United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Turkey, Portugal, Egypt, France, Israel, Laos, and the Soviet group). Australia abstained with the United Kingdom, to show support in principle for an international force, but objection to the resolution of 2nd November.

C. SECURITY COUNCIL

13. Soviet Union draft resolution: On 5th November the Soviet Union called for an immediate meeting of the Council, and circulated a draft resolution which:
- (a) called for a cease-fire within twelve hours;
 - (b) urged military and other assistance to Egypt by United Nations members, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, if the cease-fire were not observed;
 - (c) called for....

4.

- (c) called for the withdrawal of all United Kingdom, French and Israeli troops from Egypt within three days.

14. The Council on 6th November refused to include the Soviet item on its agenda by a vote of 3 in favour, 4 against (United States, United Kingdom, Australia and France) with four abstentions. Australia described the Soviet proposal as effrontery in view of Soviet action in Hungary, and as an attempt to inject Soviet power into the Middle East.

D. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

15. Afro-Asian draft resolution: The Afro-Asians are understood to have agreed on 5th November on a new draft resolution which would:

- (a) condemn the use of force by the United Kingdom, France and Israel as a breach of the Charter;
- (b) call on Israel to withdraw immediately behind the Armistice lines and observe the Armistice Agreements;
- (c) call on the United Kingdom to cease immediately all military action against Egypt and withdraw their forces.

16. The Assembly was to have met on 6th November but delayed this meeting in view of the discussion in the Security Council. No action has yet been taken by the Assembly on the Afro-Asian resolution.

183

SECRET

APPENDIX C

COMMONWEALTH REACTIONS TO ANGLO-FRENCH INTERVENTION

(United Kingdom Assessment)

Canada has taken a most helpful initiative, details of which you will know from Press in the United Nations in putting forward proposals for United Nations forces. We welcome these proposals. Mr. St. Laurent is however seriously disturbed at our decision to go ahead despite United Nations Organization criticism.

2. In Australia Mr. Menzies has welcomed Prime Minister's statement on 3rd November indicating conditions on which we would stop military action. He has also sent most helpful message designed to steady Prime Minister of Pakistan. (See paragraph 6 below).

3. In New Zealand there has been labour criticism of our policy of which Mr. Holland has to take account but we have continued to receive some support from him. New Zealand has been disturbed at strains between us and United States.

4. South African Government have refrained from public comment on the policy issue but Mr. Louw has alleged that there has been a major change in policy of United Kingdom Government over consultation with Dominions over foreign affairs, that South Africa had not been taken into consultation, that she made no complaint of this, but that it, of course, relieved Union Government of any responsibility for steps taken. (While as you know urgency made prior consultations impossible with either Commonwealth or United States there is no question of any change of policy and we attach utmost importance to liaison and consultation where practicable).

SECRET

5. /In India

SECRET

Page 2

5. In India Mr. Nehru has made speeches sharply critical of United Kingdom policy and has asked us to halt the invasion of Egypt. But according to Reuter Indian Foreign Office spokesman has denied reports that Mr. Nehru has threatened to leave the Commonwealth. Spokesman added that there was no likelihood of Indian Government acting hastily in this or any like matter which might have an important bearing on relations with other countries.
6. In Pakistan Muslim feeling is running very high. There have been disturbances outside our offices and damage to some of them. Mr. Suhrawardy is under considerable pressure to leave the Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. He has been strongly urged by us to wait developments and not to take precipitate action. Latest messages from James are more encouraging and show Prime Minister to be in more robust mood. He is leaving on Tuesday for Teheran to join Pakistan President at meeting of four Asian members of Baghdad Pact.
7. In Ceylon there have been demonstrations against us and Mr. Bandaranaike is extremely critical of our policy. We have now also had enquiry from Bandaranaike on same lines as Louw's statement in paragraph 4 above and are replying accordingly. 181
8. In dealing with any suggestion that United Kingdom policy is pro-Israeli statement in Prime Minister's broadcast that once British and French forces have occupied the key points on the Canal the Government will ensure that Israeli forces withdraw from Egyptian territory should be useful.

SECRET

Secret

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM R.G. MENZIES TO SIR ANTHONY EDEN:

I am grateful for your personal message regarding the Middle East. We have just been having long and anxious discussion in Cabinet on these problems. At this distance we receive a mixture of information, some of it from newspaper and broadcasting sources and there are therefore many points on which we are lacking clarity.

I agree with you about the dangers of an Israel/Jordan conflict, the possibilities of which would be too bad to be contemplated. Your diplomatic action in relation to Israel therefore has my warm approval. We agree with you that a war between Israel and Egypt should not be allowed to block the Suez Canal and, therefore, the joint ultimatum by the United Kingdom and France seems to us, as an emergency measure, to deal with ^athe situation suddenly arising, to have been proper.

Right throughout these matters, I have felt with you that Nasser's prestige, already enhanced by his coup in relation to the Canal, should not become so inflated as to provide a foundation for a sort of Nasser empire in the Middle East. Israel may well have made an error by mounting a large scale invasion of Egypt, because this kind of thing, shorn of the context of pin pricking

180

tactics by Egypt herself, can so easily be represented as an aggression which the Western powers would feel bound to reject.

My own feeling has been that Israel probably thought that a movement into Egypt would, by exposing the vulnerability of that country, tend to reduce Nasser's delusions of granduer.

But, allowing for all that, it was I think in the world sense, a tactical error. But the facts of live must prevail. It would appear quite impossible to stand by and see an Israel-Egypt conflict which would not only temporarily close the Canal, but might, under the stress of war, inflict such damage upon it as would put it out of action for a long time. Under these circumstances, the ultimatum delivered by the United Kingdom and France seems to be the only prompt step that could be taken and, although there will be, in many quarters, much criticism of it, you may understand that we will support it as a quick police measure not designed to produce war but to avoid the more damaging consequences of Israel-Egypt military action.

I would go further and express my personal view that it may prove to be a healthy reminder to Nasser that, though he may imagine that the great powers are powerless,

the facts are that they are not unwilling to defend their legitimate interests, which include the vital commercial lifeline through the Canal.

We are, however, distressed by what appears to be an open conflict in the Security Council between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

The first question that has been raised in my own Cabinet is whether there has been a breakdown in close communication between yourself and the United States. I have suggested that, if you and the French issued your ultimatum without reference to the United States, it was probably due to a belief that dilatory proceedings in the Security Council would at once have been advocated and that the ultimatum could have come too late to have any practical effect.

I would be glad if you could let me know whether this speculation is correct.

I am sending a personal cable to Dulles urging that he should not allow a difference of opinion to develop into a serious breach because I know that, like myself, you attach great importance to unity of action with the United States.

We in Australia, situated as we are, believe strongly in the closest cooperation with the United States. But I would not have you think that this means that British countries are merely to sign on the dotted line. There is plenty of room for frank exchanges and for the proper assertion of British responsibility and a right on the part of British countries to maintain independent views and to persuade the Americans that those views are right.

Evatt has already foreshadowed an attack upon your own Government for not consulting us before issuing the ultimatum. I propose to reply to this by saying that when armed forces are rapidly approaching the point of conflict, it would be impossible for the United Kingdom to devote a week to cabled Commonwealth communications because, under such circumstances, time rather than convention is the master. Personally, I would have thought it extremely unwise for you to occupy a lot of time in such consultations when what was needed was prompt and clear decision.

I would like to add for myself that nobody has more clearly understood the difficulties that you have had to deal with since you became Prime Minister. I

greatly admire your courage and resolution in dealing with them. I still hope that when this present problem has been resolved you will be able to maintain the attitude of the eighteen nations towards the Suez Canal issue, the significance of which is not less but much greater than it was when I last saw you in London.

What many people fail to understand is that the best way to avoid a major conflict is to be completely firm about smaller ones.

My thoughts are with you. You must never entertain any doubts about the British quality of this country. Having said that, I would express the hope that you would make it your personal business to do everything possible to secure some broad basis of agreement with the United States, having regard to the fact that our common enemies would regard a serious cleavage in the democratic ranks as one of their greatest successes in the cold war.

Secret

PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR. JOHN FOSTER DULLES FROM R.G. MENZIES:

When I received your message about the Middle East I had proceeded to draft a communication to the United Kingdom urging that other matters in the Middle East or in North Africa should not be allowed to distract attention from the need for a proper Suez Canal arrangement. At that moment the present Israel-Egypt crisis arose.

I instructed our representative on the United Nations to seek some ascertainment of the facts by the Security Council before any resolution was submitted and debated. Events turned out otherwise and, in the result, there has been a painful, and conceivably dangerous, difference of opinion between your country and the United Kingdom and France in the Council itself.

These differences can easily be exacerbated by partisans so that a state of affairs could arise which could give satisfaction only to our opponents. I know how profoundly you agree with my own view that the growing dreams of empire entertained by Nasser should be resolved, and that Nasser himself should be made to understand that he is not in a position to defy the Western world.

disso/vep

175

May I therefore say to you, as I am tonight saying in another message to Anthony Eden, that I hope that there will be an attempt on the highest level to reconcile differences of opinion and to present some united front.

Quite frankly I do not believe that it would be to the interests of any of us to have the Canal closed for weeks and possibly for months by military operations around and across it. From this point of view my colleagues and I see considerable merit in the police action which is involved in the Anglo-French ultimatum. But that ultimatum, and any action which may follow it even before this cable reaches you, may turn out to be quite unfortunate if it leads to any profound differences between the United Kingdom and yourselves. My experience is that differences of opinion are always exaggerated by eager partisans on a lower level.

I have such clear recollections of your own wise and firm leadership in the London Conference that I believe that talks between yourself and Eden would be productive of much good. There are some things that cannot be done by deputy.

I have heard and read a good deal of nonsense about the American attitude over the Suez Canal. I have spared no pains to make it clear that I regard these criticisms as quite ill founded and that in point of fact any errors that may have occurred are by no means all on one side.

I would give a great deal to be able to take a magic carpet and have myself transported into the presence of yourself and Eden, but this is not possible. Please do not think that I am assuming some astonishing wisdom, because I do not possess it. But above all things, I believe that a clear understanding on both sides of the Atlantic of the reasons for actions taken on each side is vital, and never more so than at this moment.

Reps: 8-11-56

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

172/11/20.

MR. WHITLAM: I ask the Minister for Defence, who is acting for the Minister for External Affairs, whether the economies of other countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations, namely, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, depend even more than does the Australian economy on unimpeded traffic through the Suez Canal and peaceful conditions in the Middle East.

I ask also whether, during the crisis of the last ten days in the Middle East generally and in the Suez area in particular, Australia has exchanged views with those members of the British Commonwealth which are even more intimately concerned than we are. Has Australia, during this period, exchanged views with any members of the British Commonwealth other than Britain and, if so, with which countries?

SIR PHILIP McBRIDE: It is true that the countries mentioned by the Hon. Member are importantly affected by the situation respecting traffic through the Suez Canal. In reply to the question whether we have been in communication with those countries and other countries during the last ten days I would say that we have been in communication with our representatives in the countries named on a number of occasions. I cannot tell him precisely how many times, or exactly when we last communicated with any particular country, but I can assure him that we are in constant communication with the countries mentioned on a variety of subjects.

8/11/56.

THE SECRETARY:

Referred, by direction, for information.

A. J. G. G. G.

Private Secretary.

(9/11/56)

Rec'd 12/11
Mr. Keating

→ Mr. Layden Mr. Buckingham
13/11

172

FAD

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

...:VA

O. 15146/47/48/49/50/51/52/
53/54/55/56

PRESS

Sent: 8th November, 1956
1800

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....444. (Pass immediately to Washington 947, Ottawa
183).

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2644. (Pass immediately to all European Ports).

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.....520.

Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.....258. (Pass immediately to Singapore 847).

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....361.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.....244.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.....216.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....346.

UNCLASSIFIED.

The following statement was made by the Acting
Minister 8th November:-

(Then follows text of statement).

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s. DEPT.
P.M.'s.

(Cost £300,4.8)
12th November, 1956.

171

SEC A/SS UN CR TAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEL EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

F

E G Y P T - I S R A E L

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
THE RT. HON. R.G. MENZIES, C.H., Q.C., M.P.,
in the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

THURSDAY, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1956.

Statement by the Prime Minister
in the House of Representatives,
at 2.30 p.m. Thursday, 8th November, 1956.

E G Y P T - I S R A E L

As Honourable Members know, the latest reports are that there has been a "cease fire" in Egypt, consequent upon the announcement by the United Nations of an international force for use in the Canal area. But it is still necessary to remind the House and the country of the true quality and consequences of recent events.

The free world has had clearly put to it in the last week or two a question, the answer to which will not only determine the future of the United Nations, but also the future of the world.

Israel and Egypt became involved in operations of war. That what Israel did when it invaded Egypt was an act of aggression, few people would be concerned to deny. Yet, as I have previously pointed out in public statements, Israel had become painfully aware of the aggressive attitude of her neighbours and had, quite plainly, made up her mind that something should be done to correct a situation in which Israel's existence should always be on a precarious tenure. She, therefore, sent her forces into Egypt. It was clear that if this invasion of Egypt proceeded, and Egypt defended herself, there would before long be a war conducted over and around the Suez Canal. If this local war had occurred in some other part of the world, it might have been isolated and either dealt with by the great nations or allowed to wear itself out. But the Suez Canal, as hundreds of millions of people in the world clearly understand, was and is one of the economic life lines of the world.

We in Australia realise that the great bulk of our overseas trade, which is vital to our own economic existence, passes through it in one direction or the other. The Western European powers, including Great Britain, depend upon a free and open Suez Canal for the vital industrial ingredient, to wit, oil, of their own industrial life and employment. Under these circumstances, should the two great Suez Canal shipping powers, Great Britain and France, have stood aside and pretended that a war in the Suez Canal zone was no concern of theirs? They would have been bent on economic suicide if they had thought so, or said so, or acted so. What then were they to do? Were they to believe that the United Nations could and would promptly and efficiently deal with this matter, not only by words but by deeds? If they had done so, resolutions would have been passed but there is no reason to believe that anything would have happened; no more than there is reason to believe that a vetoed resolution of the United Nations will restrain the Soviet Union from its career of butchery in Hungary.

These two great powers, therefore, concluded that action was necessary if the Suez Canal was to be kept free and open and out of a zone of war. That is why Great Britain and France developed their military activities in the Middle East. They have, I believe, been well justified in the result. It is just because they took strong action that the United Nations itself has been galvanised into action. They made it perfectly clear that their object was and is to separate the belligerents, to get a peaceful settlement of disputes, and to preserve the Canal. If, as a result of this, both Israel and Egypt have declared a "cease fire" and if the United Nations itself is prepared to put in an effective military force to replace the police action of Great Britain and France, we will all very willingly believe that practical action has been taken by the world organisation. But at the same time, it must not be forgotten that there will always be the threat of conflict around the Suez Canal if the outstanding issues are not really settled. It must, therefore, not be thought

that an international force will have exhausted its function when hostilities have ended. Indeed, these have already ended. It must continue its function until the outstanding questions between Israel and Egypt have been settled on a basis acceptable by both, and the future of the Suez Canal as an international waterway, insulated from the politics of any one nation, has been assured.

I think I might with propriety quote the words of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the House of Commons on Tuesday evening.

"During the night we received from the Secretary General of the United Nations a communication in which he informed us that both Israel and Egypt had accepted an unconditional cease fire."

.....

"I should like to make one or two comments on the general situation. There have been and no doubt still are bitter differences upon this matter across the House.

I will lay down what I believe has been the result of the action we took with all its admitted attendant risks which I have never concealed. I believe that it has limited the area of conflict. If Honourable Members think that that is not a fair comment I should like them to consider whether, when hostilities broke out, any of them thought it possible that the other Arab countries would not have been all of them immediately involved in a war with Israel. I believe - in fact I am convinced - that it was only the knowledge of the presence of our forces which limited the conflict to that area. The fact that fighting has now stopped and that the Israeli acceptance of the ten mile limit has made it virtually certain as far as it can that the two parties shall not re-engage in conflict meanwhile is, I should have thought, also an achievement which all of us should reckon to be worthwhile. Now I come

"to what is a more controversial but as time passes may perhaps become a more generally accepted statement of one of the results, namely that the action we took has been an essential condition for the attempted creation - which we hope will be successful - of a United Nations force to come into the canal zone itself. I ask Honourable Members to look at the history of the Middle East in the post-war period and ask themselves if anything but this action would have brought the United Nations to take this step. I am absolutely sure it would not. After years of flickering war the stage can now be set - if the United Nations will put forward this force adequate for the task - for negotiations and for a real settlement of the problems of the Middle East."

The concluding paragraph of my citation deals with two matters of outstanding importance.

The first is that the United Nations force should be adequate for the task. This is significant. It would be rather a strange circumstance if the properly armed and equipped troops of the United Kingdom and France should be replaced by a force of no military consequence without adequate supply and backing. It should be an effective military force. At present, we in Australia do not know whether it is desired that we should contribute to it. It is probably too soon for anybody to have worked out what its constitution is to be, how it is to be used, and in what particular respects individual nations should take part in it. All I need say at present, on behalf of the Government, is that if the proposal is to constitute a military establishment which will facilitate the making of a permanent settlement in the Middle East, Australia will be not unwilling to make such quick practical contribution as it can.

The second point to be emphasised is that Sir Anthony Eden has pointed out the objective of a real settlement of the problems of the Middle East. This is a matter of major importance. If all that happened was that the British and French forces, having cleared the Canal of physical obstructions, withdrew and were replaced by a United Nations force, and the charter of that force was merely to keep the peace for a limited time, leaving all outstanding questions concerning the canal and the relations between Egypt and Israel unsolved, our people might well ask what was the good of Anglo-French intervention. It is, therefore, essential to emphasise that the conflicts around Israel frontiers and the questions affecting the free passage of the Canal cannot be solved by being ignored or postponed.

The people of Israel have a perfect right to know that their national integrity will be respected. Half the people of the world have a perfect right to know that a non-political control of the Canal is guaranteed. Peace is not a mere matter of the cessation of hostilities; it can be founded only upon the sensible removal of differences. In the making of peace in the Middle East, co-operation with the United States will be essential. I am sure that, in spite of recent differences, such co-operation will be freely available.

It is for reasons like these and for the general reasons which I set out in my statement to the House on November 1st, that we have supported the action of the United Kingdom and continue to support it.

Some casual but biased observers have suggested that we have merely "toed the line". This is, of course, nonsense. We have not, if I may say so, lacked the capacity for expressing our own views, though we have at all times expressed them as British people. But I would think badly of myself, and my colleagues would think badly of themselves, if we remained silent or neutral under circumstances in which the Government of the United Kingdom has been assailed for taking action which we regard as both practical and courageous.

I think that already it is being realised more and more that taking a firm course on matters like the Egyptian conflict, is not a means of provoking war but averting war.

I pass to a few other considerations which have been much in our minds in these very troubled days. A good deal of apprehensive talk has occurred about the differences which have been manifested over this Egyptian matter between some of the countries of Europe and some of the countries of Asia. In particular, Honourable Members will not have failed to notice that some of our Asian friends have protested strongly against Anglo-French action in Egypt but have had little or nothing to say about the murderous activities of the Soviet Union in Hungary.

These are matters which it is considered wise politics never to mention. But a time comes when this rule should be broken. There could be no greater tragedy in the world than for it to become settled doctrine that the great nations of Asia and the great European and neo-European nations have conflicting interests, and that they must, therefore accept conflict about them as inevitable.

We in Australia do not believe that, in world matters, the interests of India must be in conflict with those of Australia or the interests of Asia in conflict with those of Europe.

Statesmanship requires that we should all swiftly bring ourselves to an understanding that the world is one, and that ordinary human beings all around the world have similar interests and the same dignified and human ambitions.

Having said this, I would like to say to such people in other nations as may be willing to listen, that there are three aspects of the present Middle East crisis which deserve the urgent and earnest consideration of all men --

1. The freedom and integrity and peace of the Suez Canal are of just as much importance to the villager of Pakistan or India as to the ordinary citizen of Australia or the wage-earner of Great Britain or France. The freedom of the Canal, therefore, has a universal quality, the significance of which is not altered by the pigment of the skin or the geographical locality of the Canal users. If we are to settle these problems by lining ourselves up in favour of a European bloc or in favour of an Asian bloc, if actions taken by Egypt are to be regarded in Arab communities as good simply because Egypt is an Arab community, then the world will be committing itself to a dispute to which there can be no end except in bitterness and destruction. In dealing with such a matter, we must try to look objectively at the merits and at the common good of all; we will initiate the suicide of mankind if we substitute bigotry for judgment, or seek to revive racial hatred under the guise of instituting the brotherhood of man.
2. The significance which we attach to great world events depends essentially upon our sense of proportion. Does anybody in Egypt or in Syria seriously believe that the active intervention of the Soviet Union in the Middle East would be in the long run to the benefit of Middle Eastern people? Would Egypt, so proud of having marched from "colonialism", seriously seek to defend its new freedom by submitting itself to the help and, therefore in due course, the tyranny of the worst "colonialism" of modern time? Are the people of Southern Asia, who have worked so long and so successfully for democratic self-government, prepared to lend their countenance to a most obvious attempt by totalitarian communism to divide the free countries so that, being divided, they may all become slaves?

3. I would have thought that the purpose of the United Nations was not to make great powers impotent and small powers truculent, but to reconcile the strength of great nations with the strength of an international organisation; to use great power not for aggression but in support of resistance to tyranny; to build around the great peace-loving powers of the world an area of peace which would ultimately become a dominating area of peaceful strength in the world.

Does anybody suppose that an enfeebled Great Britain or an enfeebled France, or, in some circumstances, an enfeebled United States of America, could give to a world organisation, the strength which alone can make that organisation effective and save it from futility?

These are matters to be thought about and to be acted about. Great Britain and France rightly felt that if the Suez Canal and the vast traffic which passes through it were to be made unavailable, inaccessible, closed by a war between two minor powers, the time had come which it was necessary that there should be some assertion of the rights of the majority of the people of the world. By bitter experience they knew that with a certain veto in the Security Council ~~and with dubious authority in the General Assembly~~, the whole pass might be lost unless definite action preceded debate. They, therefore, took definite action. I have said, and I repeat on behalf of the Government of this country and, as I believe, on behalf of the majority of the people of this country, that we agree with them. They have said, and said truly, that they have no desire to remain in perpetuity as a military garrison on the Canal. That has in the past been tried and has been abandoned. But they have been immeasurably wise and courageous in taking steps which would not only anticipate but would, in some measure, compel the attention of the United Nations. I have no doubt that they will welcome relief from their

task. But the marshalling of an international police force is not a matter of days or weeks. It requires organisation, contribution and discipline. I believe that the United Kingdom and France have pursued their intervention not for territorial conquest, not for any purpose of domination, but to produce peace where the world needs peace; so that, when the United Nations produces an international body in this area, it will not have to fight its way in but will be in such a shape and in such a position that it may first keep the belligerents apart and then bring them together for a sensible and honest and permanent solution of their differences.

Perhaps the most impudent thing that has occurred of late is the self-righteous attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards Anglo-French action in Egypt.

Many of us had just begun to hope that the anti-Stalin movement in Russia heralded a new period in which the Soviet Union would begin to recognise the self-governing rights of other people, and would accordingly reduce the international tension in the world. This would, of course, have been of great significance if it had happened to be true.

In the modern world, the Soviet Union has made itself a great "colonial" power though it has never ceased to inveigh against "colonialism". How this propaganda on the Soviet side has succeeded is one of the mysteries of life. For example, Great Britain was the great "colonial" power of the 19th Century. There is no evidence that her "colonialism" failed to improve the lot of her "colonial" people. But in this century, the whole progress of the old British Colonial Empire has been towards self-government. It has been made clear that "colonial" peoples were not to be kept in subjugation but that they were to be advanced into self-government as their capacity for self-government was developed. In the result, many countries which were once part of Great Britain's "colonial" empire

have become completely independent self-governing communities. Up to now, the proof is to be seen in Burma, in India, in Pakistan, in Ceylon. Before long there will no doubt be further proof in the cases of Malaya, Singapore and the Gold Coast countries, while the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been advancing rapidly towards a full self-governing status. In brief, the British procedure has been to promote dependent countries into self-government.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, acting in relation to what we call its "satellite" countries, of whom the two who are most vividly in the public mind are Poland and Hungary, has pursued a line of policy designed to destroy self-government and to reduce people from independence to "colonial" subservience.

It therefore comes as a shock to civilised onlookers to find that at the very moment when the Soviet Union has, by brute force and savage rapacity, been crushing the flame of independence in Hungary, with the loss of many thousands of lives, it should have the effrontery to pose as the defender of Egyptian liberty and to issue the wildest threats against the Western Powers.

I feel bound to make one further set of observations.

There has been much propaganda over recent days and weeks. For example, it has been repeatedly said from Cairo that the Anglo-French action in Egypt was the result of a pre-arrangement between Great Britain, France and Israel. This story was always fantastic, and particularly so to anybody familiar with the efforts made by Great Britain to avoid conflict between Jordan and Israel or Israel and Egypt. But the propaganda has gone on. There must be quite a few scores of millions of people today, particularly in Asian countries, who have been persuaded to believe that this allegation is true.

For another example, it has been said by some that the action taken by Great Britain and France in delivering an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel and following it up by armed action encouraged the Soviet Union to make an attack upon the people of Hungary. This statement is monstrously untrue.

On Tuesday, 30th October, I made a statement in this House about Hungary, in the course of which I pointed out that the explosion in Hungary was touched off on October 23 by the action of the police in firing into a peaceful demonstration of university students. From that moment events in Hungary moved rapidly. There was a considerable loss of life and many other casualties. The whole matter became so intolerably acute that the Security Council held an emergency meeting on October 28; a meeting at which 10 members of the Security Council voted for a discussion and investigation of the matter but were frustrated by the Soviet veto, a veto which was based upon the clearly invalid argument that what had happened in Hungary was a purely domestic affair.

It is quite clear that the events in Egypt were subsequent. Indeed it was suggested in some quarters that the invasion of Egyptian territory by Israel was designed to take advantage of preoccupations arising from the tragic events in Hungary! All I need say is that those who are always ready to criticise our friends and to justify our enemies cannot have it both ways. It is to me a melancholy fact that some people, admittedly a small minority of the Australian people, should have so exhausted their vocabularies in denunciation of the action taken by Great Britain and France, an action now proved to have produced good results, that they have left themselves with not enough words to denounce the brutal procedures of the Soviet Union in Hungary.

I have referred to some of these matters with some reluctance but only because I believe that in these great historic events the record should be

kept straight. I have, indeed, another reason for this second exposition of what I believe to be the facts about Egypt. It is this. My colleagues and I believe and have repeatedly affirmed that the free future of the world depends primarily upon mutual understanding and co-operative action between the people of the United States and those of the British Commonwealth. This does not mean that either Great Britain or Australia, to take two instances, should simply subscribe to the American opinion of the moment. We have our own pride and independence and responsibilities. But the whole history of this century is so full of friendship between our two peoples, and the whole outlook of the United States has been compounded of such generosity and understanding that I believe that the more the position adopted by Great Britain on this crisis is understood by our American friends, the more they will come to understand that what has been sought is not war but the averting of war; not aggression but the effective settlement of disputes which could, if left to work themselves out, involve all the peace-loving people of the world in the kind of conflict which they all hope honourably to avoid.

There my statement was designed to end with a feeling of optimism. But this morning, there has been news on the wireless to the effect that the General Assembly has passed a resolution directing Great Britain and France to withdraw their forces from Egypt forthwith. At the moment we have had no official advice of this decision nor, of course, have we had any opportunity to consult as to its significance. If the report is true, its significance is not to be under-estimated. But I would prefer to reserve any comment until we have means of knowing what interpretation will be given to the resolution or what the reactions to it of Great Britain and France will be.

Even before this announcement, there were still great areas of doubt and uncertainty. For example, there are reports that the government of Israel no longer accepts the armistice boundaries of some years

ago as binding on it. There are statements that the Government of Egypt which was reported to have accepted a "cease fire" unconditionally now seeks to impose conditions on its acceptance. There are later unofficial reports that Egyptian attacks on British and French troops have not ceased.

There is still considerable vagueness about the International Force - will it be called upon to conduct military operations against the Israelis if the Israelis persist in their present attitude, or against the Egyptians should they not honour the cease fire terms?

But above all, the question now is whether the Allied Forces can be seriously expected to leave at a time when the International Force does not even exist.

We have just received messages that this problem is recognized in the speeches made in support of the Afro-Asian resolution. Dr. Walker has reported to us that several nations have said that in supporting this resolution they interpret it as meaning that they support a withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces not immediately and so as to leave a vacuum but "as soon as practicable having regard to the fact that it will take some time for the International Force to be established and reach the area. Some used phrases such as "as soon as possible."

Declarations along these lines have been made, we are told, by Canada, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, and also, be it noted, by the United States.

We have been told that the substance of Mr. Cabot Lodge's statement to the Assembly was first that the United States believed that the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces should be phased with the introduction of the International force and secondly that these operations should be carried out as soon as possible.

.....

8th November, 1956

DOCUMENTS FOR PARLIAMENT HOUSE

THE SECRETARY

One hundred copies of the four resolutions passed by the Assembly between 2nd and 5th November were sent to the Parliament House Librarian on 7th November.

2. Subject to your approval it is proposed to send over 100 copies of the following which are ready:-

- (a) Statement by Eden in the House of Commons on 30th October;
- (b) Statement by Eden in the House of Commons on 1st November;
- (c) Statement to the Emergency Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 1st November by the United Kingdom delegate, Sir Pearson Dixon;
- (d) Extracts of a broadcast to the nation by Eden on 3rd November.

3. We have also run off 100 copies of a statement to the House of Commons by Selwyn Lloyd on 5th November. However, we are still trying to check the text of one quotation.

(W.G.A. LANDALE)
E.A. & M.E.

*Secretary
approved of
sending these
across to
Parliament
House*

*3 subject to
checking*

W.G.A. 8/11

File

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

MCD:SHA

0.15087.

Dated: 8th November, 1956.
1220

TO:

ALL POSTS

EXCIR.2

UNCLASSIFIED.

At Australian Government's request Canadian Government has agreed that Canadian Embassy at Cairo will assume protection of Australia interests in Egypt.

Cost 323/1/-

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)(Mr. McClintock)
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss ALL SECTIONS

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

OA:AS

I.15142

Dated: 7th November, 1956

1450

FROM:

Rec'd: 8th November, 1956

0805

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.208. RESTRICTED. EMERGENCY.

From Pyman.

Reference phone conversations with Stuart regarding request to Canadian Government to act as protecting power, I have been advised:-

- (A) Canadian Government very willing to give immediate assistance to Australian staff and office in Cairo until more definite arrangement can be made. In reply to my query as to exactly what this covered, I was informed that the Canadian authorities would be prepared to instruct the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, to undertake all immediate practical arrangements connected with the closure of our mission, and outlined in the draft message you wish the Canadian Government to send through their Embassy to Cutler. It was also mentioned that the Canadian Embassy would be told to assist in any way possible with the evacuation of the Australian staff, if you so desired. They are relying entirely on United States' assistance in this regard and would be happy to take up the matter in Washington and Cairo, presumably simultaneously with an approach by our Embassy in Washington.
- (B) Regarding long-term protection of Australian interests, Canadian Cabinet this morning decided that due to shortage of staff and lack of experience, it would be advisable for the Australian Government to consider asking a Government with a more experienced staff with greater resources to undertake the long-term protective function (for example the Swiss or Swedes). If, however, after such consideration, the Australian Government still desired Canada to act, the Canadian Government would be happy to do so to the best of its ability.

2.

My assessment is:-

146

- (A) Canadian Embassy has a very real staff problem as described to Stuart on the phone.
- (B) They are prepared to send extra staff, and feel that another officer or two may well be needed if they assume this function.
- (C) There is the greatest possible willingness to assist us and their hesitation comes only from their concern that they might let us down if the duties of protector proved

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **RESTRICTED**
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2- I.15142

heavier than might be imagined.

3. I have advised them that there are apparently about 30 persons involved in the Australian community according to recent news reports.

4. The Minister has been informed and has concurred in action taken here.

5. I am endeavouring to 'phone substance of this message through but atmospheric conditions are delaying call.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
A/MIN&DEPT TRADE (C) (MR. MCLINTOCK)
P.M'S

8th November, 1956

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E. AF&ME
E	AF&ME	INF	DL MT	C&P	ADMIN	PERS	TRAV EXCOMMS.

165

RESTRICTED



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR 117.

8th November, 1956.

FOR THE PRESSAUSTRALIAN INTERESTS IN EGYPTCanada to act as Protecting Power

The Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Philip McBride, has announced that, at the request of the Australian Government, Canada has agreed to act as protecting power in respect of Australian interests in Egypt.

The Canadian Embassy in Cairo will assist the Australian Minister, Mr. A. R. Cutler, V.C., and his Australian staff to leave Egypt as soon as the Egyptian Government has provided facilities for this, and will take over custody of the Australian Legation properties. The Canadian Embassy will also, as far as international law allows, accord protection to those Australian citizens who still remain in Egypt.

Sir Philip McBride expressed his appreciation of this generous response by the Canadian Government to the Australian request.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 8th November, 1956.
1415

TO: .

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

181.

RESTRICTED.

EMERGENCY.

Your telegram 208.

In confirmation of what Stuart said by telephone we gratefully accept Canadian offer to take immediate charge of our interests, and agree arrangements should proceed in accordance with terms of message to Cutler. We do not think it necessary at this stage to make an approach to Washington regarding United States assistance for transport for evacuation. We hope Cutler can make decisions regarding evacuation means with Canadian Embassy locally.

2. We believe task of looking after our interests should not prove particularly onerous, and would hope to avoid transfer of protecting duties from Canada to another country later. This can be examined in light of situation in a few weeks time.

3. Please convey this to Canadian authorities with a formal expression of our appreciation for their assistance.

Cost 213

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)(Mr. McClintock)
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT
ADMIN

163

RESTRICTED

*Mr. Ballingham
File
very*

Protection of Australian Interests in Cairo

In the course of yesterday afternoon the Secretary told me the Prime Minister had agreed we should ask the Canadian Government to assume protection of Australian interests in Egypt. Mr. Tange had some doubts whether the Canadians would agree, and emphasised that nothing should be passed on to Cutler unless they clearly did.

I managed to get through to Mr. Pyman by telephone at 5 p.m. and said:-

1. He was to ask the Canadian Government whether it would assume protection of Australian interests in Egypt.
2. If it agreed,
 - (a) he was to report its agreement at once by telephone.
 - (b) he was to convey to the Canadian External Affairs Department the attached text as a message to its Embassy in Cairo, for Cutler.
3. I read over the text of the message. Pyman took it down and undertook to make the approach as soon as he could. It was 2 a.m. Ottawa time and there might be some delay.

At 6.40 p.m. Pyman telephoned me back.

He told me he had spoken to the Head of the Consular Division, who had said his Department had been examining this very question in the expectation of a possible approach by the United Kingdom. He saw no objections on political grounds to Canada representing Australian interests: but there were very considerable practical problems, because of the small staff at the Canadian Embassy in Cairo and its inexperience of this sort of work. Moreover the Ambassador himself was stranded at Beirut and could not return to his post. "It would be rather difficult, to put it mildly", to undertake this task, and it might require a cabinet decision. On the other hand, if we wished to proceed, he felt sure the Canadian Government would be very willing to consider our request.

I suggested to Pyman that he should try to get Mr. Casey's view as soon as that became possible, and recommended pressing the request through to Canadian Ministerial level.

Pyman could not get the line again until 6 this morning. He told me he had spoken to Mr. Casey, who had agreed he should proceed. He had then made an official approach to the External Affairs Department, and the Canadian Cabinet had considered the request at 9.30 local time. As a result he could report:-

1. The Canadian Government was very willing to give immediate assistance;
2. It was prepared to undertake all the responsibilities detailed in our message to Cutler;
3. For transport arrangements it would have to rely on the United States, and suggested we might wish to follow this up ourselves in Washington;

162

4. The Canadian Cabinet decided it would be advisable for the Australian Government to consider asking Switzerland or Sweden to look after its long-term interests, in view of the limitations of the Canadian Embassy at Cairo.

I told Pyman he was authorised to accept this Canadian offer and to despatch the message to Cutler forthwith. We agreed to amend the last sentence of this to read "Canadian Embassy will be initially in charge of their interests": on the long-term aspects however I said the Department would advise him further when it had had time to study the Canadian suggestion. I felt the immediate issue was to get moving on evacuating the Legation and providing even an interim protecting power. Pyman said he understood all this clearly and would convey our acceptance of the Canadian offer.

FHS /AG
Consular & Protocol Branch
8th November, 1956.

161

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

AS:SHA

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

1.15175.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

Dated: 7th November, 1956.
1952
Recd.: 8th November, 1956.
1600

211.

RESTRICTED.

IMMEDIATE.

Protection of Australian Interests in Egypt.

My 208.

Following Stuart's indication that the offer of immediate Canadian assistance should be accepted and that decision on long-term protection should be deferred, I informed the Canadian authorities and arranged for despatch by them "most immediate" of cable to Cutler. The Canadians asked for amendment in the second paragraph, adding a new second sentence "It has agreed to act on a temporary basis, pending more permanent arrangement". I accepted this change. The word "initially" was inserted as agreed with Stuart in the last sentence.

2. The Canadians have prepared an accompanying message for their Embassy, Cairo, informing their staff of the decision emphasising that the arrangement may only be temporary and requesting them to carry out the necessary functions.

3. The Canadians have found the transport arrangements provided by the United States Government for the evacuation of nations from the Middle East particularly efficient. They were anxious that, as part of the exercise of their temporary functions on behalf of Australia, they should do everything possible to ensure that if Australian staff required travel assistance, the Canadian representatives in Cairo and Washington should make use of whatever co-operation the American authorities could give in respect of the Australian Legation staff and Australian nationals in Egypt. They would hope that if we did wish to avail ourselves of any opportunities for travel out of Egypt, which the United States Government may be able to provide, the Australian Embassy in Washington would seek such assistance from the State Department.

4. I am told opinion in Cabinet was solidly in favour of doing everything possible to help us. There is concern at the official level about the burden on their small and inexperienced staff and the risk of a failure by Canada to do the task effectively. There is no doubt whatever, however, that they will do it if you wish them to undertake the long-term responsibility, having special reasons (for example, the Commonwealth connections) for preferring them to the traditional protectors.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)(Mr. McClintock)
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&M E AF&ME INF C&P ADMIN

RESTRICTED

160

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DE SHA

Dated: 8th November, 1956.
1445

TO:

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

517. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Your telegram 485.

Australian troops for the Middle East.
You can assure the Indonesian authorities that the question of sending Australian forces to Middle East to assist United Kingdom forces has not arisen during present crisis. The Secretary-General has not as yet asked Australia to make a contribution to the proposed United Nations forces. A governmental statement of attitude towards contributing to this force (the establishment of which we strongly approve) will be made later today.

Cost £8/11/-

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P MT

159

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

UNCLASSIFIED
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DLB.MMc

0.15109/10/11

PRESS

Sent: 8th November, 1956
1515

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....442.

UNCLASSIFIED. EMERGENCY.

Please pass to Ottawa 182 and Washington 943.

Following is text of Prime Minister's statement
1430 8th November:

(Then follows text of statement)

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £337.8.4)
12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E. AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. UNCLASSIFIED

Mic
PRESS

0.15145

Sent; 8th November 1956
1830

TO:

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.

345. UNCLASSIFIED.

Following is text of Prime Minister's statement
1430 8th November.

(Then follows Statement)

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £21.2.3)
12th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.F&IE E
AF&ME INFO C&P



SECRET

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
KARACHI.

In reply quote No. 508/8/1/2.

Memo No. 1385/56.

8th November, 1956.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Suez Canal.

Further to telegram No. 300 dated 5th November 1956, and reference your telegram No. 355 of 4th November, I forward herewith:

- (a) a copy of my letter to the Prime Minister forwarding Mr. Menzies' message;
- (b) a copy of Mr. Suhrawardy's reply which it is understood has been sent by the Pakistan Foreign Office through their High Commission in Australia.



High Commissioner.

*Original & attachments filed
on "Attitude of Commonwealth
Countries"*

154

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DLB:AS

PRESS

0.15134-43/60

Sent: 8th November, 1956
1745

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR. (Pass to Singapore).

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

U/N. UNCLASSIFIED.

Following are extracts from Prime Minister's
statement in Parliament 14.30 8th November, 1956:

(Then follows extracts from Statement).

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

12th November, 1956
(Cost £493/-/-)

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA STA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

175/11/20.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

My warm personal congratulations on a victory which proves the confidence reposed in you by your own people. We share this confidence and know that despite some current differences your great moral and political influence will be directed towards removing causes of dispute in the Middle East and effecting all-round reconcilliation and settlement.

R.G. Menzies.

5 p.m. 8th November, 1956.

Phoned through by Miss Craig

*The message was sent unclassified
through commercial channels.*

EV 10/4

*Copy given to the
Secretary.*

155

7th November, 1956

Dear Mr McMahon,

The following is an extract
from a broadcast speech on 4th November by
Sir Anthony Eden :-

"We have only to read the
Egyptian Government's own statement
on what it intends to do. Its words,
not mine. Let me give you two examples.
The first refers to Israel. 'There will
be no stability until this small, but
vile, State is stifled.'

"The second example comes
nearer home. 'We must not in any circum-
stances lose sight of our goal, to fight
the British serpent and expel it utterly
from our land' - and land of course,
means the whole of the Middle East. That
has been the Egyptian role openly and
publicly proclaimed."

We have not been able to trace in
this Department the source of these quotations
and are still looking. If we come across the
originals or find something else suitable, I will
let you have it.

Yours sincerely,

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)

Mr W. McMahon, M.P.,
Minister for Primary Industry,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

153

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 175/1/20

Date 7th November, 1956

SUBJECT

EGYPT'S ATTITUDE TO ISRAEL

FOR MR. KEVIN

In a speech on 4th November Sir Anthony Eden said the following:-

"We have only to read the Egyptian Government's own statement on what it intends to do. Its words, not mine. Let me give you two examples. The first refers to Israel. 'There will be no stability until this small, but vile, State is stifled.'

"The second example comes nearer home. 'We must not in any circumstances lose sight of our goal, to fight the British serpent and expel it utterly from our land' - and land of course, means the whole of the Middle East. That has been the Egyptian role openly and publicly proclaimed."

2. *We are still searching for further quotable extracts from Nasser's speeches.*

EN
IEN/Middle East Section

M. P. Mason

*Seen
J. H. M.
7/11/56*

152

File 201.

RESTRICTED

MIDDLE EAST.

2/.

150

This is an affidavit
 by Mr. Kern

→ Mr. ~~Kendall~~ ^{Shaw 9/11}
 Mr. ~~Bell~~ ^{bee}

File No. 175/11/20

Date 7th November, 1956

SUBJECT

PAKISTAN'S POSITION IN THE COMMONWEALTH

FOR THE SECRETARY

Mr Casey in his telegram M.13 of 4th November from Ottawa asked whether it might not be useful for the Prime Minister (Mr Menzies) to send a personal message to President Eisenhower asking him to send an appropriate message to Suhrawardy designed to discourage Pakistan from leaving the British Commonwealth.

2. I do not think that this is desirable, particularly in the light of developments since Mr Casey sent his telegram. We now know that Pakistan is not going to make a hasty decision and that Suhrawardy is waiting to see what happens. Moreover, it would be, to say the least, rather incongruous for the President of the United States to urge a member of the Commonwealth to remain a member.

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)
Assistant Secretary
Division 1

JP/JK

*Minister had previously
approved this course, acting
on a submission from Mr
Caldwell.*

*J. Plimsoll**Mr. Laidlaw**File**wrong**Pl. file**11/11/56*

151

SECRET

2.

No other parliamentary discussion. Queensland
Division of Country Party has expressed full
confidence in Prime Minister's handling of matter.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

WM:SHA

0.15041.

Dated: 7th November, 1956.
1800

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

264.

UNCLASSIFIED.

EMERGENCY.

Your telegram regarding rupture of relations received. Will telegraph full instructions and name of protecting power as soon as necessary arrangements completed.

Cost £2/5/-

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

8th November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA RAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P ADMIN
FIN TRAV

148

SECRET

File No. 175/4/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

telephone

Record of Conversation with Mr. Gordon Poyser, Joint Secretary, Joint Planning Committee.
on 7th November, 1956.

Officers Present R.N. Birch

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

I rang Mr. Poyser to enquire whether there was to be a J.P.C. meeting this afternoon and Mr. Poyser said that a meeting was scheduled to have been held this morning but had been postponed because the Defence Committee had held an extraordinary meeting.

2. I asked Mr. Poyser what had been discussed and he said that the Committee reached certain conclusions relating to Australia's contribution to the United Nations police force in the Middle East. Although these conclusions have yet to be confirmed by the Committee the report which Mr. Poyser has just drafted contains the following recommendations -

(a) that Australia would be prepared to contribute -

(i) one destroyer;

(ii) a diving and salvage group;

(iii) a squadron of Dakotas;

(b) a battalion of troops numbering 665 but only if pressure were applied. Reluctance to commit ground troops was related to the difficulty of providing logistic support for them.

3. Mr. Poyser said the J.P.C. would meet this afternoon to consider the composition of Australian forces and a United Kingdom letter expressing British reluctance to discuss a SEATO strategic concept in conditions of global war. Mr. Poyser said that the Air and Navy representatives supported the views of the United Kingdom; Mr. Landau and Brigadier Wilton believed that Australia should prepare an expression of her own policy on the subject. He invited External Affairs comments which might be decisive if it came to a vote.

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister.	- A/S G.R.	Central Br.	- D.L. & P.I. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.	Admin. Branch.
Secretary.	A/S Admin.	Pacific Br.	- U.N. Branch.	C. & P. Br.	Antarctic Div.
A/S U.N.	L. & T. Div.	Western Br.	E.R. Branch.	C'wealth. Rels.	Melbourne Office.
					Sydney Office.

- Middle East

FOLLOWING POST(S):

ACTION:

Report prepared by R.N. Birch

(R.N. Birch)

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Telephone

Record of Conversation with

Mr. J. T. FOGARTY

7th November, 1956

on

Officers Present

Mr. Keith Brennan

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

QANTAS AIR SERVICES
THROUGH DJAKARTA

Mr. Fogarty rang to say that Q.E.A. manager in Djakarta sent a message to QEA, Sydney reading as follows:

"Due to strikes of Shell, air traffic control and point to point staff which are union and not Government inspired, all Australian aircraft including R.A.A.F. should over-fly Djakarta with immediate effect until further notice".

(point to point staff" are believed to be communications personnel associated with air traffic control).

2. Following receipt of this message QANTAS instructed the aircraft which left last night to fly direct Darwin to Singapore. This arrangement will continue until further notice.

3. Mr. Fogarty asked that we send a message to the Embassy in Djakarta asking for the Embassy's assessment of the situation.

DISTRIBUTION :

Minister.
Secretary.
A/S U.N.

A/S G.R.
A/S Admin.
L. & T. Div.

Central Br.
Pacific Br.
Western Br.

D.L. & P.I. Br.
U.N. Branch.
E.R. Branch.

E. & T.A. Br.
C. & P. Br.
C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch.
Antarctic Div.
Melbourne Office.
Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):

A/S Div.I Mr. Renouf
A/S Div.III Mr. Walshe
A/S Div.IV

ACTION :

2060/55.

Report prepared by.....

(Keith Brennan)

146

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

I. 15070.

...:OA.

Sent: 6th November, 1956.
1500

FROM:

Recd: 7th November, 1956.
1218

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

U/N.

UNCLASSIFIED.

EMERGENCY.

From Cutler.

The Permanent Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me, 1.30 p.m. today, that Diplomatic Relationships had been broken with the Australian Government as from today. Following Aide Memoire as handed to me -

X
Begins -

"Taking into consideration the position adopted by the Commonwealth of Australia, more particularly in the General Assembly in the United Nations in its session of the 2nd November, 1956, and following in the Security Council in its session of the 6th November on a question which touches in the highest the honour, the dignity and the independence of Egypt, the Government of the Republic has decided to break Diplomatic Relations with the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. This severance takes effect from this day dated Cairo 6th November, 1956." Aide Memoire ends.

I conformed strictly with your previous instructions and no action was taken by our Mission here, which was the subject of even comment by the Egyptian Government. The Permanent Head expressed satisfaction of our personal relationships and regretted the necessity to sever official relationships.

I requested an interview with the Minister but was informed he was not here. 144

Please advise urgently protecting power. May I suggest Sweden as the Swiss Legation already acts for the United Kingdom and France. Pending the appointment of a protecting power I have been promised telephone communication with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Local staff have been paid one month's salary and their employment has been suspended pending your decision. Statement of gratuity due to each locally engaged staff member will be handed to the protecting power. Australian based staff will remain in residence under Police Guard. 145

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
I.M'S.

7th November, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. B. B. B.

was 7/11

7th November, 1956

POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION BY AUSTRALIA OF FORCES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE TO SUPERVISE THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,
EGYPT AND ISRAEL

THE SECRETARY

On 5th November the United Nations established a United Nations Command for an Emergency International Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in Egyptian territory.

2. The United Kingdom has ceased fire provisionally pending confirmation by the Secretary-General that Egypt and Israel have accepted an unconditional cease-fire and that the International Force to be set up will be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the following objectives:-

- (a) A cease-fire, together with the halting of movement of military forces and arms into the area;
- (b) withdrawal by the parties to the Armistice Agreement of all forces behind the Armistice lines;
- (c) the refraining by all Members from acts which would obstruct the cease-fire or the withdrawal of force; and
- (d) the re-opening of the Canal.

It has been announced that Egypt and Israel have accepted a cease-fire unconditionally.

3. There will be another meeting of the Assembly tonight at 1.30 a.m. our time to take up again the Egypt-Israel problem.

4. We understand that Canada, Ceylon, Columbia, Finland, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Sweden have told the Secretary-General they are prepared to contribute forces (totalling about 8,000 men) to the International Force. Offers from Czechoslovakia and Denmark are also reported by the news services. We anticipate that the Assembly when it meets tonight will proceed to consider the contribution by Members of forces to serve under the United Nations Command; in the present circumstances, it is probable that the Assembly will call upon Members to provide contingents or request the Secretary-General to ascertain from Members whether they are prepared so to do.

5. The question for decision is therefore whether Australia should offer to contribute a force to form part of the International Force.

6. We understand that the Canadian Foreign

CONFIDENTIAL

/Minister

approved by
K.

Given to
Secretary

* if called upon to do
so?

I don't think we
should make an offer
out of the blue

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister has asked the New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations whether New Zealand would be prepared to make contribution of one-third of a battalion to form part of a Commonwealth Battalion. No such request has been made to us.

7. The advantages to Australia of an offer of a contribution appear as follows:-

- (a) An offer of a contribution will illustrate our readiness materially to assist the United Nations in re-establishing peace in the Middle East and generally, to assist the United Nations in carrying out its political functions;
- (b) an offer of a contribution would thus tend to off-set the effects upon other Members of the United Nations, especially the United States and Asian countries, of our support for the action of the United Kingdom and France in Egypt;
- (c) if Australia does not make an offer, an unfavourable comparison with New Zealand, which also supported the United Kingdom and France, may be drawn;
- (d) an offer of a contribution should prove of internal political value in Australia as showing the Government's support for the United Nations.

8. The disadvantages of offering a contribution appear to be:-

- (a) the cost - at least provisionally, each contributing Member will have to bear the cost of its contribution;
- (b) what may be called "inconvenience" to us. "Inconvenience" includes the strain which would be placed upon our slender forces, the indefinite length of the commitment and the risk of Australian forces in Egypt being involved in incidents with Egyptians;
- (c) an offer of a contribution by Australia may not be accepted by the Assembly in view of our support for the United Kingdom and France; we may therefore invite a rebuff by making an offer. 142

Conclusion

9. A balance of these advantages and disadvantages would seem to incline towards an offer of a contribution by Australia. However, from the practical standpoint, the offers of contribution which have been made would seem to make any contribution by Australia unnecessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

(A. P. Renouf)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM 15039

Sent: 6th November, 1956.

1635

Rec'd: 7th November, 1956.

0830

MC/BH

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

304.

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY.

Repeated for information to Singapore...23

Your telegram 351.

Pakistan Government agrees to temporary re routing of Qantas "Karachi Istanbul through Basrah - Tehran (turning point only) using corridor"E" as defined in Pakistan notices to airmen numbers 4 and 5, 1953, under night and I.F.R. conditions subject to the following conditions:

(i) every care will be taken to ensure adherence to the corridor including the employment of specialist flight navigators.

(ii) Flights will be executed at flight level 165 or above.

(iii) Permission from Tehran F.I.R. will be obtained for this operation.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
P.M'S.

7th November, 1956.

(Teletype to Melbourne
pass to Civil Aviation)

SEC L/SS UN LRO PAC&AM S&SEA GA SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DI MT C&P
G.

141

WITHDRAWAL AND CEASEFIRE

1. The United States Resolution of 2nd November urges all parties:

- (a) Immediately to cease fire;
- (b) halt the movement of military forces, and
- (c) to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines.

(We voted against this Resolution since it embodied action against the United Kingdom and French forces. Walker was instructed to abstain on any resolution which merely called on Israel to withdraw. He was instructed to support any resolution recommending an Israeli withdrawal and laying down of arms by Egypt.

Voting on the inscription of the American Resolution was 62-2 (United Kingdom, France)-9 (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Benelux countries, Portugal, Turkey and Israel.) The substantive resolution was adopted 64-5 (Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand, United Kingdom)-6 (Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa).)

2. The United Kingdom and France were prepared to "stop military action" provided:

- (a) Israel and Egypt agreed to accept United Nations forces in their territory;
- (b) United Nations undertakes to maintain such a force until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the Suez Canal;
- (c) Egypt and Israel agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Anglo-French troops, acting on behalf of the United Nations, to be stationed between the combatants until a United Nations force is constituted.

141

3. Mr. Menzies stated on 3rd November that if the United Nations accepts the idea of a United Nations Police Force in and around the Canal and the Security Council adopts and acts on it, the object of protecting the Canal will have been achieved. Meanwhile the United Kingdom and France cannot withdraw.

4. Canada, while satisfied with the first two British conditions above-mentioned is sceptical about getting sufficient United Nations support for the third condition which involves the landing of Anglo-French forces.

5. Egypt accepted the American resolution "on the condition that it would not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continued their aggression."

6. The Canadian Resolution, recognising the necessity of facilitating compliance with the American Resolution of 2nd November, requests Hammarskjöld to submit within forty-eight hours, a plan for setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, an emergency international United Nations forces to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the above resolution.

(Because of the preamble Walker abstained on this Resolution.)

The Arab-Asian countries obtained passage of a Resolution reaffirming the American Resolution of 2nd November and authorising Hammarskjöld with immediately to arrange ~~that~~ the parties for the implementation of the ceasefire and the halting of the movement of military forces into the area, and requested him to report compliance forthwith, and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of the adoption of this Resolution.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 14960.

FROM:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

Dated: 5th November, 1956.
1745
Recd.: 6th November, 1956.
0830

116.

SECRET.

Your telegram 116.

Answers to your questions must be speculative as new factors in the situation are likely to keep on emerging. Subject to the foregoing I would reason as follows:

(i) Israel's intentions concerning Sinai:

- (a) although its attacks against Egypt may have been motivated primarily by immediate security reasons, in the long view Israel must remain primarily pre-occupied with the recognition and acceptance of the state by its Arab neighbours;
- (b) if Israel can get direct negotiations it has taken the first step in achieving this objective and Eban's statement in the United Nations should be considered in this light. This statement is the most recent exposition of policy. Ben Gurion is to address Knesset, Wednesday;
- X (c) the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said yesterday the general armistice agreement on the frontier is dead and that Israel had no intention whatever of returning to it;
- (d) if Israel have any real expectations of direct negotiations, it would be prudent to expect them not to weaken their bargaining position by giving up any substantial advantage they now hold before negotiations begin;
- (e) therefore, although there is no indication of any desire for the incorporation of Sinai permanently into Israel, it is not to be expected that the present advantage of the notable possession of the road junction and control of the area contiguous to Israel will be given up at this stage except under extreme pressure if at all;
- (f) the Gaza strip has been the source of so much trouble, and is emotionally so identified with Fedayeen base: I would regard any willingness to evacuate this as most unlikely. Understand Government proposed to consider the problem arising from relatively enormous accretion of Arab population (about quarter of million) which absorbed this territory.

139

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM. L 11/960.

- 2 -

(ii) ~~Jordan~~

- (a) Incorporation of Jordan up to river is no doubt latest objective which would probably be pursued if the opportunity offered;
- (b) For the present, assurances that Israel will not attack Jordan, Syria or Lebanon in the absence of attacks from them, continue to be made;
- (c) Because of Israel's narrow waist and generally constricted shape north of Negeb, phrases such as concentration of troops near the border are rather misleading. As reported in my telegram 102, there have been concentrations north and central Israel from the first days of mobilization. These have been strengthened by additional equipment, much of it captured.
- (d) If anything like the partition of Jordan between Syria and Iraq occurred, I should expect Israel to move in immediately for its share up to the River Jordan.

(iii) Arab intentions. I have no special information on this. Press messages report entry of Syrian and Iraqi troops into Jordan which is said to be on a war footing.

Ballard.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

6th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

138

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 175/11/20

Date 6th November, 1956

SUBJECT

FOR THE SECRETARY

Copy for

MR KEVIN

Dr Evatt rang me this afternoon to say that last week Heseltine, on behalf of the Prime Minister, had shown him some factual reports on the situation in the Middle East, including telegrams from Cairo. He was ringing to ask whether the Department could arrange with the Prime Minister for him to be given some further factual reports on :

- (a) the situation in the Middle East
- (b) the debates in the United Nations and texts of resolutions.

2. He said he was not asking to see any telegrams containing comments.

3. I told Dr Evatt that I would pass his message on and that Mr Kevin was the Assistant Secretary in charge of the Middle East.

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)
Assistant Secretary
Division 1

JP/JK

*I told Miss Bell when
I returned to my office
this PM that material
had been sent across
to PM's office to be
passed to Schwartz
JWP*

137

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

DD:VA

I. 14961

Sent: 5th November, 1956

Rec'd: 6th November, 1956
0830

FROM:

Australian Consulate-General,
ATHENS.

140. UNCLASSIFIED.

From External from Cliffe.

November. Following message from Cairo lodged on 3rd

"Inform Canberra, Legation is still functioning
and staff are well."

... Cutler

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
IMMIGRATION
P.M's.

6th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MTC&P ADMIN PERS G

136

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

JW:AS

I.14944

Dated: 5th November, 1956

FROM:

1429
Rec'd: 6th November, 1956
0700

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

276. UNCLASSIFIED.

Cairo press review this morning reports the arrest of the Manager of Barclays Bank Ltd., Ismailia, but gives no name. Our records list David Lindsey Price, an Australian, as Manager. I have taken this up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior. I shall advise you further as soon as possible but communication between Cairo and Ismailia is very doubtful and the Egyptian Ministry is under obvious pressure.

The Bank cashed our cheque this morning.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

6th November, 1956

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME AF&ME INF C&P@
G

135

[Handwritten signature]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM U N C L A S S I F I E D

MMc

I.14975

Dated: 5th November 1956
2200

Rec'd: 6th November 1956
1215

FROM:

British Embassy,
TEHERAN (via London).

88105. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your telegram EX.448 - Diversion of Qantas.

United Kingdom-Australia Services.

Foreign Ministry and Civil Aviation authorities here are quite happy about the diversion over Iran. They are expecting the aircraft to fly over Rezaiyeh not Tehran as a turning point using the new direct Abadan-Rezaiyeh Air Corridor arranged with Crowther of Qantas last month.

Stevens.

(T/P TO CIVIL AVIATION THROUGH E.A. MELBOURNE)

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION.
P.M.'s.

6th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	ERC	PAC&AN	CCSEA	SA	SEA	E.A.F&IE
E	AF&IE	INF	DL	MT	CCP	ADMIN	TRAV	EXCOMIS

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.14973.

Dated: 5th November, 1956.
1223
Recd.: 6th November, 1956.
1230

FROM:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

275.

RESTRICTED.

EMERGENCY.

From Cutler.

I have advised the Australian community to remain inside and plan possible congregation at the Legation. We are entering a dangerous phase as parachute landings take place. Public services breaking down and cable communications becoming more chaotic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not yet answered my personal representations to the effect that Australians should not be subject to restrictions. I have personally encountered minor restrictions by National Liberation Army and shopkeepers on the grounds that I am Australian. Restrictions of no importance so far. Sequestered banks, supposedly open for business. We are drawing on our emergency cash pending the result of our efforts to cash cheques. Grateful you re-assure families of our safety. Your telegrams up to 258 received.

Please acknowledge in code.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (Mr. McClintock)
P.M.'s

6th November, 1956.

SECA/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SF S&SEA SA EAP&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
C&P ADMIN PERS

133

RESTRICTED

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.Record of Conversation with The Indonesian Ambassador, Dr. A.Y. Helmion 6th November, 1956.Officers Present The Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Phillip McBrideMr. W.G.A. LandaleMAIN SUBJECT(S):

EGYPT

File Guy

The Ambassador said that he had instructions to advise the Australian Government that the Indonesian Government viewed with grave concern the situation in the Middle East and regarded the Anglo-French intervention as an act of aggression. The Indonesian Government hoped that the hostilities would be localized and a peaceful solution found.

2. The Acting Minister replied that he had taken note of the views of the Indonesian Government. He said that the views of the Australian Government had been stated by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 1st November. The Australian Government considered that the emergency measures taken by the United Kingdom and France to separate the combatants and to protect the Canal were justified. Australia wholeheartedly supported the United Nations but this organization was only in a formative stage and as yet had no means of enforcing its decisions and recommendations. The United Nations was only able to take action in Korea because the U.S.S.R. was absent from the Security Council.

3. Dr. Helmi told the Acting Minister on a personal basis that the Anglo-French intervention had created an internal problem in Indonesia. The present Government had up till now been able to draw attention publicly to the high moral standards of the United Kingdom and France in their conduct of international affairs. Now there would be disillusionment. Indonesia felt very strongly about West New Guinea but was seeking a peaceful solution through the United Nations.

4. The Acting Minister said that he hoped that the Indonesian Government would not pass judgment on recent events until the results of the Anglo-French intervention had emerged. He expressed the view that Israel was surrounded by millions of hostile Arabs, and was fighting for its very existence. Egypt in particular had adopted a hostile attitude towards Israel.

5. The Ambassador admitted that Nasser was aggressive but complained that the Anglo-French action was one-sided as it was directed against Egypt. He feared that France would be tempted to hold on to the Suez Canal. He reiterated that his Government deplored the use of force and regarded the Anglo-French intervention action as an act of aggression. The Acting Minister then pointed out that Indonesia had abstained on the United Nations Assembly resolution on Hungary.

DISTRIBUTION:

Acting Minister. *[initials]*
 Secretary. *[initials]*
 A/S U.N.

Mr. Plimsoll

A/S G.R.

A/S Admin.

L. & T. Div.

Mr. Kevin

Central Br.

Pacific Br.

Western Br.

Mr. Quinn

D.L. & P.I. Br.

U.N. Branch.

E.R. Branch.

Mr. Booker

E. & T.A. Br.

C. & P. Br.

C'wealth. Rels.

Mr. Renouf

Admin. Branch.

Antarctic Div.

Melbourne Office.

Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):

DJAKARTA, NEW YORK, TEL AVIV.

Report prepared by *[signature]*
(W.G.A. LANDALE)ACTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SHA:OA.

O. 14990/1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8.

TO:

Sent: 6th November, 1956.
2000

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.

Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.

Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

GUIDANCE TELEGRAM 19.

CONFIDENTIAL.

IMMEDIATE.

Savingram to other posts.

Middle East.

The following is for your guidance.

We instructed Walker to vote against any resolution in the Assembly condemning the United Kingdom and France or advocating sanctions or reprisals against them.

2. We support this approach by reference to -

- (a) Our acceptance of the reasons stated by the United Kingdom-French for their emergency action;
- (b) The continued absence of a United Nations force;
- (c) The presence of forces of Egypt and Israel on both sides of the Canal;
- (d) Exercise by the United Nations of its responsibilities through United Nations Command and forces (as soon as they are constituted) will not be prejudiced by the United Kingdom-French action;
- (e) The need for international intervention is illustrated by the Egyptian blockages of the Canal.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (f) We accept

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

- 2 - O. 14990/1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8.

(f) We accept the United Kingdom-French statement that they wish to hand over to the United Nations Command and Forces as soon as constituted.

3. We favour, as the most constructive approach for the present and future, pushing ahead as fast as possible with the establishment of United Nations force in order that pre-conditions for the establishment of peace and a lasting solution to major problems of Middle East can be provided as quickly as possible.

4. Worthwhile use can be made of Soviet action in Hungary which can properly be contrasted with Anglo-French intervention. Many Afro-Asian countries abstained on Assembly resolution condemning U.S.S.R.

Cost : £169.18.4.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEF.

7th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UN ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

130

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

MCD:SH

O. 14964

TO:

Sent: 6th November, 1956
1600

Australian Legation,
C A I R O.

via Amsterdam.

263. UNCLASSIFIED

Your 275 received.

EA

(COST 8/4)

7th November, 1956

SEC A/SS EAF&ME AF&ME ADMIN



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O.14967
Sent: 6th November, 1956.
1645

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2615. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

For External.

Please pass our 2608 less paragraph 6 for guidance to
European Posts.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £2.8.0.

7th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL C&P MT

128

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

✓175/11/20

207/11/20

5th November, 1956

JORDAN - UNITED KINGDOM

MR. KEVIN

A. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JORDAN, 1948.

The United Kingdom view is that the 1948 Treaty of Alliance with Jordan has been automatically extended to Arab-held Palestine as a result of its annexation by Jordan.

2. Each of the Parties undertakes by Article 1 of the Treaty "... not to adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance or might create difficulties for the other Party."

3. Article 3 provides that "in the event of an imminent menace of hostilities the .. Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence."

4. Article 3 also provides that (notwithstanding the exhortation to settle a dispute between either Party and a third party by peaceful means) ~~that~~ either Party "become engaged in war, the other .. Party will" (subject to rights and obligations on either Party under the United Nations Charter or any other existing international agreement) "immediately come to his aid as a measure of collective defence."

5. Differences of interpretation are to be referred to the International Court of Justice unless the Parties agree to another mode of settlement.

6. Article 2 of the Annex (which is an integral part of the Treaty) provides for the Anglo-Jordanian Joint Defence Board "in the common defence interests of the ... Parties..."

(All underlining supplied)

Conclusion

7. Should Jordan attack Israel the United Kingdom could argue that it has no obligations under the Treaty since those obligations are only for defensive purposes.

B. UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDE

8. The Foreign Office spokesman on the 17th October, 1956, said: "Her Majesty's Government's obligations under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty are to come to the assistance of Jordan in the event of war being made against her. As I said last week, the Jordan and Israel Governments have been made aware that Her Majesty's Government fully intend to honour these obligations." In answer to a question, the spokesman said that it would be for the Government to decide in the light of circumstances when assistance to Jordan under the Treaty could be invoked. 127

9. Following the Israel attack on Qalqilya on 11th October, 1956, King Hussein of Jordan asked for immediate strengthening of the Royal Air Force units in Jordan. This was refused. The United Kingdom High Commission

SECRET

/ informed

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

informed the Department on 18th October, 1956, that it was manifestly not in the United Kingdom's nor in Jordan's interests to treat Israel raids as an act of war and to intervene. The High Commission also informed the Department that it was an illusion for the Jordanians to think that having destroyed the military value of the Arab Legion and dispensed with United Kingdom land assistance, they could rely on the Royal Air Force to win the land battle.

Conclusion

10. In the event of an attack by Jordan on Israel the United Kingdom will not regard itself as bound to offer any assistance to Jordan and will, in fact, not give any assistance unless it suits her so to do.

(W.G.A. LANDALE)^{WGA}
E.A. & M.E.

^{I.E.}
I.E. Nicholson
Middle East Section

126

SECRET

DRAFT:

I learn from Cawthorn with very great distress, that your Government is considering leaving the Commonwealth because of the situation that has arisen in the Middle East.

I know you will appreciate why the Australian Government and people would learn with sorrow of such a decision. We regard as very precious this link that has tied our country to yours, and we have I think demonstrated on many occasions the practical ways in which we pursue our co-operation.

In this message I do not want to argue the pros and cons of the United Kingdom action in the Middle East. As you know the Australian Government has publicly expressed its agreement with the course which the United Kingdom Government has felt itself obliged to follow. President Nasser's expansionist ambitions have threatened all countries in and adjacent to Middle East, and United Kingdom action cannot be viewed in isolation but as inevitable response to the situation created by Egypt itself.

Your Government ^{may} takes a different view. But let me urge that, even if there is difference on the merits of ^{a particular} ~~the~~ policy or action of a member of the Commonwealth this should not lead any of us to sever our valuable relationship. May I urge at least that you defer any final decision to leave the Commonwealth until the United Nations has been able to give further consideration to the situation as it develops. Already there are signs that an acceptable solution is possible. I appeal to Pakistan not to abandon too hastily the Commonwealth partnership in which you are so valuable and valued a part.

hr

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

O.14896

JG/BH

Sent: 5th November, 1956.
1225

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

116.

SECRET.

IMMEDIATE.

We would appreciate urgently your assessment
of the following:

- (a) Israeli intention concerning Sinai.
- (b) Israeli intentions as regards Jordan
particularly the West bank. Have
there been any significant concentrations
of Israeli troops in this area?
- (c) Intentions of Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

(Cost £1.13.4)

5th November, 1956.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

SEC A/SS UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME@ E
AF&ME INF DI C&E TM

SECRET

Lucy

I thought we might omit Israel
because the danger is less proximate,
there are many more Australians there,
& we might set up undue
anxiety at this stage among
most of them here. But perhaps
it is more politic to include Israel.
I have added another paragraph

With S/11

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

The Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Philip McBride, said to-day that according to the latest report from the Australian Minister in Cairo (Mr. A.R.Cutler, V.C.) the small Australian community in Egypt, amounting in all to some thirty persons, is safe and in good heart. The Legation is maintaining contact with them.

Mr. Cutler had earlier, on instructions from the Australian Government, advised all Australians who had no pressing reason to remain in Egypt to consider leaving the country. Numbers of them did so.

Sir Philip McBride said appropriate advice had also been conveyed to Australian citizens in Israel by the Australian Minister (Mr. B.C. Ballard). There are approximately two hundred citizens in Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Draft
(u.n.)*

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK

(PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON) REPEATED TO LONDON,
OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL - EMERGENCY

1. We realize that when the Assembly meets again the atmosphere created by the news of the landings around the Canal will be such that to talk about anything other than condemning United Kingdom and France and the possible application of sanctions may appear out of place.
2. However, we think that you should try to impress upon the Assembly the futility of condemning what the United Kingdom and France have done and asking for sanctions given that the United Kingdom and France cannot be expected to end their police action until an effective United Nations force is available in the area to protect the Canal. The more constructive approach for the Assembly to adopt at this time (and the only one which can serve to strengthen the United Nations for the future) would be to push ahead as fast as possible with the establishing of such a force so that the necessary pre-conditions for the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East and for a lasting solution of the major problems in the area can be provided as quickly as possible. (See paragraph 2 of our 428).

/4.....

121

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. You should, of course, also make the fullest possible use of the Soviet Union's violent action in Hungary and the deplorable extent to which this has been blurred by the Assembly's pre-occupation with the considerably more limited events in and around the Suez Canal. You should say that we note with concern the number of abstentions upon the United States resolution regarding Hungary. We think that the nature of the Anglo-French action can be contrasted to the U.S.S.R.'s action in Hungary with advantage to us.

120

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

BK:HP

O.14910
Sent: 5th November, 1956.
1700

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2605. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For McIntyre from Tango.

Egyptian Situation.

In discussions here, we are impressed by two considerations:

- (1) the weight of hostility directed against the United Kingdom and France not merely from anti-colonial prejudice but because they seem to have created the impression that they are recognising Israel as an ally; and
- (2) the difficult situation in which the United Kingdom will find herself if she goes ahead and puts forces into the Canal area not merely in the face of the objections of the General Assembly but also in the face of an offer (admittedly qualified) by the two belligerents to cease fire.

2. We are wondering therefore whether the United Kingdom is considering some move to distribute blame and obligations between Israel and Egypt. We are wondering also whether before landing forces they will not decide to explore further the intent of Egypt and Israel as regards a cessation of firing. We are not in a position to make any firm judgment on what is practicable or desirable because we are unable to assess certain vital questions such as the likelihood of Egypt continuing to damage the Canal and the time it will take for the United Nations police force to reach the area. But we are wondering whether there would not be some merit in the United Kingdom trying to mollify at least the important members of the hostile majority in the Assembly by postponing landings conditional upon performance by Egypt and Israel of their obligations to cease firing. This would seem to have two advantages:

- (1) If Israel and Egypt then defied the cease fire, United Kingdom and France would be in a better position than they are now to obtain recognition of the need to use their forces;
- (2) the United Kingdom might, by showing a propensity to continue discussion with the Assembly bring round the Americans at least some way towards them.

3. These are questions which you are authorised to canvass on your own account with a view to ascertaining whether the United Kingdom is exploring all the possibilities, and recognizes the risks. We do not want them presented as Australian Government views.

A/Min. & Dept. E.A.
P.M.'s.

SECRET

Cost - £30.8.4.
6th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

COV:SHA

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 5th November, 1956.
1700

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

118. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Ballard from Tange.

Our 116.

Apart from questions asked there are many
others that I hope you will anticipate in full and frequent
telegraphic reports.

Cost £2/1/8

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

6th November, 1956.

SEC A /Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

118

SECRET

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONEXTERNAL AFFAIRS.Record of Conversation with MR. HARTNELL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTon 5th November, 1956Officers Present J.C.G. KEVINMAIN SUBJECT(S):SUEZ CANAL : MIDDLE EAST OIL

Hartnell telephoned this morning to say that he was interested in developments concerning Middle East oil. I said that we were preparing a paper based on such information as we have which is not comprehensive. I also told Hartnell that we intended to send a telegram to McIntyre on the subject. Hartnell said that he was interested in:

- (a) The order of interruption and likely interruption;
- (b) the likely duration of interruption in case of Middle East pipelines.

24. 5/1
MR. LANDALE:

Please let me have telegram to McIntyre as above.

Telegram sent to London.

DISTRIBUTION :

Minister. A/S G.R.
Secretary. A/S Admin.
A/S UN. L. & T. Div.

Central Br.
Pacific Br.
Western Br.

D.L. & P.I. Br.
U.N. Branch.
E.R. Branch.

E. & T.A. Br.
C. & P. Br.
C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch.
Antarctic Div.
Melbourne Office.
Sydney Office.

Mr. Landale ✓

FOLLOWING POST(S):Report prepared by J.C.G. KEVINACTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

ABV/BH

Sent: 5th November, 1956.
1840

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2603. CONFIDENTIAL.

Patterson from McClintock.

Would you advise Mrs. Walker that week-end messages from post indicated all staff well and under no restrictions. If you have access to information on Cairo position as it affects Legation staff appreciate your keeping Mrs. Walker posted re her husband who is remaining there.

A/MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(Cost £5.5.0)

6th November, 1956.

SEC A/SS EAF&ME AF&ME ADMIN PERS

CONFIDENTIAL

116

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

VA/LH

Sent: 5th November, 1956.
1412

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON

2600.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE.

For External.

We should be interested in United Kingdom estimate of how oil pipelines and other oil installations in Middle East are likely to be affected by present situation. What prospects of serious interruption are seen and in what order? What is thought to be the likely duration of each interruption?

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (175/11/20)

MIN. & DEPT. NAT. DEVELOPMENT

(Cost £5.15.0)

MIN. & DEPT. SHIPPING & TRANSPORT

MIN. & DEPT. SUPPLY

MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

P.M'S.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Billington

828-A.



FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR 114.

5th November, 1956.

AUSTRALIANS IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Philip McBride, said today that according to the latest report from the Australian Minister in Cairo (Mr. A. R. Cutler, V.C.), the small Australian community in Egypt, amounting in all to some 30 persons, is safe and in good heart. The Legation is maintaining contact with them.

Mr. Cutler had earlier, on instructions from the Australian Government, advised all Australians who had no pressing reason to remain in Egypt to consider leaving the country. Numbers of them did so.

Sir Philip McBride said appropriate advice had also been conveyed to Australian citizens in Israel by the Australian Minister (Mr. B. C. Ballard). There are approximately 200 Australian citizens in Israel.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

VA:ABK.

I.14903.

Dated: 4th November, 1956.
1824.

FROM:

Rec'd: 5th November, 1956.
1430.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

194.. SECRET.

For the Acting Minister and Secretary from Casey.

M.13.

See message to Cawthorn my M.13. It occurs to me that Suhrawardy may be trying to beat India and Ceylon to it. He may believe that they will leave the Commonwealth, and he does not want to tag along behind them.

2. Might it not be useful for the Prime Minister to send a personal message to President Eisenhower asking him to send an appropriate message to Suhrawardy.?

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

5th November, 1956.

113
130

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

AS.MMc

I.14902

Dated: 4th November 1956
1805
Rec'd: 5th November 1956
1430

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

SECRET.

Ad ressed Karachi 1, repeated External Canberra
195, London 51.

M.12. Cawthorn from Casey.

On reaching Ottawa I got a copy of Menzies' telegram
355 to you with a message for Suhrawardy which was the
first I had heard of this devastating possibility. No doubt
you will use your personal influence with the President to
hold this matter up until this emotional wave passes.

2. Meanwhile subject to your discretion please give
the following personal message to Suhrawardy from me. You
may amend the following message within reasonable limits in
accordance with your local knowledge and more recent
information.

Begins -

"On arrival at Ottawa from London today I was
handed a copy of Menzies' message to you and I lose no time
in adding my voice to his. I realise the political pressures
that will be on you on this issue. On the other hand I
think I know your own convictions about the value of the
Commonwealth connection to you and to us all.

"Perhaps I know better than most the extreme and
long continued provocation under which Britain and Israel
have suffered at the hands of the Egyptian Government. The
resent situation in the Middle East is not something that
can be looked at in isolation. It is the last link in a
long chain of events.

"Without seeking to canvas any further the merits
or otherwise of the matter, I would hope beyond almost
anything I have hoped for before, that you would find
yourself able to wait some little time before you and your
Government make up your minds on this momentous issue.

"All good wishes to you."

Ends.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.H.'s.

5th November, 1956.

11/5/11/10.
SECRET

5th November, 1956.

SUHRAWARDY'S STATEMENT CONCERNING PAKISTAN LEAVING THE COMMONWEALTH.

THE MINISTER:
THE SECRETARY: ✓
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY:
DIVISION I:
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DIVISION IV:

While preparing a submission on this subject, I have just been supplied (3.30 p.m.) with a copy of Telegram No. 194 from Ottawa wherein the Minister suggests that the Prime Minister should send "a personal message to President Eisenhower asking him to send an appropriate message to Mr. Suhrawardy not to leave the Commonwealth".

2. I would advise against the sending of such a telegram because -

- (a) we have no information as to how much support the excitable and ambitious Pakistan Prime Minister has left behind him. We do know that at important Cabinet meetings certain "Republican" Ministers have not been invited;
- (b) we do know that President Iskander Mirza (the strong man of Pakistan) only allowed Mr. Suhrawardy to take Office on the latter undertaking to support S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pact.

3. The Foreign Secretary, Baig, has proved himself a weak adviser and pro-Egyptian according to Telegrams from Karachi and he is the only Pakistani, besides Suhrawardy, who has been mentioned in the telegrams from Karachi.

4. A very different aspect as to this threat by Mr. Suhrawardy that Pakistan leave the Commonwealth may arise when we have definitive news that President Iskander Mirza and Foreign Secretary Noon have information of what is going on at Karachi in their absence.

5. If I may say so, the calm but serious terms of our own Prime Minister's telegram admirably fitted the present situation, and any departure from them which has already taken place, or which is in contemplation with regard to a proposed Presidential message, can only do harm.

J. Oldham
(J. Oldham)
Adviser on Commonwealth Relations.

JEO:HMS.

Secretary
Acting Minister has marked
his copy "I agree"
Brown

McLachlan

Mr. Buckingham

was 7/11

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

HMCC,MMc

O.14853/54/55

Sent: 4th November 1956
1320

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....355.

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2596.OTTAWA..... 171.SECRET. EMERGENCY.Please convey following personal message to
Suhrawady from Menzies.

Begins -

I learn from Cawthorn, with very great distress, that your Government is considering leaving the Commonwealth because of the situation that has arisen in the Middle East.

I know you will appreciate why the Australian Government and people would learn with sorrow of such a decision. We regard as very precious this link that has tied our country to yours, and we have I think demonstrated on many occasions the practical ways in which we pursue our co-operation.

In this message I do not want to argue the pros and cons of the United Kingdom action in the Middle East. As you know the Australian Government has publicly expressed its agreement with the course which the United Kingdom Government has felt itself obliged to follow to defend the Canal and separate the belligerents. President Nasser's expansionist ambitions have threatened all countries in and adjacent to the Middle East. The United Kingdom action has to be viewed not in isolation but as the inevitable response to the situation created by Egypt's past actions and Israel's present act of violence.

Your Government may take a different view. But let me urge that, even if there is difference on the merits of a particular policy or action of any member of the Commonwealth, this should not lead any of us to sever our valuable relationship. May I urge at least that you defer any final decision until the United Nations has been able to give further consideration to the situation as it develops? Already there are signs that an acceptable solution is possible.

At this historical point, I ask in all sincerity that you consider whether Pakistan herself would not surrender some of her capacity to influence the course of

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

2.

SECRET

0.14853/54/55

world events if she withdraws from this unique family of nations.

Events are moving. The United Kingdom has made a proposal to the United Nations. Can we not await the outcome of the discussions and negotiations about to be held?

Ends.

PRIME MINISTER & DEPT.
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £70.16.8)

5th November, 1956.

109

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

JPW:AS

I.14876

Dated: 3rd November, 1956
1522

FROM:

Rec'd: 4th November, 1956
1215

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

273. SECRET.

From Cutler.

Reference your telegram 250, received 3rd
November.

Egyptian Government, to date, has not identified us with the United Kingdom. Australian Chancery staff and citizens not subject to restrictions. If required for Press, all Australian citizens are safe and well, and the Legation is maintaining contact with them.

2. Miss O'Neill allowed to sail s.s. "Aeolian" from Alexandria afternoon of 2nd November for Athens. Egyptian Government cancelled exit visas United Kingdom members of evacuation party, and refused them permission to sail after having arrived at Alexandria. Athens advised of movements of Miss O'Neill.

3. Now physically impossible to evacuate anyone as both sea and air communications have ceased. I had previously decided to retain Walker.

4. Cairo is tense but so far no incidents. National Liberation Army are evident in force and second line - fortified posts have been set up throughout the city and Gezira. Police guard on Australian Chancery increased. Bombing continues. Public mood impossible to forecast.

5. Nasser's family have occupied house opposite residence. Who protects who? Staff in good heart.

A/MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S
TRADE (C)

4th November, 1956
(Ø Corrupt Group)

108

SEC	A/Ss	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.AF&ME
E	AF&ME	INF	DL	MT	C&P	ADMIN		

Tell Tony in case UK do not know.

SECRET

Done 11/11/56

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

For Blakeney

Please convey following message to
Dulles from Prime Minister.

Begins

I am most distressed to hear of your illness. It has been heartening during this crucial time to know that your hand has been in touch with developments. In wishing you an early recovery, I express not only personal sympathy but the sincere hope that your experience will be available to help us all through this difficult period.

Ends.



JCGK/SCB

CONFIDENTIAL

4/11/56

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

WR:SH

O. 14859

TO:

Sent: 4th November, 1956
1840

Australian Legation,
C A I R O

258. UNCLASSIFIED

My 255.

(c) Please take in text of Canberra cable O.14836-47.

(COST £12.0.0)

EA
P.M. 's

5th November, 1956

SEC A/SS UN P.C&M S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL MT C&P

607

A/s M/s

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.
UNCLASSIFIED.

MR/BH

O.14858

Sent: 4th November, 1956.
1718

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

257. UNCLASSIFIED.

My 255.

(b) Please take in text of U.N. New York
Cable to Canberra No. 768 - 1.14740)

(Cost £17.16.8)

2/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E F&ME E AF&ME
INF DI C&P MT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

O.14857

BH

Sent: 4th November, 1956.
1710

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

256. UNCLASSIFIED.

By 255.

(a) (Please take in text of cable 309
Canberra to Tokyo - C.14754)

(Cost £28.0'0.)

/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

5th November, 1956.

SEC 1/SS UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF C&P

105

Lt. P. McBride says:

US resolutions, although OK, do not

complete the pattern. Our position about

about United Nations force as

envisaged by Pearson, this is

a ~~first~~ ~~first~~ fruitful idea &

gives us ice to slide on. We

should endeavour to link up

the three resolutions (2 US & 1 Canadian)

and approach the session today

on the basis of the whole.

→ McBride

McBride

Mr. Pennington

was 5/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

SW:ABK.

I.14854.

Dated: 3rd November, 1956.
2150.

FROM:

Rec'd: 4th November, 1956.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

475. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Because of the probable extension of the anti-British boycott by the trade union to Australian enterprises including Qantas, we must reckon with the possibility of having no air connection between Australia and Djakarta. If that eventuality develops, would you approve firstly our sending staff members to and from Singapore with bags and secondly our sending bags from Singapore to Australia care of the pilot if we are unable to make connection with the courier?

Crocker.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

4th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss S&SEA SEA ADMIN PERS TRAV EXCOMMS.

RESTRICTED

104

✓

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

DLB.MMc

O.14860

Sent: 4th November 1956
1425

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

429. UNCLASSIFIED. EMERGENCY.

In case telephone circuit is out, following
are instructions.

- (1) We support United States Resolution on Arab-Israel relations and you should strongly press United Kingdom to vote for it. If United Kingdom does not vote for it, you should abstain.
- (2) On resolution on Suez Canal, we do not think this **so** urgent that decision on membership of Committee and details need be voted tonight. We could accept broad principles, but only if membership is right. We would prefer five to three. You should seek postponement. Stock completely with United Kingdom on this resolution.
- (3) We support general idea of Canadian resolution.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UNC PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

103



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HMC:ABK.

O.14877.8.

Sent: 4th November, 1956.
2125.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2599. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Addressed London 2599, repeated Ottawa 175 for Casey. For McCarthy from Tange.

In McIntyre's absence grateful if you would give us immediate report on United Kingdom intentions in respect of:-

- (a) This mornings Assembly resolution with its 12 hour ultimatum;
 - (b) United States Draft Resolution seeking committee of three to prepare Suez Canal settlement and to take responsibility for keeping Canal open and,
 - (c) Resolution calling for United Nations Police Force.
2. Have India and Pakistan indicated intentions to United Kingdom?
 3. We were told by Cawthorn that Suhrawardy had told the United Kingdom High Commissioner that withdrawal from the Commonwealth was inevitable. Prime Minister has sent him message urging delay while situation develops.
 4. Repeat reply to Casey.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £24/16/8)

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

HMcC

0.14873

Sent: 4th November, 1956.
1925

TO:-

Australian High Commission,
W E L L I N G T O N.

339. RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

1. Reuter reports New Zealand statement that she would contribute forces to United Nations police force.

2. Please enquire and advise urgently whether report has substance.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £1.1:0)
4th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL C&P N.T.
G

161

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

HMCC

0.14872

Dated: 4th November, 1956.
1910

TO:-

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

431. RESTRICTED. EMERGENCY.

Your 789 Canadian Resolution.

Since our second telephone discussion
I have Government approval for your voting in the manner
we agreed namely:

- (1) To have voting in two parts.
- (2) To vote and speak for operative part.
- (3) Vote with United Kingdom on preamble and whole resolution.
- (4) Explain vote as necessary because of position we took on November second resolution.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(COST £7.6.0)
4th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P M.T.

G

100

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

AS.GJW:ABK.

0.14862/3.4.5.6.7.8.9.70.

Sent: 4th November, 1956.
1755.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....430.

PASS TO:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA....172.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....924.

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....2598.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI...270.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO....312.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI....356.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA....210.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA...505.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

New York pass to Ottawa and Washington.

Reference in Prime Minister's statement of November 3rd to Security Council adoption of any General Assembly proposal for United Nations police force is not intended to mean that Australia considers Security Council approval is essential or necessarily desirable.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £64/13/8)

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P.
G.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

HMcC.MMc

O.14853/54/55

Sent: 4th November 1956
1320

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....355.

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2596.OTTAWA..... 171.SECRET. EMERGENCY.Please convey following personal message to
Suhrawady from Menzies.

Begins -

I learn from Cawthorn, with very great distress,
that your Government is considering leaving the Commonwealth
because of the situation that has arisen in the Middle East.

I know you will appreciate why the Australian
Government and people would learn with sorrow of such a
decision. We regard as very precious this link that has tied
our country to yours, and we have I think demonstrated on many
occasions the practical ways in which we pursue our co-
operation.

In this message I do not want to argue the pros and
cons of the United Kingdom action in the Middle East. As you
know the Australian Government has publicly expressed its
agreement with the course which the United Kingdom Government
has felt itself obliged to follow to defend the Canal and
separate the belligerents. President Nasser's expansionist
ambitions have threatened all countries in and adjacent to
the Middle East. The United Kingdom action has to be viewed
not in isolation but as the inevitable response to the
situation created by Egypt's past actions and Israel's
present act of violence.

Your Government may take a different view. But
let me urge that, even if there is difference on the merits
of a particular policy or action of any member of the
Commonwealth, this should not lead any of us to sever our
valuable relationship. May I urge at least that you defer
any final decision until the United Nations has been able
to give further consideration to the situation as it
develops? Already there are signs that an acceptable
solution is possible.

At this historical point, I ask in all sincerity
that you consider whether Pakistan herself would not
surrender some of her capacity to influence the course of

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

2.

SECRET

0.14853/54/55

world events if she withdraws from this unique family of nations.

Events are moving. The United Kingdom has made a proposal to the United Nations. Can we not await the outcome of the discussions and negotiations about to be held?

Ends.

PRIME MINISTER & DEPT.
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £70.16.8)

5th November, 1956.

97

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.14830/1/2/3/4

HMc/BH

Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
2200

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK..428

Pass to

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON..922.

Repeated:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON...2593

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA...170

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON..338.

CONFIDENTIAL.

IMMEDIATE.

Your 763.

Jordan-Israel.

1. Further consideration by the Council of these complaints at a time when the whole Arab-Israel question may be regarded as before the emergency session of the Assembly is unlikely to have any constructive result.
2. Dulles has given a lead by referring in the Assembly to the need for something better than the uneasy armistices which have now existed for 8 years between Israel and her neighbours. We agree. We feel that the Assembly should at the earliest possible time turn its attention from recriminations against the United Kingdom and France towards finding positive and lasting solutions of the whole Middle East problem.
3. It would be preferable if Council removed this question from its agenda so that the emergency session of the Assembly could consider the whole complex of Arab-Israeli disputes.
4. At same time we think it would be a tactical mistake for Australia to take any open initiative which looked like stifling of a hearing of a complaint against Israel at time when charges are being made of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. If Council proceeds to a debate and a conclusion you should deal with cases on their merits.
5. It may be appropriate for you to refer in Council to United Kingdom action to obtain assurance that Israel will not attack Jordan and Israel's assurance of October 29,

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

2.

0.14830/1/2/3/4

(Eden's speech Oct. 30) to which she has adhered.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

(Cost £75.9.10)

5th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UN@	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EA&ME	E	AF&ME
INF	DL	C&P	MT						

CONFIDENTIAL

95

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DBB.MMc

0.14835/36/37/38/39/40/41
14842/43/44/45/46/47.

Sent: 3rd November, 1956
2150

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON (Immediate) Please pass immediately to European posts.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK (IMMEDIATE) Please pass immediately to Washington
and Ottawa.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON (IMMEDIATE).

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

COLOMBO.

NEW DELHI.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

RANGOON.

Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR (Please pass to Singapore).

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

MANILA.

TOKYO.

UNCLASSIFIED.

The following is the text of a statement issued today
by the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, 3rd November 1956.

"As I pointed out in my statement to Parliament, the
action taken by the United Kingdom and France was and is
police action; the only quick and practical means of
separating the belligerents and protecting the Canal.

"Without such police action the Israel-Egypt position
might by now have become completely out of hand with
spreading consequences.

"If the United Nations Assembly accepts the idea of a
United Nations police force in and around the Canal, and the
Security Council adopts it and acts on it the object of
protection of the Canal will have been achieved. Meanwhile
it is clear that the United Kingdom and France cannot
withdraw. Police action, to be effective, must be continuous
while the danger exists.

94

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.14835/36/37/38/39/40/41
42/43/44/45/46/47.

"I fear there is much confusion about the position of Egypt. That the author of the Suez Canal confiscation and the promoter of anti-British and anti-Israel activities in the Middle East should now be represented as the innocent victim of unprovoked aggression is, of course, both wrong and absurd.

"We will await the concrete development of Mr. Pearson's helpful proposal for an international police force with most sympathetic interest."

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s DEPT.
P.M.'s.

(COST £249.3.8)

7th November, 1956.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.A.P&ME
E	AP&ME	INT	DL	C&P	MT			

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

:ABK.

0.14836/7/6/9/40/1/2/3/4/5/6/7.

Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
2100.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.

Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.

U/N. UNCLASSIFIED.

London please pass immediate European Posts. New York
please pass immediate to Washington and Ottawa. Kuala Lumpur
please pass to Singapore.

The following is the text of:-

Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, 3rd November, 1956.

As I pointed out in my statement to Parliament, the action
taken by the United Kingdom and France was and is police action;
the only quick and practical means of separating the belligerents
and protecting the Canal.

Without such police action the Israel-Egypt position
might by now have become completely out of hand with spreading
consequences.

If the United Nations Assembly accepts the idea of a
United Nations police force in and around the Canal, and the
Security Council adopts it and acts on it, the object of pro-
tection of the Canal will have been achieved. Meanwhile it is
clear that the United Kingdom and France cannot withdraw.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

2. 0.14836/7/8/9/40/1/2/3/4/5/6/7.

Police action, to be effective, must be continuous while the danger exists.

I fear there is much confusion about the position of Egypt. That the author of the Suez Canal confiscation and the promoter of anti-British and anti-Israel activities in the Middle East should now be represented as the innocent victim of unprovoked aggression is, of course, both wrong and absurd.

We will await the concrete development of Mr. Pearson's helpful proposal for an international police force with most sympathetic interest.

P.M. & DEPT.
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

4th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

SW:SH

O. 14826

TO:

Sent: 3rd November, 1956
1830

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

209. RESTRICTED - PRIORITY

Egypt.

Your telegram 1970.

Walker abstained on United States resolution in
Security Council because -

- (a) terms of resolution reached us too late to send instructions,
- (b) the investigation of the facts by the Council which he had asked for (under instructions) had not occurred.

2. Main points of Prime Minister's statement on 1st November are in my immediately following telegram.

(COST £6.15.0)

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

5th November, 1956

SEC	A/SS	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EA&ME	E
AF&ME	INF	DL	C&P	MT					

G

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED.

PRENS

O.14827

Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
1745

TO:

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

309. UNCLASSIFIED.

Our telegram 209.

Prime Minister made interalia following points as well as those contained in paragraph 1 of our circular telegram.

(Please take in text of Canberra
Cable 309 - O.14734 to Tokyo)

(Cont 222.18.0)

5th November, 1956.

E.A.
E.M.B.

SEC A/cs UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DI C&P MT.

Amended Copy

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

UNCLASSIFIED.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

PREIS

O.14827

Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
1745

TO:

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.

U/N

UNCLASSIFIED.

Our telegram 209.

Prime Minister made interalia following points as well as those contained in paragraph 1 of our circular telegram.

(Please take in text of Canberra
Cable 309 - O.14734 to Tokyo)

(Cont 222.18.0)

5th November, 1956.

E.A.
T.M's.

SEC	A/CS	UN	PAC&AM	S&SEA	SA	EAF&ME	E	AF&ME
INF	DI	C&P	MT.					

88

FH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

DW:HP

0.14814
Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
1315

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

253. SECRET. PRIORITY.

For Cutler from Secretary.

A.B.C. has reported you as saying that there would be no organised evacuation for the thirty to fifty Australians in Egypt and that the Mission had given Australian nationals no advice.

2. Grateful for advice on this report. Your memoranda 510 and 439 refer.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
A/ " " " Trade (Canb.) (Mr. McIntock)
P.M.'s.

Cost - £3.13.4.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
C&P@ ADMIN PERS TRAV

SECRET

87

✓

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **CONFIDENTIAL**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DW:HP

O.14813
Sent: 3rd November, 1956.
1245

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

252. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Press reports "British subjects" must register with Police within three days. Are Australian citizens involved or only United Kingdom?

2. Press also reports that British banks seized and sealed. How does this affect you?

3. Please advise us regarding safety of Australian citizens.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " " Trade(C)(Mr. McLintock)
P.M.'s.

Cost - £3.11.8.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL C&P ADMIN PERS TRAV

CONFIDENTIAL

P2

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

...:SH

O. 14829

TO:

Sent: 3rd November, 1956
1200

British Embassy,
A N K A R A.

EX.459. UNCLASSIFIED

Your 1 in reply my EX449. QEA services are operated with super Constellations 4 times weekly between Australia and London. Routeings, days and times of arrival and departure Istanbul in local times as follows -

First frequency west bound flight EM535 arrive 1140 depart 1240 each Friday. East bound Friday EM536 arrive 0705 depart 0805 each Monday routeing Australia, Djakarta, Singapore, Colombo, Bombay, Karachi, Basra, Istanbul, Rome, London.

Second frequency west bound flight EM531 arrive 1140 depart 1240 each Tuesday. Eastbound flight EM532 arrive 0905 depart 1005 each Friday routeing Australia, Djakarta, Singapore, Bangkok, Calcutta, Karachi, Basra, Istanbul, Rome, Frankfurt, London.

Third frequency west bound flight EM533 each Thursday. East bound flight EM534 each Saturday timings as for first frequency route as for second frequency omission Frankfurt.

Fourth frequency west bound flight EM513 arrive 1140 depart 1240 each Sunday. East bound flight EM514 arrive 0505 depart 0615 each Wednesday route as for second frequency omission Djakarta, Bangkok and Frankfurt. On eastbound flights Basra may also be omitted at discretion of Captain.

In addition special Olympic super constellation flight will operate west bound as EM513/236A arrive 1140 depart 1240 on 7th November and east bound as EM514/236A arrive 0350 depart 0500 on 9th November.

As we understand 115/145 octane fuel will not be available Istanbul until 5th November flight EM532/118 and EM534/035 east bound and EM513/236 west bound all on 4th November will call Athens instead of Istanbul.

External.

(COST £21.2.6)

MIN & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

5th November, 1956

SEC A/SS UN ERQ PAC&AM S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL C&P MT ADMIN TRAV

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

JPW:EGM:

1. 14770

FROM:

Dated: 2nd November, 1956
1211

Rec'd: 3rd November, 1956
0830

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1189. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your telegrams 915 and 919.

Both Western Union and Commercial Cable Co.,
say they are accepting and delivering traffic addressed to Cairo.

2. Your telegram 920 has been passed to Cutler.

Blakeney.

E.A.

3rd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME AF&ME INF C&P
ADMIN EXCOMMS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

:EGM:

I. 14741

FROM:

Dated: 2nd November, 1956
1148
Rec'd: 3rd November, 1956
0830

B owker,
ANKARA.

1. UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

Following received from Ankara dated 1st November. Addressed Foreign Office 881 repeated Canberra 1.

B.O.A.C. services and Canberra telegram EX449.

Qantas Empire Airways Services.

We have made representations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but have not yet received a reply.

2. Meanwhile local B.E.A. representative has been informed by official concerned in Civil Air Administration, Department of Ministry of Communications, that

(1) Routes specified in Foreign Office telegram 1877 are acceptable to Turkish Authorities:

(2) Turkish Authorities require by 1000 hours 3rd November, through diplomatic channel, full details of B.O.A.C. and Qantas services being diverted to overfly Turkey including types of aircraft, routes and weekly schedules. They will then give general approval and no further detailed requests for clearance will be necessary:

(3) Until 3rd November, B.O.A.C. and Qantas may continue with diverted flights over and technical stop in Turkey which Turkish Authorities will regard as emergency measures in accordance with terms of I.C.A.O. Convention.

3. None of this has yet been confirmed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs but according to local B.E.A. representative, Civil Air Administration Department has already cabled above information direct to all International airlines concerned.

A/MIN. & DEPT: E.A.
MIN. & DEPT: CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'s

(T/T Civ. Aviat. Melb)

3rd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER@ ALL SECTIONS

84

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

JW.MMc

I.14754

Dated: 2nd November 1956
1535
Rec'd: 3rd November 1956
0500

FROM:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

114. SECRET.

Your telegram 111.

Tel Aviv means the United Kingdom Consular district of Tel Aviv in which, for this purpose, the Israel side of Jerusalem will be included. This area embraces all Israel south of Hadera.

2. It is our understanding that similar arrangements are contemplated for the Haifa Consular district i.e. all Israel north of Hadera. (Refer to the appropriate warning letter annexed my memorandum 278, 4th August).

3. As you know the only Legation dependents are Mrs. Holland and three children. No intention of evacuating them yet. If the situation warranted, the British Embassy wives will be evacuated to Cyprus in the first instance and the Holland family will accompany them. Only short stay in Cyprus and onward movement to Athens or other suitable places for the duration of the emergency envisaged.

4. Assume Miss Cram would stay with the Legation. If this is wrong, please advise.

5. Revised list of citizens, according to the best information we can procure, will be sent by next bag.

Ballard.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (1520/62)
P.M.'s.

3rd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss E.AF&ME AF&ME C&PC ADMIN PERS TRAV

83

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

SHA:HP

O.14785
Sent: 2nd November, 1956.
1730

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

919. RESTRICTED. EMERGENCY.

For Blakeney.

Our 915.

If you have any means of sending message in figure
cypher being cabled separately to Cutler glad if you could
arrange.

External Affairs.

Cost - £3.10.0.

5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA E.AF&ME AF&ME INF C&P ADMIN
EXCOMMS

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

....:SH

I. 14729

Dated: 1st November, 1956
2305
Rec'd: 2nd November, 1956
1630

FROM:

Australian Legation,
C A I R O

271. UNCLASSIFIED

"Aeolian" sailed without evacuee party. Valerie O'Neill remaining Alexandria pending efforts to obtain another ship. Her safety is being watched closely. Athens advised.

Cutler.

A/MIN & DEPT EA
A/MIN & DEPT TRADE (MR. MCCLINTOCK)

2nd November, 1956

SEC A/S's S&SEA EAF&ME AF&ME C&P ADMIN@ PERS TRAV@

....:SH

I. 14729

Dated: 1st November, 1956
2305
Rec'd: 2nd November, 1956
1630

Australian Legation,
C A I R O

"Aeolian" sailed without evacuee party. Valerie O'Neill remaining Alexandria pending efforts to obtain another ship. Her safety is being watched closely. Athens advised.

Cutler.

A/MIN & DEPT EA
A/MIN & DEPT TRADE (MR. MCCLINTOCK)

2nd November, 1956

SEC A/S's S&SEA EAF&ME AF&ME C&P ADMIN@ PERS TRAV@

....:SH

I. 14729

Dated: 1st November, 1956
2305
Rec'd: 2nd November, 1956
1630

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR FILE

UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY : EGYPT.

Walker spoke to the Secretary this afternoon on the telephone and said that the United States had submitted a Resolution calling on all parties to cease fire and to desist from sending any further forces to the area. He said that, as far as he could see, this Resolution would gain wide support.

2. Walker was given the following instructions:-

- (a) He was to vote against the United States Resolution;
- (b) He was to vote against any Resolution calling upon the United Kingdom and France to withdraw;
- (c) He was to abstain on any Resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its forces;
- (d) He was to support any resolution recommending an Israeli withdrawal and the laying down of arms by Egypt.

WVZ 2/11

2nd November, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

O.14746

Sent: 2nd November, 1956.
1510

OA/BH

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

915. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

O.T.C. are not accepting telegraph traffic
for Egypt. Please advise whether American telegraph
companies are still accepting and delivering traffic
addressed to Cairo.

(Cost \$4.0.0)

E. A.

5th November, 1956.

SEC	A/S(Div1)	A/S(Div3)	A/S(Div4)	UN	PAC&AM
S&SEA	EA&ME	AF&ME	INF	C&P	ADMIN EXCOMMS@

80

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

MCR:VA

O. 14725

Sent: 2nd November, 1956
1340

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

353. RESTRICTED.

Your 292 paragraph 6. Please see our unnumbered
Guidance Circular telegram and telegram No. 352.

- - - - -

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

(Cost 10/10)
5th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

79

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RESTRICTED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

MMC:ABK.

I.14717.

FROM:

Dated: 1st November, 1956.
1818.
Rec'd; 2nd November, 1956.
1300.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1186. RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Personal.

Repeated London 161 for Minister.

For Prime Minister.

The Ambassador phoned me from the ship this afternoon and asked me to pass you the following immediate message.

Begins.

Information on ship very scanty. Am unable to evaluate situation. However, I wish you to know I am prepared to fly back to Washington with my wife from Australia or any intermediate point of call if the Government should decide this at any time would be necessary. Next Port from which this could be done after Honolulu is Wellington, New Zealand, where we arrive on 15th November. I reach Honolulu tomorrow 2nd November, at 9.00 a.m. and the ship sails at 5.00 p.m.

I shall be with Stump all day. Glad of your immediate views to reach me tomorrow care of Stump whom I shall phone immediately the ship reaches Honolulu.

Regards,

Spender.

ENDS.

Blakeney.

PRIME MINISTER.
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/S(DIV.1) A/S(DIV.3) A/S(DIV.4) UN PAC&AM E.A.F&ME.

RESTRICTED

2nd November, 1956.

Travel to the Middle East.

MR. KEVIN

In answer to Immigration's enquiry whether any restrictive measures should be brought in my own feeling is against this. The position is very unclear and on the whole I do not think it to our advantage to attempt a precise regulation of travel to Israel, Egypt or elsewhere in the area.

2. If however, arising in particular from our arrangement with the Egyptians for granting visas for Egypt, Immigration feel the present position to be embarrassing, I agree the best course is for Australian passports to be restricted to the extent of making them invalid for travel to Israel and Egypt. The problem would still arise however of dealing with requests for visas for Egypt made by holders of other than Australian passports.

3. The impossibility of physical travel into the countries concerned is, in the last resort, the best guarantee of limiting movement.

(F.H. Stuart)
Consular & Protocol Branch.

FHS /AG

Mr. Robinson
2/11

175/11/20.

RADIO AUSTRALIA : POINTS TO REFUTE ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION
BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE AND ISRAEL.

A number of accusations have been made that this action by Israel against Egypt was taken in collusion with the United Kingdom and French Governments. Nothing could be further from the truth, as will become apparent if we examine the circumstances and atmosphere in which the action was taken and subsequent undertakings by the United Kingdom and French Governments.

1. It will be remembered that early in October Jordan, fearing an attack by Israel, appealed to Iraq for military assistance and that, as a result of this appeal, Iraq stationed troops and aircraft on the Iraqi-Jordan border and promised to send these troops to Jordan's aid if she were attacked by Israel. Israel protested in no uncertain terms, and it will be remembered that the United Kingdom found it necessary to warn Israel that if it did attack Jordan, the United Kingdom would consider itself compelled to come to Jordan's aid and to honour its obligations under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. The Israeli Government's reaction ~~is~~ one of concern and astonishment at what it chose to describe as "Britain's threat to take up arms against Israel." Surely it is inconceivable that the United Kingdom should be planning with Israel an attack on Egypt at the very time that she was issuing these grave warnings to Israel.

2. Looked at in another way, it is equally inconceivable that the United Kingdom and France would consciously bring about a situation which would seriously jeopardise their vast interests in the Middle East. It is well-known, for instance, that the economies of the United Kingdom and France are vitally dependent on Middle East oil supplies. Surely it cannot be contended that the United Kingdom and France have participated in an action which seriously threatens these interests, and, in fact, it is clear from the nature of their ultimatum that their intention is to separate the belligerents with a view to preventing war in the Middle East.

76

3. It is quite inconsistent with the whole history of British and French policy in the Middle East to contend that, after years of patient counselling and untiring efforts on the part of these two countries in their attempts to bring peace and stability to the area, they ^{should} ~~are~~, at this stage, indulge in a complete reversal of policy by actively encouraging hostilities. Without passing judgment on whether the Israelis were justified or not in taking this action against Egypt, it is quite clear that the initiative was Israel's and Israel's alone. If the moral leadership of the United Kingdom and France over all these centuries is to count for anything, we must surely accept their solemn assurance that the action they are taking in Egypt has been forced on them, not willingly sought, and that they regard themselves as taking only the minimum of police action of a temporary nature in this emergency.

2/11/56

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SHA.

O.14734.

PRESS

Dated: 2nd November, 1956.
1230

TO:

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.

309.

UNCLASSIFIED.IMMEDIATE.

Prime Minister in statement to the House on situation in Egypt made, inter alia, following points as well as those contained in paragraph 1 of our Circular Telegram.

1. Summarizing facts leading up to present situation, he said "There can be little doubt that around the Israeli frontiers the faults have by no means been all on one side."
2. "When the invasion occurred....within relatively few hours it therefore became clear that, if the invasion were resolutely pursued and resolutely resisted, there would, almost inevitably, be fighting over and around the Suez Canal with quite probably a complete interruption of traffic, loss of ships and lives, and a high degree of danger that the Canal itself might be effectively closed for a long time."
3. "It is, in our opinion, a great misfortune that differences of view should have occurred between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other. Such differences, which proceed from honest divergences upon matters of judgment can easily be fanned into bitterness by intemperate statements by observers in both Continents."
4. With regard to Commonwealth consultation, the Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom was not at fault at all. "The circumstances were those of great emergency." He added, "There was literally no time to be lost if any action was to be taken to keep the combatants out of the Canal area, and afford it proper protection."
5. With regard to the propriety of the action taken by Great Britain and France, he said that the Government of Australia believed that "the action was proper". Continuing, he said "It had already been demonstrated, in the case of the Israeli ships, that a resolution passed by the Security Council and condemning Egypt can be set at nought in the absence of strong executive action. Israel has also ignored some United Nations views. It was quite clear that the procedures of the Security Council were such that even assuming that some resolution could be carried, the Canal would have been involved in war long before any United Nations' action could become effective."
6. He reminded the House that "all the negotiations with Egypt about the Canal have been designed to produce a peaceful settlement giving effective guarantees of a non-political administration of the Canal. It would be tragic if this great matter became obscured."
7. He concluded by saying that "It is still open to Egypt to end the present military operations by accepting the proposition that like Israel, it should withdraw its troops for ten miles from the Canal so that great international and human interests will not be subordinated to what might, under other circumstances and in another place, be regarded as a purely local dispute."

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.14734.

- 2 -

8. He said, "We have not been asked to make any commitments ourselves nor have we made any."

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN P C&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P
G

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

::HP

0,14710/11/12/13/14
Sent: 1st November, 1956.
11.16 p.m.

TO: (PRESS)

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....352.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.....266.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.....237.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.....502.

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.....112.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Prime Minister in statement to the House on situation in Egypt made, inter alia, following points as well as those contained in paragraph 1 of our unnumbered circular telegram.

1. Summarizing facts leading up to present situation, he said "there can be little doubt that around the Israeli frontiers the faults have by no means been all on one side. The plain fact is that Israel exists in a state of international tension. Egypt still claimed months ago to be technically at war with Israel. Following upon his recent coup in respect of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian President has increasingly felt that he can defy the great and interested nations".

2. "When the invasion occurred....within relatively few hours it therefore became clear that, if the invasion were resolutely pursued and resolutely resisted, there would, almost inevitably be fighting over and around the Suez Canal with quite probably a complete interruption of traffic, loss of ships and lives, and a high degree of danger that the Canal itself might be effectively closed for a long time".

3. "It is, in our opinion, a great misfortune that differences of view should have occurred between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other. Such differences, which proceed from honest divergences upon matters of judgment, can easily be fanned into bitterness by intemperate statements by observers in both Continents. We have, in these circumstances, heard with pleasure the statement made this morning by President Eisenhower. True in that statement he has clearly maintained the American view that force in the Middle East is both unwise and improper. But he went on to say that what he had said on that point was in no way to minimise American friendship for Great Britain and France, and American determination to maintain that friendship".

4. With regard to Commonwealth consultation, the Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom was not at fault at all. "The circumstances were those of great emergency". He added, "there was literally no time to be lost if any action was to be taken to keep the combatants out of the Canal area, and afford it proper protection".

5. With regard to the propriety of the action taken by Great Britain and France, he said that the Government of Australia believed that "the action was proper". Continuing, he said, "It had already been demonstrated, in the case of the Israeli ships, that /a resolution.....

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2-

0.14710/1/2/3/4

a resolution passed by the Security Council and condemning Egypt can be set at nought in the absence of strong executive action. Israel has also ignored some United Nations views. It was quite clear that the procedures of the Security Council were such that even assuming that some resolution could be carried, the Canal would have been involved in war long before any United Nations' action could become effective".

6. With regard to relations with the United States he said, "I have myself within the last twenty-four hours or less urged upon British and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur on a high level, in order to reconcile any differences of opinion and produce a result satisfactory to all". "I would like to urge with all humility that our friends in America should understand the pressure of events upon both Great Britain and France, and the true nature of the action taken by them; action which, if both resolute and prompt, may well be the only means now existing for preventing a general conflagration in the Middle East".

7. He reminded the House that "all the negotiations with Egypt about the Canal have been designed to produce a peaceful settlement giving effective guarantees of a non-political administration of the Canal. It would be tragic if this great matter became obscured".

8. He concluded by saying that "it is still open to Egypt to end the present military operations by accepting the proposition that, like Israel, it should withdraw its troops for ten miles from the Canal so that great international and human interests will not be subordinated to what might, under other circumstances and in another place, be regarded as a purely local dispute".

9. He said "We have not been asked to make any commitments ourselves nor have we made any".

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £127.0.0.

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P
G

76



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

13 NOV 1956

1957/11/20

CANBERRA

In reply quote No. 1/1/4/5.

Memo. No. 339/56.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV.

1st November, 1956.

The Secretary,
Dept. of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Last night the Legation received from London via the British Embassy diplomatic wireless a telegram which although purporting to come from the High Commissioner I took after further inspection to have come from you and to be in fact your telegram 108 to this post.

2. The message does not contain any indication of its time of origin and therefore I do not know at what point you were embarrassed by lack of news, but insofar as the telegram implies criticism of the Legation I shall now detail the way Tuesday the 30th October was spent.

3. Our Israel Clerk/Telephonist/Receptionist/Interpreter had previously been called up and was not available.

4. The Israel Army communique was, I believe, announced from Kol Israel at about 10pm. on Monday, 29th October. On that same evening I had had some information of it from a friendly Military Attaché but it was not until the morning of Tuesday the 30th that I could see its full terms in the press. By this time it was 4pm. your time and Radio Australia had already been able to announce it.

5. Seeing that no additional detailed information of engagements, clashes, and so on was available ^{was} taking place indeed in Egypt not Israel - there was no factual information available which would have helped you.

6. In order to get as much background and general information as I could before telegraphing you I secured appointments with both the U.S. Ambassador and the British Ambassador, with whom I was from 11am. to 1pm.

7. Pending going off to these appointments it appeared to me that priority should be given to considering emergency arrangements, concerning ~~with~~ which instructions had been sought three months previously but had not yet been received. I decided to send out the "warning letter" and drafted this, and as it was quite impossible for upwards of 200 letters to be typed in the office, arrangements were made to have them duplicated outside. It also seemed desirable to have an emergency reserve of cash and we consulted with the bank as to arranging this; currency notes turned out to be unavailable and so we arranged to draw travellers' cheques. Mr. Holland was attending to these two pieces of business while I was with the Ambassadors. I should emphasize the extent to which the tempo of doing any business in Tel Aviv has been slowed down by the extreme depletion of manpower.

8. We all had some lunch at the usual time, which turned out to be a good thing seeing we were not able to take food next until after 9pm.

9. Immediately after lunch it was necessary for Mr. Holland

70

CR

and me to go to the bank and sign and collect the travellers' cheques. On return to the Legation Mr. Holland was able to start preparing the addresses for typing "warning letter" envelopes, and I was able to start drafting outward messages. During the morning, of course, Miss Cram had been fully engaged with, inter alia, end of the month accounting work, decyphering of inward messages, and so on.

10. The drafting, typing and cyphering of my telegrams 105 and 107 were still in progress when I was invited to attend the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This involved car travelling for about an hour in the newly imposed blackout and about half an hour with the official concerned. On return to the Legation I drafted my telegram 109 reporting this interview. *(at about 8.15 p.m.)*

11. From this point on Miss Cram, Mr. Holland and I were all engaged either in cyphering the above outward telegrams or in decyphering your inward messages 105, 106 and 107. We were, however, interrupted in this after 9 o'clock by an air raid warning which lasted for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours; it was during this period that we were able to take a light meal. After the air raid warning was over we all continued with the telegrams, and it was not until shortly before midnight that we were able to lodge them at the cable office. Owing both to the blackout and the fact that transport at that time of night was non-existent, we had been obliged to let both drivers go off some hours earlier as both live a considerable distance from the Legation. Even if we had had the drivers driving through the blackout would still necessarily have been slow.

12. Thus it was shortly before midnight when ^{some} ~~the sum~~ of the telegrams were lodged which is, of course, 8am. Canberra time, and allowing for time in transmission it is quite probable you would not have received them before noon on the following day. This is regrettable but so far as I can see we are victims in this of the difference in clock time.

13. I trust you will agree that all the members of the Legation staff made the best use of their time on Tuesday and that the work was undertaken in the proper priorities. If you disagree with this please let me know, for my future guidance.

14. I should be glad if this might be brought to the attention of the officer who ~~lodged~~ ^{originated} your telegram 108.

B.C. Ballard
(B.C. Ballard)
Minister.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

:HP

O.14688

Sent: 1st November, 1956.
2100

TO:

ALL POSTS (Except San Francisco, Dili, Noumea)

U/N. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

(London please pass copy to Mr. Casey).

The following is interim guidance on the attitude you should take in discussion on the Anglo-French intervention in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. It should be read with Prime Minister's statement which is expected to be made later today.

(1) Australia accepts that the Anglo-French intervention was a necessary emergency measure by two great democratic Powers:

- (a) not to make war - but to prevent war by separating two belligerents.
- (b) not to seek territory or national advantage - but to assure to the whole world the treaty rights of continued free access through the international waterway by protecting its installations and ships from damage from Israel-Egypt hostilities.
- (c) not to impose a settlement in the Egypt-Israel dispute - but to discharge limited function essential for reaching settlement.
- (d) not to maintain forces permanently in Egypt - but to withdraw them as soon as the stated purpose has been achieved.
- (e) not to usurp the right of the Security Council to settle the Egypt-Israel dispute - but to ensure that, when choosing a method of settlement, the Security Council would not have as part of the factual background for its deliberations the prior destruction or dislocation of the Suez Canal.
- (f) not to involve the settlement of the dispute on the operation of the Canal with Arab-Israel disputes - but to prevent that involvement.

If hostilities between Egypt and Israel are allowed to develop over the Canal, efforts to obtain agreement on its future operation would be profoundly affected. Egypt and Israel might use their military position as a factor in the settlement of a problem in which such considerations would be entirely unjustified.

(2) While Israeli action is not defended it is considered essential that the history of the Arab-Israel situation be looked at in its entirety.

(3) Criticism of Anglo-French failure to seek Security Council approval for their intervention should be met by

SECRET

/reference.....

68

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

-2-

O.14688

reference to inadequate responses of both Egypt and Israel in the past to Security Council resolutions, appeals and other efforts; and crucial importance of time.

(4) Present situation should be treated as unique. It is an action taken by two powers with treaty rights in the security and free passage of the Canal. Both powers have major interests involved and extensive property in jeopardy.

(5) It is of critical importance to prevent any further deterioration of Anglo-American relations.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £886.8.10

2nd November, 1956.

67

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

DW:SH

O. 14700

TO:

Sent: 1st November, 1956
2025

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N

2567. UNCLASSIFIED - IMMEDIATE

Please pass our 2566 (Prime Minister's statement)
immediate to Paris 260, Hague 174, Rome 366, Geneva 334, Bonn 383.

(COST £1.16.8)

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

2nd November, 1956

SEC	A/S's	UN	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	EA&ME	E
AF&ME	INF	DL	MT	C&P					

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

AS PRESS

0.14694-99

Sent: 1st November, 1956
2020

TO:

Australia High Commission,
LONDON. (For External).....2566

Repeat to:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.....260

Australian Embassy,
THE HAGUE.....174

Australian Legation,
ROME.....366

Australian Consulate-General,
GENEVA.....334

Australian Embassy,
BONN.....383

UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

Following is text of Prime Minister's Statement
delivered 2000 1st November:-

(Then follows full text of Statement).

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

2nd November, 1956
(Cost £84/2/6)

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E. AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DW:SHA

0.14693.

TO:

Dated: 1st November, 1956.
2020

Australian Mission to United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

426.

UNCLASSIFIED.

EMERGENCY.

Please pass our 425 (P.M.'s statement)
emergency to Washington 909 and Ottawa 169.

Cost \$1/18/-

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
C&P

62

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SHA.

0.14689/90/1.

PRESS

Dated: 1st November, 1956.
2015

TO:

Australian Mission to United
Nations,
NEW YORK.....425

Pass by New York to:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....909

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....169

UNCLASSIFIED. EMERGENCY.

Following is text of Prime Minister's
statement delivered 2000 1st November:

(Then follows full text of statement).

Cost £224

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT
C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

JERC:AS

PRESS

O.14692

Sent: 1st November, 1956
2015

TO:

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.

336. UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

Following is text of Prime Minister's Statement
delivered 2000 1st November:-

(Then follows full text of Statement).

A/MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

2nd November, 1956
(Cost \$22/8/8)

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ML
AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

W. Billington

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
in the House of Representatives
at 8 p.m., Thursday, 1st November, 1956.

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

The facts in relation to the Middle East are not as yet completely clear though events are obviously developing very rapidly.

The movement of Israeli troops across the Egyptian frontier occurred only a few days ago, but it was preceded by events going back over some years. Twelve days ago the Israeli Prime Minister made a speech in which he discussed the charges made against Israel of conducting forays across her frontiers. He countered this by saying that Israel had a perfect right to self-defence to seek redress for attacks made inside her own frontiers. He complained that the United Nations authorities had shown a tendency to transform to armistice agreements into unilateral obligations by Israel to the United Nations and ignore breaches of them by the Arab States. He said that the helplessness of the United Nations regarding Israel's passage through the Suez Canal had been obvious for years. There can be little doubt that around the Israeli frontiers the faults have by no means been all on one side.

The plain fact is that Israel exists in a state of international tension. Egypt still claimed months ago to be technically at war with Israel and has, in fact, throughout used that as the justification for her exclusion of Israeli ships from the Canal.

Following upon his recent coup in respect of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian President has increasingly felt that he can defy the great and interested nations. It is well known that he has established military contacts with Syria and has been actively developing his own position by propaganda in the states east of Jordan.

It is not my intention at the present time to examine whether the Israeli invasion of Egypt falls within either the letter or the spirit of the relevant agreements. But it seems to be only just to point out that the geographical and political situation of Israel is such as to give the Israeli people the greatest feeling of apprehension.

However, when the invasion occurred, Egypt, as was to be expected, put in train military measures to repel it. Within a relatively few hours it therefore became clear that, if the invasion were resolutely pursued and resolutely resisted, there would, almost inevitably, be fighting over and around the Suez Canal with quite probably a complete interruption of traffic, loss of ships and lives, and a high degree of danger that the Canal itself might be effectively closed for a long time. In this state of affairs, the matter was promptly taken to the Security Council. What happened there is fairly well known but I will briefly recall it.

When it first became known to us that the Security Council was meeting urgently, our instructions to our representative on the Council, Dr. Walker, were that before any resolution was passed the Council should satisfy itself about the facts which, at that time, were in Canberra completely obscure; we pointed out to him that judgment by the Security Council should not be
/too hasty

61

too hasty and should follow a quick ascertainment of the facts rather than precede it. The Council had placed before it by the representative of the United States a resolution in the following terms:

"Security Council noting that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian Territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, expressing its grave concern at this violation of Armistice Agreement,

- (1) Calls upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire.
- (2) Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind established Armistice lines.
- (3) Calls upon all members, (a) to refrain from use of force or threat of force in the area in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, (b) to assist the United Nations in ensuring integrity of Armistice Agreements, (c) to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it has not complied with this resolution.
- (4) Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed in compliance with this resolution and to make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area by implementation of this and prior resolution."

It will be seen that this resolution called upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces behind Armistice lines, called upon all members to refrain from the use of force or threat of force, and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it had not complied with the resolution.

Great Britain and France voted against this resolution being plainly of opinion that it was aimed at imposing disabilities upon Israel, and Israel only. The Australian representative abstained from voting for, by the time the terms of the resolution reached us, it was too late to add to the instructions already given and, in any event, the investigation of the facts asked for by Dr. Walker had not occurred. His abstention was, therefore, the sensible and proper course. Subsequently, the Soviet Union proposed a resolution in the following terms:

"Security Council noting that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian Territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, expressing its grave concern at this violation of Armistice Agreement,

- (1) Calls upon Egypt and Israel immediately to cease fire.
- (2) Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind established Armistice lines.
- (3) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed in compliance with this resolution and to make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area by implementation of this and prior resolution."

This was voted for by Dr. Walker, since it appeared to embody acceptable general principles, but it was, having regard to the developments which were then occurring, voted against by Great Britain and France with the United States abstaining.

/The disability

The disability attending the Security Council's deliberations is not so much that there were vetoes, since these are to be expected in cases where international tension is high and where the permanent members do not find themselves all on one side. But it is, in our opinion, a great misfortune that differences of view should have occurred between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other. Such differences, which proceed from honest divergences upon matters of judgment, can easily be fanned into bitterness by intemperate statements by observers in both Continents.

We have, in these circumstances, heard with pleasure the statement made this morning by President Eisenhower. True, in that statement he has clearly maintained the American view that force in the Middle East is both unwise and improper. But he went on to say that what he had said on that point was in no way to minimise American friendship for Great Britain and France, and American determination to maintain that friendship. He added, no doubt with lively recollection of the events in August and September, that Britain and France have been subject to repeated provocation.

To return to the narrative, we were early yesterday morning advised from our Acting High Commissioner in London that the United Kingdom had in mind calling upon both Israel and Egypt to cease fighting and to withdraw their forces from the neighbourhood of the Canal. At 1 p.m. yesterday, we were advised that the matter was under most urgent consideration by the United Kingdom cabinet. At 1.30, we learned that Great Britain and France had delivered what was in effect an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel calling for an answer within 12 hours.

The terms of that ultimatum required that both sides should stop all fighting immediately and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal. Furthermore, in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal, the Egyptian Government was asked to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

Immediately thereafter, we learned that Egypt had rejected the ultimatum, though Israel was prepared to act upon it if Egypt was also agreeable. It is, as yet, not clear what military operations have been instituted by Great Britain and France but the House will be informed of any developments.

I now proceed to say something about two developments which will present themselves to the minds of Honourable Members in relation to the actions of Great Britain and France.

First, is the United Kingdom at fault in not having engaged in a pre-consultation with the other British Commonwealth countries? Our answer to this question is that she was not at fault at all. The circumstances were those of great emergency. Hostile armed forces were rapidly approaching each other, and extensive combat was imminent. As I have said, in that combat vital interests in the passage of the Canal were quite likely to suffer the most serious damage. The Canal is an international waterway with a guaranteed freedom of passage for the ships of all nations; but that guarantee would cease to have much value if the Canal itself were put out of action by becoming part of a theatre of active war. There was literally no time to be lost if any action was to be taken to keep the combatants out of the Canal area, and afford it proper protection.

Effective consultation (and I say "effective" because a mere "form of consultation" would have been quite useless)

/would plainly

would plainly have occupied considerable time and the urgent position might have fallen into irretrievable disaster. In our opinion, therefore, Great Britain, whose Canal and other Middle East economic interests are so vast, was correct in proceeding upon her own judgment and accepting her own responsibility. We are not living in an academic world. The normal processes of consultation should always be followed wherever possible but there are instances like the present one in which events move too fast for normal processes.

The second great question that arises is as to the propriety of the action taken by Great Britain and France. Upon this point the Government of Australia believes that the action was proper. It had already been demonstrated, in the case of the Israeli ships, that a resolution passed by the Security Council and condemning Egypt can be set at naught in the absence of strong executive action. Israel has also ignored some United Nations views. It was quite clear that the procedures of the Security Council were such that even assuming that that some resolution could be carried, the Canal would have been involved in war long before any United Nations' action could become effective. Great Britain and France, therefore, decided that they would, so to speak, "hold the pass". Their purpose, as they plainly state, was to have the Israeli and Egyptian forces withdrawn from the Canal for a distance of 10 miles on either side so that the operation of the Canal would not be menaced. Their action, so considered, was a police action taken in a state of great emergency and was in fact calculated to keep the combatants apart and to enable counsels of moderation thereafter to prevail.

We see nothing sinister in all this. On the contrary, it seems to us to be quite realistic and to pay due regard to the moving and inexorable facts of life.

As I have said, it is a great misfortune that there should have arisen public differences between those great democracies whose friendly co-operation is so vital to us all and any breach between whom can give satisfaction only to the Communist powers in their continuing "cold" war.

I have myself urged upon British and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur on a high level, in order to reconcile any differences of opinion and produce a result satisfactory to all. I have a profound respect for the efforts made by both President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles to keep the peace of the world. Mr. Dulles has, in particular, been the subject, in my opinion, of a great deal of hostile but uninformed criticism. But I would like to urge with all humility that our friends in America should understand the pressure of events upon both Great Britain and France, and the true nature of the action taken by them; action which, if both resolute and prompt, may well be the only means now existing for preventing a general conflagration in the Middle East.

I could perhaps sum this aspect of the matter up by saying that the Anglo-French action represents an emergency measure by two of the great democratic Powers.

Their object is not to make war but to prevent war by separating two belligerents.

They are not seeking territorial advantage or subjugation of peoples but are aiming to assure to the whole world the treaty rights of continued free access to the international waterway by protecting its installations, the ships that use them, and the people who travel in those ships.

/They are not

They are not seeking to impose an arbitrary settlement in the Egypt-Israel dispute but to discharge a limited function which will enable a settlement to be reached.

They have made it clear that they are not seeking to maintain forces permanently in Egypt but will withdraw them as soon as the immediate purpose has been achieved.

They are not seeking to usurp the right of the Security Council to attempt to settle the Egypt-Israel dispute but are determined to ensure that when choosing a method of settlement the Security Council will not have to face the fact of the prior destruction or dislocation of the Suez Canal.

Above all, there is, as I believe, no desire to involve or confuse a settlement of the dispute about the operation of the Suez Canal with other Middle East disputes, but to prevent that involvement.

The practical effect of allowing hostilities between Egypt and Israel to develop over the Canal would be that, in future, efforts to obtain agreement on the vitally important Suez Canal question would be disastrously affected by the efforts of the present belligerents to use their military position as a factor in the settlement of a problem in which these considerations would be entirely out of place.

I remind the House that all the negotiations with Egypt about the Canal have been designed to produce a peaceful settlement giving effective guarantees of a non-political administration of the Canal. It would be tragic if this great matter became obscured.

I advise the House, if I may, against hasty judgments on the facts. Notwithstanding the elaborate provisions made by the Security Council for observers, there has as yet been no report from these observers; and there is still much room for doubt as to the precise nature of aggression and the identity of the people responsible.

In this statement, I am indicating the views of the Australian Government. We have not been asked to make any commitments ourselves nor have we made any. But I hope and believe that Australia will never be unwilling to offer its opinion upon a matter which so vitally concerns the United Kingdom and all those countries of the British Commonwealth to whom the Suez Canal is of vital economic importance.

May I remind the House that it is still open to Egypt, as Sir Anthony Eden has made clear, to end the present military operations by accepting the proposition that, like Israel, it should withdraw its troops for 10 miles from the Canal so that great international interests will not be subordinated to what might, under other circumstances and in another place, be regarded as a purely local dispute.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

...:VA

O. 14664

Sent: 1st November, 1956
1645

TO:

ALL POSTS EXCEPT RIO, SAN FRANCISCO, NOUMEA, DILI.

UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

Prime Minister will make statement in
Parliament at 8 p.m. CET 1st November.

A./MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

(Cost £35.6.4)
2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN CR P.C&M E. IM&SP S&SEA S. SEA E.A.F&ME
E A.F&ME INF DL C&P MT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

O.14681

DM/BH

Sent: 1st November, 1956.
1910

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV

111. SECRET IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram 110.

Paragraph 2(b) refers only to plans for Tel Aviv. What is position of Australians in other parts of Israel? We agree to your participation in British Embassy plan. We would agree to dual nationals being assisted if Israeli authorities consent.

2. If you have plans for evacuating Legation women and children please advise. Do you think situation yet warrants this?

3. We would be glad to have by first bag your latest detailed return of all Australian citizens indicating whether dual nationals or otherwise.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (1520/62)
P.M'S.

(Cost £2.14.2)

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/S(Div1) A/S(Div3) A/S(Div4) EAF&ME AF&ME
C&P@ ADMIN PERS TRAV.

SECRET

57

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

TP:HP

O.14682
Sent: 1st November, 1956.
1820

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2563. UNCLASSIFIED. IMMEDIATE.

For Casey from Tange.

Prime Minister will be making comprehensive statement
on Egyptian situation at 2000 hours today (Thursday). Text will
be telegraphed.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £9.10.0.

2nd November, 1956.

SEC A/S(Div.1) A/S(Div.3) A/S(Div.4) E.AF&ME AF&ME INF

S T A T E M E N T

by

THE PRIME MINISTER

THE RT. HON. R.G. MENZIES, C.H., Q.C., M.P.

on

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

made in the

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

Thursday, 1st November, 1956.

55(au)

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AT 8 P.M. THURSDAY, 1st NOVEMBER, 1956.

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

The facts in relation to the Middle East are not as yet completely clear though events are obviously developing very rapidly.

The movement of Israeli troops across the Egyptian frontier occurred only a few days ago, but it was preceded by events going back over some years. 12 days ago the Israeli Prime Minister made a speech in which he discussed the charges made against Israel of conducting forays across her frontiers. He countered this by saying that Israel had a perfect right to self-defence to seek redress for attacks made inside her own frontiers. He complained that the United Nations authorities had shown a tendency to transform the armistice agreements into unilateral obligations by Israel to the United Nations and ignore breaches of them by the Arab States. He said that the helplessness of the United Nations regarding Israel's passage through the Suez Canal had been obvious for years. There can be little doubt that around the Israeli frontiers the faults have by no means been all on one side.

The plain fact is that Israel exists in a state of international tension. Egypt still claimed months ago to be technically at war with Israel and has, in fact, throughout used that as the justification for her exclusion of Israeli ships from the Canal.

Following upon his recent coup in respect of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian President has increasingly felt that he can defy the great and interested nations.

It is well known that he has established military contacts with Syria and has been actively developing his own position by propaganda in the states east of Jordan.

It is not my intention at the present time to examine whether the Israeli invasion of Egypt falls within either the letter or the spirit of the relevant agreements. But it seems to be only just to point out that the geographical and political situation of Israel is such as to give the Israeli people the greatest feeling of apprehension.

However, when the invasion occurred, Egypt, as was to be expected, put in train military measures to repel it. Within a relatively few hours it therefore became clear that, if the invasion were resolutely pursued and resolutely resisted, there would, almost inevitably, be fighting over and around the Suez Canal with quite probably a complete interruption of traffic, loss of ships and lives, and a high degree of danger that the Canal itself might be effectively closed for a long time. In this state of affairs, the matter was promptly taken to the Security Council. What happened there is fairly well known but I will briefly recall it.

When it first became known to us that the Security Council was meeting urgently, our instructions to our representative on the Council, Dr. Walker, were that before any resolution was passed the Council should satisfy itself about the facts which, at that time, were in Canberra completely obscure; we pointed out to him that judgment by the Security Council should not be too hasty and should follow a quick ascertainment of the facts rather than precede it. The Council had placed before it by the representative of the United States a resolution in the following terms:

"Security Council noting that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian Territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, expressing its grave concern at this violation of Armistice Agreement."

- "(1) Calls upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire.
- (2) Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind established Armistice lines.
- (3) Calls upon all members, (a) to refrain from use of force or threat of force in the area in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, (b) to assist the United Nations in ensuring integrity of Armistice Agreements, (c) to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it has not complied with this resolution.
- (4) Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed in compliance with this resolution and to make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area by implementation of this and prior resolution."

It will be seen that this resolution called upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces behind certain Armistice lines, called upon all members to refrain from the use of force or threat of force, and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it had not complied with the resolution.

Great Britain and France voted against this resolution being plainly of opinion that it was aimed at imposing disabilities upon Israel, and Israel only. The Australian representative abstained from voting for, by the time the terms of the resolution reached us, it was too late to add to the instructions already given and, in any event, the investigation of the facts asked for by Dr. Walker had not occurred. His abstention was, therefore, the sensible and proper course. Subsequently the Soviet Union proposed a resolution in the following terms:

"Security Council noting that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian Territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, expressing its grave concern at this violation of Armistice Agreement.

- (1) Calls upon Egypt and Israel immediately to cease fire.
- (2) Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind established Armistice lines.
- (3) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed in compliance with this resolution and to make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area by implementation of this and prior resolution."

This was voted for by Dr. Walker, since it appeared to embody acceptable general principles but it was, having regard to the developments which were then occurring, voted against by Great Britain and France with the United States abstaining.

The disability attending the Security Council's deliberations is not so much that there were vetoes, since these are to be expected in cases where international tension is high and where the permanent members do not find themselves all on one side. But it is, in our opinion, a great misfortune that differences of view should have occurred between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other. Such differences, which proceed from honest divergences upon matters of judgment, can easily be fanned into bitterness by intemperate statements by observers in both Continents.

We have, in these circumstances, heard with pleasure the statement made this morning by President Eisenhower. True, in that statement he has clearly maintained the American view that force in the Middle East is both unwise and improper. But he went on to say that what he had said on that point was in no way to minimise American friendship for Great Britain and France, and American determination to maintain that friendship. He added, no doubt with lively recollection of the events in August and September, that Britain and France have been subject to repeated provocation.

To return to the narrative, we were early yesterday morning advised from our Acting High Commissioner in London that the United Kingdom had in mind calling upon both Israel and Egypt to cease fighting and to withdraw their forces from the neighbourhood of the Canal. At 1 p.m. yesterday, we were advised that the matter was under most urgent consideration by the United Kingdom Cabinet. At 1.30, we learned that Great Britain and France had delivered what was in effect an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel calling for an answer within 12 hours.

The terms of that ultimatum required that both sides should stop all fighting immediately and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal. Furthermore, in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal, the Egyptian Government was asked to agree that Anglo French forces should move temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

Immediately thereafter, we learned that Egypt had rejected the ultimatum, though Israel was prepared to act upon it if Egypt was also agreeable. It is, as yet, not clear what military operations have been instituted by Great Britain and France but the House will be informed of any developments.

I now proceed to say something about two questions which will present themselves to the minds of Honourable Members in relation to the actions of Great Britain and France.

First, is the United Kingdom at fault in not having engaged in a pre-consultation with the other British Commonwealth countries? Our answer to this question is that she was not at fault at all. The circumstances were those of great emergency. Hostile armed forces were rapidly approaching each other, and extensive combat was imminent. As I have said, in that combat vital interests in the passage of the Canal were quite likely to suffer the most serious damage. The Canal is an international waterway with a guaranteed freedom of passage for the ships of all nations; but that guarantee would cease to have much value if the Canal itself were put out of action by becoming part of a theatre of active war. There was literally no time to be lost if any action was to be taken to keep the combatants out of the Canal area, and afford it proper protection.

Effective consultation (and I say "effective" because a mere "form of consultation" would have been quite useless) would plainly have occupied considerable time and the urgent position might have fallen into irretrievable disaster. In our opinion, therefore, Great Britain, whose Canal and other Middle East economic interests are so vast, was correct in proceeding upon her own judgment and accepting her own responsibility. We are not living in an academic world. The normal processes of consultation should always be followed wherever possible but there are instances like the present one in which events move too fast for normal processes.

The second great question that arises is as to the propriety of the action taken by Great Britain and France. Upon this point the Government of Australia

believes that the action was proper. It had already been demonstrated, in the case of the Israeli ships, that a resolution passed by the Security Council and condemning Egypt can be set at naught in the absence of strong executive action. Israel has also ignored some United Nations views. It was quite clear that the procedures of the Security Council were such that even assuming that some resolution could be carried, the Canal would have been involved in war long before any United Nations' action could become effective. Great Britain and France, therefore, decided that they would, so to speak, "hold the pass". Their purpose, as they plainly state, was to have the Israeli and Egyptian forces withdrawn from the Canal for a distance of 10 miles on either side so that the operation of the Canal would not be menaced. Their action, so considered, was a police action taken in a state of great emergency and was in fact calculated to keep the combatants apart and to enable counsels of moderation thereafter to prevail.

We see nothing sinister in all this. On the contrary, it seems to us to be quite realistic and to pay due regard to the moving and inexorable facts of life.

As I have said, it is a great misfortune that there should have arisen public differences between those great democracies whose friendly co-operation is so vital to us all and any breach between whom can give satisfaction only to the Communist powers in their continuing "cold" war.

I have myself urged upon British and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur on a high level, in order to reconcile any differences of opinion and produce a result satisfactory to all. I have a profound respect for the efforts made by both President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles to keep the peace of the world. Mr. Dulles has, in particular, been the subject, in my opinion, of a great deal of hostile but uninformed criticism. But I would like to urge

with all humility that our friends in America should understand the pressure of events upon both Great Britain and France, and the true nature of the action taken by them; action which, if both resolute and prompt, may well be the only means now existing for preventing a general conflagration in the Middle East.

I could perhaps sum this aspect of the matter up by saying that the Anglo-French action represents an emergency measure by two of the great democratic powers.

Their object is not to make war but to prevent war by separating two belligerents.

They are not seeking territorial advantage or subjugation of peoples but are aiming to assure to the whole world the treaty rights of continued free access to the international waterway by protecting its installations, the ships that use them, and the people who travel in those ships.

They are not seeking to impose an arbitrary settlement in the Egypt-Israel dispute but to discharge a limited function which will enable a settlement to be reached.

They have made it clear that they are not seeking to maintain forces permanently in Egypt but will withdraw them as soon as the immediate purpose has been achieved.

They are not seeking to usurp the right of the Security Council to attempt to settle the Egypt-Israel dispute but are determined to ensure that when choosing a method of settlement the Security Council will not have to face the fact of the prior destruction or dislocation of the Suez Canal.

Above all there is, as I believe, no desire to involve or confuse a settlement of the dispute about the operation of the Suez Canal with other Middle East disputes, but to prevent that involvement.

The practical effect of allowing hostilities between Egypt and Israel to develop over the Canal would be that, in future, efforts to obtain agreement on the vitally important Suez Canal question would be disastrously affected by the efforts of the present belligerents to use their military position as a factor in the settlement of a problem in which these considerations would be entirely out of place.

I remind the House that all the negotiations with Egypt about the Canal have been designed to produce a peaceful settlement giving effective guarantees of a non-political administration of the Canal. It would be tragic if this great matter became obscured.

I advise the House, if I may, against hasty judgments on the facts. Notwithstanding the elaborate provisions made by the Security Council for observers, there has as yet been no report from these observers; and there is still much room for doubt as to the precise nature of aggression and the identity of the people responsible.

In this statement, I am indicating the views of the Australian Government. We have not been asked to make any commitments ourselves nor have we made any. But I hope and believe that Australia will never be unwilling to offer its opinion upon a matter which so vitally concerns the United Kingdom and all those countries of the British Commonwealth to whom the Suez Canal is of vital economic importance.

May I remind the House that it is still open to Egypt, as Sir Anthony Eden has made clear, to end the present military operations by accepting the proposition that, like Israel, it should withdraw its troops for 10 miles from the Canal so that great international interests will not be subordinated to what might, under other circumstances and in another place, be regarded as a purely local dispute.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

Dated: 1st November, 1956.
1007
Recd.: 1st November, 1956.
2145

2954. UNCLASSIFIED. EMERGENCY.

From External.

Your telegram 2556.

Following opening paragraphs are common to both texts. Begins:

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken note of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. This event threatens to disrupt the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal on which the economic life of many nations depends.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are resolved to do all in their power to bring about the early cessation of hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Canal.

Thereafter the notes read as follows:

(To Israel) They accordingly request the Government of Israel -

- (a) to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air forthwith;
- (b) to withdraw all Israeli military forces to a distance of 10 miles East of the Canal.

A communication has been addressed to the Government of Egypt requesting them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces from the neighbourhood of the Canal and to accept the temporary occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

The United Kingdom and French Governments request an answer to this communication within 12 hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both Governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements the United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

(To Egypt) They accordingly request the Government of Egypt -

- (a) to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air forthwith;
- (b) to withdraw all Egyptian military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Canal;
- (c) in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all* in order to separate the belligerents to accept the temporary

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.*

The United Kingdom and French Governments request an answer to this communication within 12 hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both Governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements, the United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

A similar communication has been sent to the Government of Israel.

* as received.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

1st November, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 14652.

VA:OA.

Sent: 1st November, 1956.
1330

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2556. CONFIDENTIAL. EMERGENCY.

Please telegraph urgently precise text of United
Kingdom/French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt.

Cost : £2.15.0.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P MT

CONFIDENTIAL

52

Points for
Par's speech

was 1/11

sent across to Minister.
by amendments NOT
included - Mr. Nelson's
amendments in 2nd
copy were included.
was 1/11

We do not believe that it would be in the interests of any of us to have the Canal closed indefinitely by military operations around and across it. Nor could it be in anybody's interests to have damage inflicted under the stress of an Israeli-Egyptian war, which would not only temporarily close the Canal but put it out of action for some time.

From this point of view we are not disposed to condemn the emergency police measures ~~which are~~ involved in the Anglo-French action, *which aim at isolating the Canal from the hostilities*

There will be criticism of the Anglo-French decision, but under the circumstances we have outlined, prompt steps were essential which would safeguard treaty rights on an open waterway for the world's shipping which would otherwise be threatened by hostilities in the area between Egypt and Israel.

It is true that the Security Council has been ⁱⁿ seized of the dispute. But the vast complex of area situations which the Middle East has thrown up during the past ten years, no assurance could be felt that its treatment of the Israeli penetration into Egypt would suffice to halt hostilities or provide any real protection to the Canal.

We cannot overlook that the United Kingdom and France are two powers vitally dependent on the Canal and having interests in it derived from solemn convention. We must also recognise that national property and the protection of their nationals are also involved.

The Canal has likewise a vital defence interest for the United Kingdom. Egypt conceded this interest in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, negotiated when the United Kingdom agreed to withdraw from its Canal base. Under that Treaty, the United Kingdom was given the right to re-occupy the base should Egypt be attacked by a foreign power. It is true that Israel was excepted from the definition of foreign powers, but the principle of British interest in the security of this particular region was nevertheless established and recognised by Egypt.

7 { The United Kingdom action is not to be condemned in any isolated context. It should be seen in the perspective of Egypt's seizure of the Canal in breach of the Suez Canal *Concessions* Convention and, it may be argued, in breach also of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many weeks have gone by since that expropriation, during which time the Security Council has given attention to the dispute. Egypt nevertheless remains in actual control of this international waterway, and has shown no true disposition to reach an agreed solution.

We, in common with the United Kingdom, have loyally and consistently supported the principles of the United Nations Charter. Whatever breakdowns in morality there have been, have occurred in other camps. But the procedure set up by the Charter is not faultless. It is perhaps the best that can be accomplished under present world conditions, but inevitably it sometimes fails to safeguard essential national rights and to provide necessary remedies. The fault is not the lack of expressed principle but tardy and frequently inadequate procedure.

There is a growing tendency among United Nation members to become preoccupied with procedure and to treat it as an end in itself. In the process essential morality becomes obscured and essential interests disregarded. It is this tendency which, in the present crisis, prompts critics of the United Kingdom and France to regard their action in its narrowest context, without regard to vital factors lying in the background to it.

Procedure is important but merely as a means towards a defined end. The end, as we all see it, is the maintenance of international standards of conduct of which the Charter can only be a part expression. International morality is not to be measured only in terms of the Charter. If it falls short of established rights it should not on that account be left to go by default and clear breach of those rights be condoned.

The present situation needs to be seen in this light. It should be distinguished from other unilateral acts in which countries have thrown in military forces in order to secure some political ambition. The record of Communist expansion conforms to this pattern.

The Anglo-French action in Egypt has very different features:

- (a) the objective is not to make war, but to prevent war by separating two belligerents;
- (b) it does not seek territory or national advantage; its purpose is to assure to the world treaty rights of

45

free access through an international waterway by protecting its installations and the ships that use them;

- (c) it does not attempt to impose a settlement in the Israeli-Egyptian dispute, but to discharge a limited function;

- U.K. and France*
(d) not to maintain forces permanently in Egypt but to withdraw them as soon as the stated purpose has been achieved.

It is important that settlement of the Suez Canal dispute should not become entangled with Israeli-Egyptian relations. The practical effect of allowing hostilities between Egypt and Israel to develop over the Canal would be that henceforth efforts to obtain agreement on the future operation of the Canal would be profoundly affected by these efforts, not merely of Egypt, but of Israel to use their military position as a factor in the settlement of a problem in which these considerations would be entirely unjustified.

The United Kingdom and France have, in an emergency, undertaken the task of ensuring the availability of the Canal. It was necessary for them to act for several reasons:

- (a) the valid belief that Egypt would be incapable of resisting Israel without hostilities occurring in the Canal area;
- (b) the presence in the Canal zone of Egyptian forces which it could be expected would be the target of Israeli attack - forces which the Egyptians showed no readiness to withdraw. Egypt was offered by United Kingdom and France an arrangement under which Israel would have to do her forces any further agreed assist from bringing

*or alternatively
the removal
of the canal by
Israel*

48

into Egypt than the limit of the ten mile zone along the whole range of the Canal;

(c) the unreliability of any alternative course of action.

Past responses by Middle East countries to United Nations appeals did not encourage optimism that the Israelis or Egyptians would respond in the present dispute;

(d) the need to ensure that the destruction or dislocation

of the Canal should not have become an accomplished fact by the time United Nations procedures could be brought to bear;

(e) the need to limit the fighting, not only for the purpose of protecting the Canal, but to protect British property and lives.

The United Kingdom regards its action as consistent with the United Nations Charter. It is also regarded as consistent with the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 that:

"the three Governments should they find that any of these States (that is the Arab States and Israel) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, consistent with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, shall immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation."

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

DEB:ABK.

I.14620.

Dated: 31st October, 1956.
2200.

FROM:

Rec'd: 1st November, 1956.
1200.

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

AMENDED COPY.

110. SECRET.

Reference your telegram 106 and related telegrams; memorandum referred to has not yet arrived.

2. Status of United Kingdom planning is as follows:

(a) As reported in paragraph 10 of my memorandum 245 either there were no plans 1954 or they are now dead and Bullock's memorandum 367, 1954 and the references in your telegram 88 are now irrelevant.

(b) As reported in our telegram 92, the British Embassy now has outline plan for Tel Aviv in which we are able to, and propose to, participate. Details are being sent by bag tomorrow. The plan essentially depends on the good offices of the Israel Government being available to facilitate its execution, and on the availability of air/sea lift when the time comes; scheme would be set in motion on receipt of Foreign Office sanctions. X Foreign Office has ruled that warning letters need not be sent to dual nationals, but these would be assisted if the Israel authorities agree.

3. The foregoing plan is in some respects imprecise but it is impracticable for the Legation to do anything better or as good with our own resources.

4. Pursuant to United States advice that all Americans leave the Middle East, the United States Embassy here has repeated this locally and has, under instructions, already compulsorily evacuated Embassy dependants and non-essential staff. No other mission has done the latter. The United Kingdom, and Canada have sent warning notices to their nationals and yesterday I sent all non-duals letters to the effect of paragraph 9 of the emergency instructions. The United Kingdom and Canada are not thinking of evacuating dependants or non essential staff until instructed.

5. Yesterday I authorized the purchase from official funds of two thousand dollars travellers cheques which are being kept in safes as emergency funds; currency notes were not available.

6. Replies to our enquiries made for registration purposes (my memorandum 245 paragraph 12) have proved slow and incomplete but our present record of Australians in Israel are:

(a) 66 have produced documentary evidence of having rejected Israel nationality;

(b) 113 claim to be in the above class but have no documentary evidence;

(c) 24 are registered on special cards and we do not know whether they are duals or not.

SECRET

....2.

46

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

2. I.14620.

- (d) 77 claim to be Israel nationals; the above figure includes alien wives and children but not alien husbands of Australian citizens. It is my understanding that all dual nationals are under the "Israel" Government while here (your paragraph 2).

7. If you think anything further should be done please instruct.

Ballard.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (1520/62)
P.M.'S.

(Amendment X)

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss E.A.F&ME AF&ME C&P ADMIN PERS FIN.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

BH:HMCC

0.14609

Sent: 1st November, 1956.
0330

TO:-

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

904. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Blakeney.

Please convey urgently following personal message to John Foster Dulles from R.G. Menzies.

Begins:

When I received your message about the Middle East I had proceeded to draft a communication to the United Kingdom urging that other matters in the Middle East or in North Africa should not be allowed to distract attention from the need for a proper Suez Canal arrangement. At that moment the present Israel-Egypt crisis arose.

I instructed our representative on the United Nations to seek some ascertainment of the facts by the Security Council before any resolution was submitted and debated. Events turned out otherwise and, in the result, there has been a painful, and conceivably dangerous, difference of opinion between your country and the United Kingdom and France in the Council itself.

These differences can easily be exacerbated by partisans so that a state of affairs could arise which could give satisfaction only to our opponents. I know how profoundly you agree with my own view that the growing dreams of empire entertained by Nasser should be resolved, and that Nasser himself should be made to understand that he is not in a position to defy the Western world.

May I therefore say to you, as I am tonight saying in another message to Anthony Eden, that I hope that there will be an attempt on the highest level to reconcile differences of opinion and to present some united front.

Quite frankly I do not believe that it would be to the interests of any of us to have the Canal closed for weeks and possibly for months by military operations around and across it. From this point of view my colleagues and I see considerable merit in the police action which is involved in the Anglo-French ultimatum. But that ultimatum, and any action which may follow it even before this cable reached you, may turn out to be quite unfortunate if it leads to any profound differences between the United Kingdom and yourselves. My experience is that differences of opinion are always exaggerated by eager partisans on a lower level.

I have such clear recollections of your own

SECRET

44

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

0.14609

-2-

wise and firm leadership in the London Conference that I believe that talks between yourself and Eden would be productive of much good. There are some things that cannot be done by deputy.

I have heard and read a good deal of nonsense about the American attitude over the Suez Canal. I have spared no pains to make it clear that I regard these criticisms as quite ill founded and that in point of fact any errors that may have occurred are by no means all on one side.

I would give a great deal to be able to take a magic carpet and have myself transported into the presence of yourself and Eden, but this is not possible. Please do not think that I am assuming some astonishing wisdom, because I do not possess it. But above all things, I believe that a clear understanding on both sides of the Atlantic of the reasons for actions taken on each side is vital, and never more so than at this moment.

PRIME MINISTER
A/MIN.FOR E.A.

1st November, 1956.

SECRET

43

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

O. 14607/8.

MMC:OA.

Sent: 1st November, 1956.
0335.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.2545. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For McCarthy.

Please convey urgently to Sir Anthony Eden the following personal message from R.G. Menzies :

Begins -

I am grateful for your personal message regarding the Middle East. We have just been having long and anxious discussion in Cabinet on these problems. At this distance we receive a mixture of information, some of it from newspaper and broadcasting sources and there are therefore many points on which we are lacking clarity.

I agree with you about the dangers of an Israel/Jordan conflict, the possibilities of which would be too bad to be contemplated. Your diplomatic action in relation to Israel therefore has my warm approval. We agree with you that a war between Israel and Egypt should not be allowed to block the Suez Canal and, therefore, the joint ultimatum by the United Kingdom and France seems to us, as an emergency measure, to deal with a situation suddenly arising, to have been proper.

Right throughout these matters, I have felt with you that Nasser's prestige, already enhanced by his coup in relation to the Canal, should not become so inflated as to provide a foundation for a sort of Nasser empire in the Middle East. Israel may well have made an error by mounting a large scale invasion of Egypt, because this kind of thing, shorn of the context of pin pricking tactics by Egypt herself, can so easily be represented as an aggression which the Western powers would feel bound to reject.

My own feeling has been that Israel probably thought that a movement into Egypt would, by exposing the vulnerability of that country, tend to reduce Nasser's delusions of grandeur.

But, allowing for all that, it was I think in the world sense, a tactical error. But the facts of life must prevail. It would appear quite impossible to stand by and see an Israel-Egypt conflict which would not only temporarily close the Canal, but might, under the stress of war, inflict such damage upon it as would put it out of action for a long time. Under these circumstances, the ultimatum delivered by the United Kingdom and France seems to be the only prompt step that could be taken and, although there will be, in many quarters, much criticism of it, you may understand that we will support it as a quick police measure not designed to produce war but to avoid the more damaging consequences of Israel-Egypt military action.

/ I would

SECRET

42

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

- 2 - O. 14607/8.

I would go further and express my personal view that it may prove to be a healthy reminder to Nasser that, though he may imagine that the great powers are powerless, the facts are that they are not unwilling to defend their legitimate interests, which include the vital commercial lifeline through the Canal.

We are, however, distressed by what appears to be an open conflict in the Security Council between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

The first question that has been raised in my own Cabinet is whether there has been a breakdown in close communication between yourself and the United States. I have suggested that, if you and the French issued your ultimatum without reference to the United States, it was probably due to a belief that dilatory proceedings in the Security Council would at once have been advocated and that the ultimatum could have come too late to have any practical effect.

I would be glad if you could let me know whether this speculation is correct.

I am sending a personal cable to Dulles urging that he should not allow a difference of opinion to develop into a serious breach because I know that, like myself, you attach great importance to unity of action with the United States.

We in Australia, situated as we are, believe strongly in the closest co-operation with the United States. But I would not have you think that this means that British countries are merely to sign on the dotted line. There is plenty of room for frank exchanges and for the proper assertion of British responsibility and a right on the part of British countries to maintain independent views and to persuade the Americans that those views are right.

Evatt has already foreshadowed an attack upon your own Government for not consulting us before issuing the ultimatum. I propose to reply to this by saying that when armed forces are rapidly approaching the point of conflict, it would be impossible for the United Kingdom to devote a week to cabled Commonwealth communications because, under such circumstances, time rather than convention is the master. Personally, I would have thought it extremely unwise for you to occupy a lot of time in such consultations when what was needed was prompt and clear decision.

I would like to add for myself that nobody has more clearly understood the difficulties that you have had to deal with since you became Prime Minister. I greatly admire your courage and resolution in dealing with them. I still hope that when this present problem has been resolved you will be able to maintain the attitude of the eighteen nations towards the Suez Canal issue, the significance of which is not less but much greater than it was when I last saw you in London.

What many people fail to understand is that the best way to avoid a major conflict is to be completely firm about smaller ones.

My thoughts are with you. You must never entertain any doubts about the British quality of this country. Having said that, I would express the hope that you would make it your

SECRET

/ personal

41

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

- 3 -

O. 14607/8.

personal business to do everything possible to secure some broad basis of agreement with the United States, having regard to the fact that our common enemies would regard a serious cleavage in the democratic ranks as one of their greatest successes in the cold war.

Ends.

Cost :

PRIME MINISTER
A/MIN FOR E.A.

1st November, 1956.

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

BGH:VA

O. 14603/4/5/6

Sent: 1st November, 1956
0205

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....422. (Pass to Washington 903).

Repeated to -

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2544. (For Casey and Mc Intyre).

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....334.

SECRET. EMERGENCY.For Walker from McBride.Israel-Egypt.

1. We are well satisfied with your handling of situation at last meeting. We ourselves had not known of United Kingdom-French policy decisions and intended ultimatum before Council discussion took place.
2. We wish you to avoid opposition to United Kingdom-French position without however identifying Australia as a strong advocate of it. If confronted with a resolution condemning the two powers as aggressors or demanding that entry of forces be postponed (or that they be withdrawn) you should vote against the resolution and say that Australia accepts the United Kingdom assurance that the forces will enter Egypt temporarily to secure the treaty rights of an open waterway for the world's shipping which would otherwise be threatened by hostilities in the area between Egypt and Israel. The functions is that of a policeforce.
3. It may be that a further resolution will be brought forward directed at the entry of Israeli forces. In this event you should avoid supporting any resolution which singles out Israel and imposes any obligation upon her alone without imposing comparable obligations upon Egypt.
4. We recognise that proposed reference to General Assembly poses a problem since we and others have supported in principle the desirability of appealing to the General Assembly in order to circumvent a veto on questions affecting peace and security. Nevertheless if a reference to General Assembly of question of United Kingdom-French forces is proposed we should argue that a special session will not contribute to a solution of the real problem which lies between Israel and Egypt. The Council should continue to remain seized of this question.
5. We are completely unaware of United Kingdom and United States views on the Yugoslav proposal to refer to the Assembly. In view of the critical importance of trying to avoid any further deterioration of Anglo-American relations we consider you should do your best to prevent the Council coming to a quick

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

O. 14603/4/5/6

2.

decision so that there is more time for consultation among all Western powers and particularly between the United Kingdom and United States.

6. At time of drafting this message we still have no confirmation that United Kingdom-United States forces have in fact entered Egypt.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s.

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME AF&ME E INF DL MT C&A

G

SECRET

38

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

MMC:SH

O. 14602

TO:

Sent: ~~1st November, 1956~~
0230

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N

2543. SECRET - IMMEDIATE

For Casey from McBride.

Cabinet tonight discussed the serious situation in Egypt and the split between United Kingdom and United States. We would greatly welcome your own views and any information you can give us.

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

1st November, 1956

SEC A/S's UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME AF&ME INF DL
MT

SECRET

37 ✓

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 175/11/50

Date 31st October, 1956.

3179/56.

SUBJECT

Q.E.A. SERVICE THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST

FOR MR. KEVIN *uk*

MR. RENOUF

MR. QUINN

→ MR. BILLINGTON

MR. STUART

Mr. Fogarty, from the Department of Civil Aviation, rang me this morning and asked whether the announcement by the French and U.K. that they would move into the Canal zone unless fighting discontinued in the Middle East would affect the advice I had given yesterday afternoon.

I said ~~that it would not~~. Iraq was the only country which might become involved and in which Qantas was envisaging operations.

Mr. Fogarty said that Q.E.A. had been in touch with their London Manager, Mr. Tapp, who said BOAC had received advice similar to that which we had given Civil Aviation. BOAC is planning to divert its services and QEA will probably make a decision about diversion later in the morning.

I said to Mr. Fogarty that it had been reported over the air last night that Q.E.A. was diverting services through Istanbul. Mr. Fogarty said that that report was premature. Q.E.A. had yet to take a decision regarding diversion but that he thought that that decision would be taken very soon. He said there was no possibility that Q.E.A. would suspend or delay for any significant time services on the Kangaroo route to London. Olympic traffic left Q.E.A. with no alternative but to continue its services.

[Signature]
K. Brennan.
E.R. Branch.

Mr. Brennan

SECRET

31st October, 1956.

ISRAEL - EGYPT

THE SECRETARY

1. The U.K. - French ultimatum appears to contravene the U.N. Charter (Article 2 (4)). The whole spirit of the Charter is that it is the Security Council which has the responsibility for maintaining peace and solving disputes which may lead to breaches of the peace. Members of the U.N. are therefore enjoined against the threat or use of force to solve their disputes - at least until the Council has been consulted and has had a chance to act or to prove unable to act. It seems therefore that if the U.K. and France send forces into Egyptian territory without Egypt's consent, there would be a prima facie case of aggression.
2. It may be argued that the U.K. is entitled by Article 4 of the Canal Zone Agreement to re-occupy the Canal Zone bases in the event of an attack by Israel against Egypt. This is correct. However, Article 10 of the Agreement says that the Agreement shall not affect the obligations of the ^{parties} party under the U.N. Charter. In any event, France is not a party to the Agreement and the U.K. has not referred to it, presumably for this very reason.
3. The action of the U.K. and France in voting against the U.S. resolution before the Security Council (calling upon all Members to refrain from the use or threat of force in the area in any matter inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.), amounts to a grave public disagreement

Mr Bellington

was 5/11

W. G. F. G. G.

SECRET

35

SECRET

2.

of the major Western allies. This in itself is bad enough; what is worse is that this disagreement has been over the threat or use of force in a ~~matter~~^{manner} inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.

4. A basic feature of Western policy since the War has been on this occasion discredited publicly by the U.K. and France. This feature is the agreement not to use or threaten force to solve international problems except pursuant to the U.N. Charter. The effect of this repudiation of basic Western foreign policy by the U.K. and France upon smaller countries is likely to be very considerable indeed.

5. The apparent lack of consultation between the U.K. and France with the U.S. before presenting their ultimatum must surely be deplored. It has already led to the fiasco for the Western Powers in the Security Council.

6. The results of the discussion in the Security Council for the future of the United Nations may be very serious indeed. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see that the provisions of the Charter regarding the maintenance of peace are likely in future to have much value. The situation is all the more regrettable because the U.K. and France might easily have avoided it. All they would have had to do would have been to inform the Security Council in emergency session that fighting between Israel and Egypt was likely to occur around the Suez Canal and that therefore they proposed, with the Security Council's approval, to send in forces to protect the Canal. When this proposal was vetoed by the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and France could have announced that they had seriously endeavoured to get the Council to protect their essential interests; as the Council had failed to do so, they would have to protect their interests by direct action themselves.

34

SECRET

SECRET

3.

7. Egypt rejected the ultimatum ^{and} as Israel has said that she will accept it if Egypt accepts it. Fighting must therefore be expected between Egypt and the U.K. and France. This must be a situation even beyond Egypt's greatest hopes when she launched her attack (it seems too much to believe that what has happened was ^{Israel's} ~~Egypt's~~ basic plan). The result will be that after committing aggressing, Egypt can now stand by while the U.K. and France fight the victim of Israel's aggression and stop Egypt defending herself against such aggression. It is inevitable that many people in the World will draw the conclusion that Israel's aggression was instigated by the U.K. and France. The effect of such an aggression, which is likely to be very popular in under-developed countries generally, upon the policies of those countries towards the U.K. and France may be considerable.

8. It is difficult to see Nasser doing anything but fighting to the end. The Canal, the future of which has motivated the U.K. and France, may in this case be blocked or seriously damaged. The outcome is likely to mean the end of Nasser. Nasser's departure will lead to a void in the form of Government or control of Egypt. Undoubtedly the Communists will seek to capitalize on such a situation.

9. The results of conflict between the U.K. and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other upon the other countries of the Middle East (some of whom may come into the conflict), are not nice to contemplate. There will certainly be trouble for British and French interests in the Middle East on the whole on a scale yet to be determined.

SECRET

33

SECRET

4.

10. The British and French ultimatum, their attitude in the Security Council and the fighting which seems bound to ensure, is a propaganda windfall for the U.S.S.R.

A.P. Renouf.
U.N. Branch.

SECRET

32

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

JG:SHA

0.14597.

Dated: 31st October, 1956.
2000

TO:

British Embassy,
TEHERAN.

EX.448.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Qantas Empire Airways Super Constellation Kangaroo services between Australia and the United Kingdom will until further notice operate on a route Karachi-Basra-Istanbul. Right of overflight of Iran under International Air Services Transit Agreement will be exercised in respect of the Basra-Istanbul section. Aircraft will fly over Teheran as a turning point but will not land there.

First flight eastbound will be EM514/235
ETD London 2200 hours GMT 31st October due Istanbul 0805 hours local time 1st November and Basra 1640 hours local time.

First flight westbound EM533/035 ETD
Karachi 0045 local time 2nd November Basra 0530 local time 2nd November, ETA Istanbul 1155 local time 2nd November.

Operation thereafter four times a week in each direction.

Grateful if you would inform Persian authorities.

British Empire Airways, Teheran will give you time tables in respect of these flights which we would like you to pass to Persian authorities.

Cost \$23/17/-

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'s

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ERQ PAC&AM SA&EA SA SEA EAP&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&F MT
ADMIN TRAV EM COMS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

0.14598/9/600/1

Sent: 31st October, 1956.
2000

JC/BH

TO:

British Embassy,
ANKARA...EX 449

British Embassy,
ATHENS...EX 450

Repeat:
Australian High Commission,
KARACHI...351

Australian Legation,
ROME...365

UNCLASSIFIED.

Qantas Empire Airways Super Constellation Kangaroo Service between Australia and the United Kingdom will until further notice be diverted to follow the route Karachi- BASRA - Teheran (turning point only - no stop) - Istanbul (technical stop) - Rome overflying Greece.

Rights of overflight or technical stop as indicated above under the International Air Services Transit Agreement will be exercised in respect of Iran, Turkey and Greece.

First flight eastbound will be EM 514/235 ETD London. 2200 hours GMT 31st October due Istanbul 0805 hours local time 1st November and BASRA 1640 hours local time 1st November.

First flight westbound EM 533/035 ETD Karachi 0045 local time 2nd November BASRA 0530 local time 2nd November Istanbul 1155 local time 2nd November.

Operations thereafter four times weekly in each direction.

Grateful if you would inform local authorities.

British Empire Airways will pass to local aeronautical authorities time tables in respect of these flights.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'S.

(Cost £67.1.8)

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN ERQ PAC&AM S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DI MT C&P ADMIN TRAV EXCOMMS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Questions Without Notice

31st October, 1956.

ISRAEL-EGYPT CONFLICT

DR. EVATT asked the Prime Minister whether Australia had received any prior indication of the U.K.-French intentions regarding the conflict, and what instructions had been sent to our representative on the Security Council. He asked generally whether the powers concerned had been in consultation with Australia, and whether the Prime Minister would make a statement in which he would indicate whether Australia had any particular obligations.

MR. MENZIES said that reports were as yet to some extent confusing and the facts were not yet capable of clear definition. Sir Anthony Eden, however, had already made a statement in the Commons, and he proposed to read this. He said that the Government had been on constant communication both with the U.K. Government and our own representatives abroad. He wished to have the clear facts, and then he would make a statement.

(The P.M. then read Eden's statement)

DR EVATT asked further whether the Australian Government was consulted in advance, and what instructions were given to our Security Council representative.

MR. MENZIES repeated that the Government had been in constant communication for some time since the affair arose. He considered it would be unwise to take individual matters out of their context. He repeated that he proposed to make a full statement. He also said that if further factual information reached him later today, he would consult the Acting Minister for E.A., and with the leave of the House would communicate any such factual information to the House.

MR. MAKIN asked whether Australia was in any way committed by the Eden statement.

MR. MENZIES said that so far as he knew Australia was in no way committed.

SECRETARY
MR. PLIMSOLL
MR. FORSYTH
MR. KEVIN
MR. WALLER
MR. DAVIS
MR. LANDALE
MR. OLDHAM
DR. WYNES

25

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

MMC:SHA

0.14594.

Dated: 31st October, 1956.
1745

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2540.

SECRET.

EMERGENCY.

For External.

(Please ask Foreign Office to transmit
following to Australian Legation, Tel Aviv, by diplomatic
wireless.)

Begins:

108.

Our telegram 104. We have been
embarrassed by lack of information on Israeli penetration
into Egypt and wonder whether normal cabling facilities
are still available. Please telegraph urgently your
assessment of situation particularly Israeli intentions
and their justification of the action taken.

2. Please confirm you have received our
telegrams 88 and 106 of yesterday.

Ends.

Cost £8/1/8

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

1st November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&PQ
ADMIN EX COMMS

SECRET

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI ACTION IN EGYPT

by the

ACTING MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

According to reports now coming in from the Middle East, and the situation is still by no means clear, Israeli forces, in their drive across the Sinai Peninsula, have penetrated to a point close to the Southern end of the Suez Canal. Other reports indicate that Egyptian infantry and armoured units have moved across the Canal to meet the Israeli forces.

An Israel communique has stated that Israel's resort to military action has been made necessary by continuous military attacks by Egypt on Israeli citizens and on her land and sea communications. The communique went on to say that the purpose of these Egyptian attacks was to bring about the destruction of Israel and deprive the people of Israel of the possibility of peaceful co-existence.

Australia has always urged the prompt exposure by the United Nations of border infringements by either Israel or the Arab States. It has been the hope of the Western democracies and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that border incidents would be kept in check while efforts were being made to get agreement on the fundamental issues between the Arab States and Israel. We believe a period of peace and calm to be an essential requirement before an effectual solution of the Palestine problem can be reached.

It seems permissible to regard Israel's action as one consequence of Egypt's unilateral action in nationalizing the Suez Canal. That action by Egypt does not justify the Israeli invasion of its territory, but it did provide circumstances in which Israel has embarked upon unilateral action for its own purposes. There also lies in the background Egypt's consistent refusal to concede the existence of Israel, an Egyptian boycott

28

of Israel and other forms of provocation. However, let me repeat, these things do not justify the action that Israel has now taken.

The Israeli action has been referred by the United States to the Security Council whose task in these instances, as we see it, is to determine the facts, come to a conclusion and seek to take appropriate action. Our instructions to the Australian representative on the Security Council were that he should support inscription of the question which was proposed by the United States, that it should be considered urgently, that both Egypt and Israel should be heard, and the United Nations Truce Supervisor, General Burns, asked to report immediately.

After the item was inscribed before the Security Council the United States brought forward a resolution which sought the withdrawal of Israeli forces, proposed an injunction against assistance to Israel and called upon United Nations members to refrain from the use of force in the area. This resolution was vetoed by the United Kingdom and France. In the absence of instructions on the resolution, which it was impossible to convey in the extremely short time available, the Australian representative abstained from voting after endeavouring to obtain a postponement of the vote.

The Soviet Union then proposed another resolution calling upon both sides to cease firing and for a withdrawal behind the frontier. This resolution was also vetoed by the United Kingdom and France.

Yugoslavia then suggested that an emergency session of the General Assembly should be called. The President adjourned the Council until tomorrow so that members of the Council could reflect upon this suggestion.

In the course of the debate in the Council, the Australian representative repudiated criticisms that had been

voiced of the objectives of the United Kingdom and France. Dr. Walker said that the United Kingdom and France had explained their objective very clearly - to restore peace.

In the House of Commons yesterday the British Prime Minister, after pointing out that very grave issues are at stake and unless hostilities can be stopped, free passage through the Canal will be jeopardised, said:-

".... as a result of the consultations held in London today the United Kingdom and French Governments have now addressed urgent communications to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. In these we have called upon both sides to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Canal. Further in order to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations we have asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily, I repeat temporarily, into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. The Governments of Egypt and Israel have been asked to answer this communication within twelve hours. It has been made clear to them that if at the expiration of that time one or both have not undertaken to comply with these requirements British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance."

The Egyptian Government has rejected the Anglo-French approach; the Israelis are reported to have accepted it provisionally, from which one assumes they have been ready to accept it if the Egyptians did likewise.

The Australian Government regrets that Israel has embarked upon its present course of action which it find difficult to condone and which gives rise to a grave situation in an area already dangerously unsettled.

26

The Government of Israel has received the communication addressed jointly by the Governments of ~~the~~ France and the United Kingdom to the Governments of Israel and Egypt for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of their forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal.

In response to this communication the Government of Israel has the honour to state that it accepts the conditions both as to time and to area and declares its willingness to take the necessary practical steps to this end. In this undertaking, it is assumed ~~that~~ by the Government of Israel that a positive response will have been forthcoming also from the Egyptian side.

('phoned to Mr. Landale by M. Dover of Israel Legation, Sydney at 4.p.m. 31.10.56.)

Leavel

654/3

30th October, 1956.

ISRAEL/ARAB STATES ARMED STRENGTHS

MR. KEVIN

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Frontier Guards	Reserves	Total
Israel	60,000	2,000	5,000	36,000	150,000	253,000
Estimate of Egypt November, 1955.	85,000	7,451	7,000	4,000	50,000	153,451)
Jordan	15,000	54	152		30,000	45,206)
Iraq	48,000	184	1,674			49,858)
Syria	40,000	350	1,371	4,000		45,721)

AIR FORCES		Total	Front line Strength
November, 1955.	Israel	219	87 including 30 jet fighters
No details are held of Egyptian aircraft acquired from the Soviet	Egypt	153	98 including 64 jet fighters
	Jordan	8	2 including jet fighters
	Iraq	78	47 including 11 jet fighters
	Syria	86	15 including 8 jet fighters

It must be emphasized that all the above figures are now out of date. Egyptian Army and Air Force strength must be much greater on paper than shown. Similarly the Israeli Air Force is known to have Sabres and Ouragans acquired this year.

Mr Pearson referred recently to 4 Canadian Sabres en route going to Israel.

Defence Liaison Branch
N.F. Parkinson

per Buckingham

I understand that these figures were amended

was 24/10

23

Mr Lee 21/10

above figures are being revised

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. SECRET

...:VA

O. 14464

Sent: 30th October, 1956
1240

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

104. SECRET. EMERGENCY.

Radio reports 1200 hours Australian time indicate that Israeli forces have advanced 60 miles into Egypt and are west of Nkhala Junction 70 miles from Suez. Please report urgently.

- - - - -

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

30th October, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
MT

G

SECRET

TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

United Kingdom-Egypt

Article IV of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base signed on the 19th October, 1954, provides:

X

"In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on 13th April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall accord to United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place The Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes."

*X An agreed
minute provides
that this
Article shall not
come into operation
in the event of an attack
by any
of the States
mentioned
or by Israel.*

United Kingdom-United States of America-France (Tripartite Declaration)

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have declared in their tripartite declaration of May 1950 that:

"the three Governments should they find that any of these States (that is the Arab States and Israel) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, consistent with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, shall immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation."

United Kingdom-Iraq-Turkey-Iran-Pakistan (Baghdad Pact)

Article I of the Baghdad Pact stipulates that "..... the high contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence".

Egypt-Syria

In a defence pact signed on the 20th October, 1955, "the two contracting parties consider any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them as an attack on both".

Egypt-Saudi-Arabia

In a defence pact signed on the 27th October, 1955, the countries likewise consider "any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them as an attack on both".

Egypt-Saudi-Arabia-Yemen (Yedda Pact)

The Jedda Pact signed on the 21st April, 1956, stipulates that any armed aggression against any signatory shall be considered as an attack on the other signatories.

Egypt-Jordan

An agreement signed on May, 1956, provides for the co-ordination of military plans between the two countries in the event of an Israeli attack on any Arab State and for continuing liaison between the military authorities of both sides.

As far as is known the agreement does not include a provision that an attack on one shall be regarded as an attack on the other.

*Given to Mr Davis for the
F.A.C. 31/10 21*

Jordan-Lebanon

A Jordan-Lebanon Military Agreement signed on 21st May, 1956, provides for exchanges of military missions between the two countries and for the exchange of intelligence and war plans between the two armies.

Jordan-Syria

An agreement signed on the 31st May, 1956, provides for the exchange of military information and for the co-ordination of military plans. Provision is made for a Joint Military Council and for a Syrian Military Liaison Committee to be established in Jordan.

Jordan-Iraq

The precise terms of the agreement recently reached by these two countries are not known but pursuant to that agreement Iraq has already stationed troops and planes on the Jordanian border and has undertaken to send them into Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack on that country.

United Kingdom-Jordan

Article III of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance of 1948 provides that:

"Should either Party - efforts made in concert to find a peaceful settlement having proved unsuccessful - 'become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 4, immediately come to his aid as a measure of collective defence.

'In the event of an imminent menace of hostilities the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence.'

Article 4

'Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or under any other existing international agreements, conventions or treaties.'

Draft 2.

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI ACTION IN EGYPT

by the

ACTING MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

According to reports now coming in from the Middle East, Israeli forces, in their drive across the Sinai Peninsula, have penetrated to a point thirteen miles from the Suez Canal. Other reports indicate that Egyptian infantry and armoured units have moved across the Canal to meet the Israeli forces. United Nations machinery on the spot has already moved into operation, and we are now awaiting a report from the United Nations Truce Supervisor, General Burns.

An Israel communique has stated that Israel's resort to military action has been made necessary by continuous military attacks by Egypt on Israeli citizens and her land and sea communications. The communique went on to say that the purpose of these Egyptian attacks was to bring about the destruction of Israel and deprive the people of Israel of the possibility of peaceful co-existence.

I think we must not overlook the fact that Egypt has brought this Israeli fire on herself. Ever since the State of Israel came into being in 1948, the Arabs, under Egyptian leadership, have refused to recognise its existence. It was the Arabs who, the moment the United Kingdom Mandate of Palestine came to an end in May 1948, moved troops into Israel in an attempt to annihilate the young State and so initiated the Palestine war. And it has been the Egyptians who, despite the armistice agreements of 1949, who persistently claimed and exercised belligerent rights against Israel, and who, by their sustained political, economic and communications boycott, have endeavoured to cripple, if not exterminate, the young independent nation of Israel. As the House will be well aware, the Australian Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the Arab boycott of Israel. Like other democratic powers, Australia has urged the prompt exposure by the United Nations of border infringements by either Israel or the Arab States. It has been the hope

19

of the Western democracies and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that border incidents would be kept in check while while efforts were taken to get agreement on the fundamental issues between the Arab States and Israel. We believe a period of peace and calm to be an essential requirement before a ^{effectual} ~~formal~~ solution of the Palestine problem can be broached.

In an attempt to bring such a period of stability to the area the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and France undertook to take immediate action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent any violation of the frontiers or armistice lines between Israel and her Arab neighbours. On 29th October, President Eisenhower has recalled that his own and previous administrations have pledged the United States to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East, and he has again formally declared that the United States shall honour this pledge. The United Kingdom and France have also announced that they are prepared to act and have served notice on both Israel and Egypt that unless ^{p.m.} they cease fighting by 2.30/Australian time, British and French troops will intervene.

Concurrently action is being taken by the Western Powers in the Security Council where the meeting is still in progress. It is the Government's view that it is urgently necessary for the United Nations to establish the facts and come to a conclusion. On the face of it there is no evidence of recent aggressive military action by Egypt against Israel which would entitle Israel to claim that her penetration of Egyptian territory is required as an act of self-defence. In our opinion, therefore, the first task before the Security Council should be to obtain an objective and official account of the facts. Until this is done it is difficult for the Security Council to proceed to any judgment.

18

31st October, 1956.

Draft 3.

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI ACTION IN EGYPT

by the

ACTING MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

According to reports now coming in from the Middle East, and the situation is still by no means clear, Israeli forces, in their drive across the Sinai Peninsula, have penetrated to a point close to the Southern end of the Suez Canal. Other reports indicate that Egyptian infantry and armoured units have moved across the Canal to meet the Israeli forces. A report is awaited from General Burns, the United Nations Truce Supervisor.

An Israel communique has stated that Israel's resort to military action has been made necessary by continuous military attacks by Egypt on Israeli citizens and her land and sea communications. The communique went on to say that the purpose of these Egyptian attacks was to bring about the destruction of Israel and deprive the people of Israel of the possibility of peaceful co-existence.

~~The Australian Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the sustained Arab boycott of Israel.~~ Like other democratic powers, Australia has urged the prompt exposure by the United Nations of border infringements by either Israel or the Arab States. It has been the hope of the Western democracies and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that border incidents would be kept in check while efforts were taken to get agreement on the fundamental issues between the Arab States and Israel. We believe a period of peace and calm to be an essential requirement before an effectual solution of the Palestine problem can be ^{reached} ~~breached~~.

The Israeli action has been referred by the United States to the Security Council whose task, as we see it, is to establish the facts and come to a conclusion. On the face of it there is no evidence of recent aggressive action by Egypt against Israel which would entitle Israel to claim that her deep penetration on to Egyptian soil is required as an act of self-defence.

17

Having said this, it is impossible to deny that the Israeli action does not flow as one consequence of Egypt's unilateral action in nationalizing the Suez Canal. That action by Egypt does not justify the Israeli invasion of its territory, but it did provide circumstances in which Israel has ~~been prompted to embark~~ upon unilateral action for its own national purposes. There also lies in the background Egypt's consistent refusal to concede the existence of Israel, an Egyptian boycott of Israel and other forms of provocation.

I am doubtful about this.

The United Kingdom and France have now served notice on both Israel and Egypt that unless they cease hostilities and withdraw their troops from the Canal by 2.30 p.m. Australian time this afternoon, British and French will intervene. This warning is reported to have been rejected by Egypt but accepted by Israel subject to a proviso that the Egyptians likewise withdraw.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, concluded when the United Kingdom agreed to withdraw from the Suez Canal provides that if Egypt is attacked by an outside power, the United Kingdom may re-enter the Suez Canal Base which it previously held. In the Middle East treaty complex there is also the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 whereby the United Kingdom, United States and France undertook to take action to prevent any violation of frontiers or armistice lines between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

~~The October~~ The Australian Government regards it as regrettable that Israel has embarked upon its present action which it is difficult to condone and which gives rise to a grave situation in an area already dangerously unsettled.

31st October, 1956.

16

1

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI INVASION OF EGYPT

Radio reports suggest a most serious violation of Egyptian territory by Israel. Israeli columns are reported to be advancing towards Suez. No other details are at present known, and as yet there have been no reports of contact of forces on the ground or in the air.

A report is awaited from General Burns, the United Nations Truce Supervisor.

The Israeli Government has sought to justify this invasion of Egypt as made necessary by continuous Egyptian military attacks on Israel and her land and sea communications.

The Australian Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the sustained political, economic, and communications boycott exerted by Arab States upon the independent nation of Israel. Like other democratic Powers, we have urged prompt exposure by the United Nations of border infringements by either Israel or Arab States. It has been the hope of the Western democracies, and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that border incidents would be kept in check while efforts were taken to get agreement on the fundamental issues between the Arab States and Israel.

It is urgently necessary for the United Nations to establish the facts and come to a conclusion. On the face of it, there is no evidence of recent aggressive action by Egypt against Israel which would entitle Israel to claim that her deep penetration on to Egyptian soil is required as an act of self defence. As a first step, the United Nations should call upon Israeli forces to withdraw.

15

*Miller : Original & Minute
20/10/10*

*in Buckingham
wms*

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI INVASION OF EGYPT

Radio reports suggest a most serious violation of Egyptian territory by Israel. Israeli columns are reported to be advancing towards Suez. No other details are at present known, and as yet there have been no reports of contact of forces on the ground or in the air. A report is awaited from General Burns, the United Nations Truce Supervisor.

The Israeli Government has sought to justify this invasion of Egypt as made necessary by continuous Egyptian military attacks on Israel and her land and sea communications.

The Australian Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the sustained political, economic, and communications boycott exerted by Arab States upon the independent nation of Israel. Like other democratic Powers, we have urged prompt exposure by the United Nations of border infringements by either Israel or Arab States. It has been the hope of the Western democracies, and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that border incidents would be kept in check while efforts were taken to get agreement on the fundamental issues between the Arab States and Israel.

It is urgently necessary for the United Nations to establish the facts and come to a conclusion. On the face of it, there is no evidence of recent aggressive action by Egypt against Israel which would entitle Israel to claim that her deep penetration on to Egyptian soil is required as an act of self defence. As a first step, the United Nations should call upon Israeli forces to withdraw.

COPY NO. 27

Canberra, 30th October, 1956

Decision No. 542

The Prime Minister read to Cabinet the latest press message which reported that Israeli forces had already penetrated 60 miles inside the Egyptian frontier.

The Prime Minister mentioned that he had received a personal message from Mr. John Foster Dulles on this issue and that he was proposing to discuss the message in more detail with the Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Philip McBride.

A. B. Brown

Secretary to Cabinet.

Rec'd 31/10/56

Mr. ~~Lang~~ in Birmingham

13

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

File No.....

Date..... 30th October, 1956

3179/56.

SUBJECT

MR. DULLES' MESSAGE

FOR..... THE SECRETARY.....

It is difficult to know just what Mr. Dulles had in mind when he sent the attached message to the Prime Minister. He expressed concern lest the Suez Canal problem become involved on the one hand with French problems in North Africa, and on the other with Israeli-Arab problems, and he wonders whether the United Kingdom and France may "become deeply involved on a broad anti-Arab front." In what would appear to be in the context of the Suez Canal problem, he says that he himself is not in close touch with recent British-French thinking, but in view of the leading role which Australia has played, he feels it appropriate to express his concern to Mr. Menzies.

2. I think that the message can be read as a hint to Mr. Menzies that in Dulles' view the Suez Canal problem may go by default. Dulles may be hinting that, in the face of Fawzi's proposals to Hammarskjöld, and in the face of Hammarskjöld's own efforts to find a solution, the United Kingdom and France are not being sufficiently forthcoming. Fawzi himself has complained that he should not be expected to "write out a treaty," the inference being that the proposals he has already made are sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for talks. As we have said elsewhere, the American attitude towards a settlement of the Suez problem seems to be pragmatic, notwithstanding the United States' formal adherence to the 18 Power proposals. In his message to the Prime Minister, Dulles may well be appealing to Mr. Menzies to persuade at least the United Kingdom to show more elasticity in approaching the search for a negotiating basis. As regards the question of whether or not the Americans are being kept sufficiently informed of Anglo-French thinking, Walker got the impression in New York when the Foreign Ministers were meeting with Hammarskjöld that the United States did not know what was going on.

3. Dulles' message is in line with what seems to be genuine American anxiety about the whole position in the Middle East. This anxiety expressed itself last week in a State Department warning to American citizens. Dulles' fear that the United Kingdom and France may become deeply involved on a broad anti-Arab front probably springs in part from French activity in North Africa (including the "Athos" incident, the arrest of five Algerian rebel leaders), but also from the near stalemate which has been reached in the Suez Canal problem by the public position which the parties, not least France and the United Kingdom, have taken up. It is difficult to see that Dulles' concern is based on other courses: there has been no dispute between Britain and the United States over Iraqi troops in Jordan, the Baghdad Pact gives rise to no real difficulties, and there is no substantial difference of opinion between Britain and the United States over such peripheral problems as Buraimi Oasis although the two countries are not always at one on tactics.

(J.C.G. KEVIN) SECRET
Assistant Secretary

Copy to
10/31/56/13/3

see Bickington

was 2/11

12

Fd

I assume you are following developments in Middle East particularly Suez. I am beginning to feel concern lest this Suez matter may become involved on the one hand with French problems in North Africa, and on the other hand with Israel-Arab problems and that our Western European friends may become deeply involved on a broad anti-Arab front.

I am not myself in close touch with recent British-French thinking but in view of leading role which Australia has played, I feel it appropriate to express my concern to you.

....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

...:VA

O. 14525/26/27/28/29/20/
31

Sent: 30th October, 1956
2305

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....421. (Pass to Washington and Ottawa).

Repeated -

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....901.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....2530. (For Casey and McIntyre).

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.....107.

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.....245.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV. 120.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV. 113.

EMERGENCY. SECRET.

My telegram New York 416, Washington 897, London
2525, Tel Aviv 105, Cairo 244, Ottawa Sav. 117, Wellington
Sav. 110.

Matter was discussed this evening with the Prime
Minister and Acting Minister - while we can support inscription
the first task before the Security Council should be to obtain
an objective and official account of the facts - until this is
done it is difficult for the Security Council to proceed to
any judgment.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

(Cost £41.5.6)
31st October, 1956.

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED COPY

OA:SH

O. 14491/92/93/94/95/96/97

TO:

Sent. 30th October, 1956
2030

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.....416

Repeated -

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....897

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. (For. Casey. & McIntyre)....2525

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.....105

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.....244

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.117.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAV.114

(New York please pass to Washington and Ottawa.

CONFIDENTIAL - EMERGENCY

Israel attack upon Egypt.

1. It seems from reports on the A.B.C. that United States, probably with United Kingdom and France, will today ask the Security Council to take up this attack.

2. Judging by the radio reports of the attack, it has not been made pursuant to any recent or commensurate provocation by Egypt and is therefore unjustified.

3. Accordingly, you should support inscription of the item and urgent consideration. Egypt and Israel should be heard and UNTSO asked to report immediately.

4. It would seem preferable for the Council to consider this issue, in which Israel appears clearly in the wrong, separately from that of Israel-Jordan border where there is the complicating factor of provocation from Jordan.

(COST £51.3.8)

MIN & DEPT EA
P.M. 's

31st October, 1956

SEC A/S's UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SE/SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P MT

G

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. **CONFIDENTIAL**

OA:CM

0.14488/89

Sent: 30th October, 1956.
1805

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.....243

REPEAT:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....348

CONFIDENTIAL

Following closing of Cairo airport, Qantas aircraft in flight or immediately departing Westbound have been instructed not to proceed beyond Karachi without further advice. Next flight Eastbound has been instructed to delay departure from London twenty four hours.

2. We have told Civil Aviation we consider early re-opening of Cairo airport to civil aircraft unlikely and that Qantas would be well advised to consider diversionary routes which we understand are likely to be Karachi-Basra or Abadan-Istanbul navigating via Teheran or Karachi-Teheran-Istanbul. We have offered no comment on any of these possible routes.

A/MIN. & DEPT E A
MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M'S

Cost £18.0.8

31st October, 1956

SEC	A/Ss	UN	ERC	S&SEA	SA	E.AFCME	E	AF&ME	INF
DL	C&P	MT	ADMIN	TRAV					

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

MG:HMCC

O.14524

Sent: 30th October, 1956.
2230

TO:-

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.106. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Our telegrams 88 and 102.

Memorandum 193 of 17th October should be reaching you about now. Contents may be summarised as follows:

Begins:

"Situation likely to face you is one which can only be met by improvisation as it develops, and not by any attempt to adhere to any set of mechanical instructions. Draft plans set out in your memoranda 367 of 15th June, 1954, and 245 of 25th July last (paragraph 7) seem to provide best basis that can be devised in present circumstances. In principle you should concern your self only with Australians who are not dual Israeli nationals, or with such dual nationals as the Israeli authorities are prepared to see leave. (This answers paragraph 7 of your second memorandum)"

Ends.

2. Following examination of current situation today Acting Minister has authorised you to use your discretion in issuing, if and when in your opinion the situation makes this desirable, an appropriate warning to Australian citizens and to Australian dual nationals not made subject to Israeli jurisdiction to leave the country. The decision to issue such a warning would no doubt be taken after consultation with your British and Canadian colleagues. Although we must leave it to your discretion to act in this and related questions without prior reference to us, you should report what you do.

3. Please report whether you desire authority to hold an emergency fund in cash. Your imprest account is today being replenished with remittance of one thousand pounds.

4. Our last return from you shows 284 Australian citizens in Israel. What is present figure?

* Amendment.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (1520/62)
P.M'S.(COST £8.4.2)
31st October, 1956.

SEC A/Ss EAF&ME AF&ME C&P@ ADMIN PERS FIN

SECRET

The Government has, through diplomatic channels, asked urgently for advice of the intentions of the United Kingdom, United States, and French Governments, who have joined in a collective declaration of attitude in the event of violation of frontiers or armistice lines.

30/10/56

14

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

SECRET

File No.....

Date...30th October, 1956

3179/56.

SUBJECT

ISRAELI ATTACK ON EGYPT

FOR...ACTING MINISTER.....

SECRETARY

According to radio reports Israeli troops have crossed the Egyptian frontier in force. One report, attributed to an Israeli spokesman, claims that units of the Israeli Army have penetrated more than 100 miles into Egyptian territory. Another states that they are within 70 miles of the town of Suez.

Possible Reasons for Attack:

2. A number of factors have tended recently to increase Israel's suspicion and hostility towards her Arab neighbours including:-

- (a) The resignation of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Sharett, who exerted some moderating influence on Ben Gurion, who originated and has been promoting his policy of "massive retaliation;"
- (b) The defence co-ordination negotiations, which, in the last year, have been conducted between Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, all directed specifically against Israel;
- (c) The Suez Canal crisis.

3. Some of the possible reasons for this attack are:-

- (a) An increasing lack of confidence by Israel in the United Nations' ability to do anything substantial in the way of promoting co-existence between Israel and the Arab States;
- (b) A sense of frustration at not being able to use its military superiority to solve its political problems or achieve the limited objective of destroying its Arab enemies;
- (c) That this is the most propitious time to initiate a "second round" against the Arabs for the following reasons:-
 - (i) that Israel must take preventive measures against Egypt before it has had time to assimilate Soviet bloc aid;
 - (ii) pre-occupation of Egypt with the Suez Canal dispute and the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the vicinity of the Israeli border to the Suez Canal area; 6
 - (iii) that because of the West's pre-occupation with the Suez Canal crisis, Israel can act with impunity;

/ (iv) the ...

Mr Bellington

- (iv) the fear that Jordan may soon dis-integrate leaving a vacuum to be filled, possibly by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Possible Effects

4. Israel's attack on Egypt may have the following effects:-

- (a) It will clearly incite Arab hostility against Israel, which is already at a high pitch, and will unite the Arab States behind Egypt;
- (b) the Security Council will, in all probability, be seized of the issue. Egypt may take the initiative with a view to enhancing its position with the West in the context of the Suez Canal dispute;
- (c) Nasser may decide to extend hostilities by invoking the defence pacts Egypt has concluded with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This would have for Nasser the desirable effect of diverting attention at home from the Suez Canal dispute and quelling unrest in the Egyptian Army, which for some time has been spoiling for an attack on Israel;
- (d) Egypt may call upon the United Kingdom, the United States and France to honour their Tripartite Declaration of 1950 under which they undertook to prevent violation of the frontiers or armistice lines between the Arab States and Israel;
- (e) It may entitle the United Kingdom to reactivate the Suez Canal base in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, but in view of the present stage of "negotiations" with Egypt over the Suez Canal dispute this is hardly feasible.
- (f) If hostilities threaten Jordan, it may enable the United Kingdom to retrieve, or at least improve, its position in Jordan by acting under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948;
- (g) If the Russians are consistent, they can be expected to come down on the side of the Arabs.

Treaty Complex

5. This attack on Egypt may bring into effect a number of treaties in relation to the following countries:-

Syria-Saudi Arabia-Yemen:

6. Egypt can immediately invoke its bilateral treaties with Syria and Saudi Arabia, and the Jeddah Pact (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). Under each of these treaties, any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of the signatories is to be regarded as an attack on the other signatories.

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

Jordan:

7. Egypt could call upon Jordan to co-ordinate their military plans under the Egyptian-Jordanian Pact signed in May 1956. So far as we are aware, this Pact does not include a provision that an attack on one shall be regarded as an attack on the other.

Iraq-Jordan:

8. Iraq has already stationed troops and planes on the Jordanian border and has undertaken to send them into Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack on that country.

United Kingdom-Jordan:

9. In the event of Jordan becoming involved in hostilities, the United Kingdom might find itself called upon by Jordan to honour the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance of 1948. Article 3 provides that "should either party become engaged in war, the other high contracting party will immediately come to his aid as a measure of collective defence." This undertaking is made subject to the condition that it shall not in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve on either party under the United Nations Charter or other existing international commitments.

United Kingdom-Egypt:

10. The interesting position arises that, as a result of this armed attack on Egypt, the United Kingdom could, under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base signed in October 1954, claim the right to reactivate the base.

11. Article 4 provides that "in the event of an armed attack by an outside power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the (Arab League Defence Pact) or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the base on a war footing and operate it effectively."

United Kingdom-France-United States of America:

12. The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have declared in their Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 that:- "the three Governments should they find that any of these States (i.e. the Arab States and Israel) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, consistent with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, shall immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation."

Action in the Security Council

13. The Security Council at present has two complaints before it: one by Jordan relating to alleged attacks by Israel on 25/26th September and 15th October and a counter-complaint by Israel charging Jordan with persistent violations of the Armistice Agreement and the cease-fire pledge given the Secretary-General of the United Nations during his mission to the Middle East last April/May.

/ The Council

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET

14. The Council took up the Jordanian complaint on 19th October when preliminary statements were made. There was further discussion on 25th October when the Council adjourned to enable the Secretary-General to give his views on the situation. It is expected that the Council will again meet on this matter either to-day or later this week.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

OA:VA

O. 14462

Sent: 30th October, 1956
1245

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2519. CONFIDENTIAL. EMERGENCY.

Israel - Egypt.

Please give us immediately United Kingdom appreciation of Israeli invasion and United Kingdom intentions so far as they have been decided. What is their assessment of their obligations under tripartite declaration?

MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

(Cost £4.11.8)
30th October, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
MT

G

CONFIDENTIAL

2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

I. 14452.

JERC:OA.

Sent: 30th October, 1956.
0943.

FROM:

Recd: 30th October, 1956.
2045.

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

261. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

From Cutler.

Latest Middle East events, particularly Israel troop mobilisation, have resulted in a State Department's warning to American citizens. The Foreign Office have taken similar action. In view of your instruction to keep in close touch with the British Ambassador and your authority for me to use my discretion, plus the time factor, I have reaffirmed my advice of 10th September to Australians in Egypt. Copy of letter of 10th September is held by you. Copy of present advice will be included in next bag. Tel Aviv, London Washington, informed. My personal assessment is that the Israel/Arab situation is indeed grave but the physical threat to Australian citizens in Egypt is not as acute as it was on 10th September.

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
I.N'S.

30th October, 1956.

SEC A/SS L&T(DIV.5) UN AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL CIP ADMIN
PERS.

SECRET